

SELECT PASSAGES
ON
DUTY TO THE STATE
AND KINDRED SUBJECTS

FOR READING, ANALYSIS, AND TRANSLATION
IN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

ARRANGED BY
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GENERAL PREFACE

THE following extracts have been chosen with a view to emphasizing the duty which we owe to the State and to one another. After endless generations of social life some degree of self-sacrifice for the good of the State is natural perhaps to all civilized members of the human race. Speaking generally, only those who have sacrificed something survive in their sons and daughters; so that with the generations the social tendency should become through the force of heredity more and more deeply imbued in our nature. In normal civilized men and women the capacity for practical devotion to the State is great, even in those who usually speak in terms of cynical individualism. The old indeed are set in the ways of their prime, and if in their earlier days the natural generosity and enthusiasm of youth remained undeveloped, perhaps these motives may have been quelled in them for ever. But my belief is that acquaintance, and especially an early acquaintance, with the ardent thoughts of writers who have felt the call of the social life, and have spoken worthily of it, is itself generally sufficient to kindle a flame in hearts which have not already become indurated, from whatever cause. It is with this belief that I offer the following Selection, gathered from writers differing in everything save the one perennial conviction, common to all lands and times, that we, and all that we hold dear, live by others, and to love

and protect our neighbours is an essential part of duty and of religion. The extracts deal with many aspects of social life, and will, I think, be found to possess a very varied interest. I have divided them into two series or four parts, graduated according to difficulty, to suit the needs of readers of all capacities above the most elementary. Almost all the passages will, I think, be found well worth reading as literature, as well as for their matter.

The titles used for the extracts in this volume are not to be attributed to the authors themselves. I have selected them as far as practicable from the actual words of the text. When this did not seem to me possible I have kept as close as I could to the leading idea of the passage. In all cases the titles have been chosen chiefly with a view to their serving as an index of the chief subjects touched upon in this Selection. In a very few cases I have thought it desirable to add explanatory phrases to the text, and these it seemed most convenient to print as footnotes.

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J. G. JENNINGS.

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FIRST SERIES

PART I

1. PLAY THY PART.

REMEMBER that thou playest a part whichever the Master wishes; short, if he wishes it short; long, if he wishes it long. If he wishes thee to act the part of a beggar, see that thou actest it with a good grace; or a cripple, or a ruler, or a simple citizen. For this is thy affair, to play well the part given; but to choose it is another's.

EPICTETUS: *Manual*.

2. PUNISHMENT.

‘Do this; don’t do that; otherwise I will throw thee into prison!’ This is not like ruling rational beings. But say rather: ‘As God hath ordered, so do; for if thou dost not so, thou wilt pay the penalty and suffer harm!’ What sort of harm? No other harm than not to have done what thou shouldst have done; whereby thou wilt lose thy good faith, thy modesty, thy rightly ordered life. Seek for no greater harms than these.

EPICTETUS: *Discourses*.

3. IGNORANCE.

If anyone is able to convince me and prove to me that I do not think or act rightly, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever harmed. But he is harmed who remains in self-deception and ignorance.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

4. SELF-INJURY.

He, who transgresses, transgresses against himself. He, who is unjust, does injustice to himself, for he makes himself evil.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

5. THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR.

As man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of the Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not used to consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought of that the universe should be the object of benevolence to such creatures as we are. . . . The object is too vast. For this reason moral writers also have substituted a less general object for our benevolence, mankind. But this likewise is an object too general, and very much out of our view. Therefore persons more practical have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the principle of virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform love of our country; and this is what we call a public spirit, which in men of public stations is the character of a patriot. But this is speaking to the upper part of the world. Kingdoms and governments are large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of mankind is much narrower than the government they live under: . . . common men do not consider their actions as affecting the whole community of which they are members. There plainly is wanting a less general and nearer object of benevolence for the bulk of men than that of their country. Therefore the Scripture, not being a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety put* the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our

* Based.

country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and with which we have to do.

JOSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham:
Human Nature, and Other Sermons.

6. RISE, WRESTLE AGAIN.

Do not despair of thyself, do not behave like those mean persons who having once yielded give themselves up altogether and are swept away as though by a flood. But learn what they do who train boys to wrestle. Has the boy fallen: 'Rise', say they, 'wrestle again, till thou art strong'. And so do thou behave! For know that nothing is more susceptible to training than the human soul. Thou needest but to will, and the thing is done, the soul is set right; as, on the contrary, thou needest but to fall a-nodding, and it is lost. For from within come both ruin and help.

EPICTETUS: *Discourses.*

7. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgment with which it is anywhere directed or applied, seem to have been the effect of the division of labour. . . .

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture, but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry make one pin in a day and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws

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out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which in some manufactories are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

ADAM SMITH *The Wealth of Nations.*

8. THE BEE.

That which is not of advantage to the swarm, is no advantage to the bee.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations.*

9. CO-OPERATION.

Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live in a very distant part of the country! How much commerce and navigation in particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world! What a variety of labour too is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house, the brick-maker, the bricklayer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in order to produce them. Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the different

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parts of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps by a long sea and a long land carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the light and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these northern parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the tools of all the different workmen employed in producing those different conveniences; if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even according to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated.

ADAM SMITH: *The Wealth of Nations*.

10. FOR ONE ANOTHER.

Men are born for the sake of one another. Either teach them then, or bear with them.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

11. THE DEFENCE OF SOCIETY.

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more

expensive as the society advances in civilization. The military force of the society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense either in time of peace or in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire-arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrow, a cannon or a mortar than a balista or a catapulta. The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked up again, and were besides of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta, and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery too, over that of the ancients, is very great, it has become much more difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town so as to resist even for a few weeks the attack of that superior artillery. In modern times, many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

In modern war, the great expense of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expense; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized,

over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times, the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times, the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.

ADAM SMITH *The Wealth of Nations*.

12. THE CHARACTER OF A CITIZEN.

Thou art a citizen of the world and a part of it; and not one of the servants but one of the leaders, for thou art capable of comprehending the divine government and of reflecting upon the orderly development of the universe. What then is the sign of a citizen? To hold nothing as one's personal advantage; to determine about nothing as though one were detached from society, just as a hand or a foot, if these had reasoning power and could comprehend the constitution of nature, would never be impelled towards or grasp at anything otherwise than with reference to the whole body.

EPICETUS: *Discourses*.

13. GOOD MANNERS.

The basis of good manners is self-reliance. . . . Those who are not self-possessed, obtrude, and pain us. Some men appear to feel that they belong to a Pariah caste. They fear to offend, they bend and apologize, and walk through life with a timid step. As we sometimes dream that we are in a well-dressed company without any coat, so Godfrey acts ever as if he suffered from some mortifying circumstance. The hero should find himself at home, wherever he is; should impart comfort by his own security and good-nature to all beholders. The hero is suffered to be himself. A person of strong mind comes to perceive

that for him an immunity is secured so long as he renders to society that service which is native and proper to him.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON. *The Conduct of Life.*

14. WILL.

Thou art not flesh, and hair, but Will. If thou keepest this fair, then wilt thou be beautiful.

EPIOTETUS: *Discourses.*

15. FACES NEVER LIE.

Human character evermore publishes itself. The most fugitive deed and word, the mere air of doing a thing, the intimated purpose, expresses character. If you act, you show character; if you sit still, if you sleep, you show it. You think because you have spoken nothing when others spoke, and have given no opinion on the times, on the church, on slavery, on marriage, on socialism, on secret societies, on the college, on parties and persons, that your verdict is still expected with curiosity as a reserved wisdom. Far otherwise; your silence answers very loud. You have no oracle to utter, and your fellow-men have learned that you cannot help them; for oracles speak. Doth not wisdom cry, and understanding put forth her voice?

Dreadful limits are set in nature to the powers of dissimulation. Truth tyrannizes over the unwilling members of the body. Faces never lie, it is said. No man need be deceived, who will study the changes of expression. When a man speaks the truth in the spirit of truth, his eye is as clear as the heavens. When he has base ends, and speaks falsely, the eye is muddy and sometimes asquint.

I have heard an experienced counsellor say that he never feared the effect upon a jury of a lawyer who does not believe in his heart that his client ought to have a verdict. If he does not believe it, his unbelief will appear to the jury, despite all his protestations, and will become

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their unbelief. This is that law whereby a work of art, of whatever kind, sets us in the same state of mind wherein the artist was when he made it. That which we do not believe, we cannot adequately say, though we may repeat the words never so often.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON. *Essays*.

16. TROUBLE.

To-day I got away out of all trouble, or rather I cast all trouble out; for it was not outside me, but within, in my opinions.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

17. LIFE WITHIN THE HOME.

The life within the family has a deep effect on the whole moral nature. It supplies it with relations, so close and so varied, that they foster in turn all the feelings of sympathy, and fill us with a deep sense of its peculiar charm. A series of ties, first those which are formed for us, then those which we select—dispose our nature to become one as it were with the only beings whom any of us ever truly know. They, to whom this opportunity of seeing into the secret hearts of those about us is denied, may often doubt that it is possible; but that it is actually realized by many of us must be clear to anyone who reflects calmly on the difficulties and the circumstances which surround it. A cold and critical temper is far from being the best guide to enable us to judge the true character of natures, so complex as those of man. They who reproach love with so often being blind, forget that hatred is always blind; and with results far more fatal. The truth is, on the contrary, that were it not that we habitually see those who belong to us through the eyes of affection, we should never do full justice to their best qualities. And, again, it is just this habitual sense of mutual love which makes those qualities shine out with a strength, such as nothing

but this close intimacy could produce. We need not always accept the judgment which the wife, the mother, or the son, may form of those dear to them; but we must remember that they are drawn from sources of knowledge, to which the eye of a stranger has no access. Thus the life within the Home, the great end of which is to foster the affections and sympathies, gives us the most difficult and the most precious of all the subjects of knowledge, the knowledge of human nature.

AUGUSTE COMTE: *System of Positive Polity*
(C. T. Gorham's *Great French Rationalists*).

18. FORBEARANCE.

Have we not, by our nature, modesty? 'We have'. Is he who loses this not damaged, is he deprived of nothing, does he not lose something which belongs to him? Have we not, by our nature, a certain faithfulness, affection, desire to benefit each other, and forbearance towards each other? Whosoever then permits himself to be damaged in these, will he be unharmed and uninjured? 'What then', says one, 'should I not harm him who has harmed me?' First look what harm is, and remember what thou hast heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in a state of the will, and evil consists therein likewise, see whether what thou art saying is not this, 'What, since that man has harmed himself by doing an injustice to me, should I not also harm myself and do an injustice to him?'

EPICTETUS *Discourses*.

19. SERVICEABLENESS.

I have already alluded to the difference hitherto existing between regiments of men associated for purposes of violence, and for purposes of manufacture; in that the former appear capable of self-sacrifice—the latter, not; which singular fact is the real reason of the general lowness of estimate in which the profession of commerce is held,

as compared with that of arms. Philosophically, it does not, at first sight, appear reasonable (many writers have endeavoured to prove it unreasonable) that a peaceable and rational person, whose trade is buying and selling, should be held in less honour than an unpeaceable and often irrational person, whose trade is slaying. Nevertheless, the consent of mankind has always, in spite of the philosophers, given precedence to the soldier.

And this is right.

For the soldier's trade, verily and essentially, is not slaying, but being slain. This, without well knowing its own meaning, the world honours it for. A bravo's trade is slaying; but the world has never respected bravos more than merchants: the reason it honours the soldier is because he holds his life at the service of the State. Reckless he may be—fond of pleasure or of adventure—all kinds of bye-motives and mean impulses may have determined the choice of his profession, and may affect (to all appearance exclusively) his daily conduct in it; but our estimate of him is based on this ultimate fact—of which we are well assured—that, put him in a fortress breach, with all the pleasures of the world behind him, and only death and his duty in front of him, he will keep his face to the front; and he knows that this choice may be put to him at any moment, and has beforehand taken his part—virtually takes such part continually—does, in reality, die daily.

Not less is the respect we pay to the lawyer and physician founded ultimately on their self-sacrifice. Whatever the learning or acuteness of a great lawyer, our chief respect for him depends on our belief that, set in a judge's seat, he will strive to judge justly, come of it what may. Could we suppose that he would take bribes, and use his acuteness and legal knowledge to give plausibility to iniquitous decisions, no degree of intellect would win for him our respect. Nothing will win it, short of our tacit conviction,

that in all important acts of his life justice is first with him; his own interest, second.

In the case of a physician, the ground of the honour we render him is clearer still. Whatever his science, we should shrink from him in horror if we found him regard his patients merely as subjects to experiment upon; much more, if we found that, receiving bribes from persons interested in their deaths, he was using his best skill to give poison in the mask of medicine.

Finally, the principle holds with utmost clearness as it respects clergymen. No goodness of disposition will excuse want of science in a physician, or of shrewdness in an advocate; but a clergyman, even though his power of intellect be small, is respected on the presumed ground of his unselfishness and serviceableness.

JOHN RUSKIN *Unto this Last.*

20. REWARDS.

When thou hast done a kindness and another has received it, why seek for a third thing besides, as the foolish do, to get the credit of having done it, or to obtain a return ?

MARCUS AURELIUS *Meditations.*

21. A RULE FOR MERCHANTS.

In his office as governor of the men employed by him, the merchant or manufacturer is invested with a distinctly paternal authority and responsibility. In most cases, a youth entering a commercial establishment is withdrawn altogether from home influence; his master must become his father, else he has, for practical and constant help, no father at hand: in all cases the master's authority, together with the general tone and atmosphere of his business, and the character of the men with whom the youth is compelled in the course of it to associate, have more immediate and pressing weight than the home influence, and will usually

neutralize it either for good or evil; so that the only means which the master has of doing justice to the men employed by him is to ask himself sternly whether he is dealing with such subordinate as he would with his own son, if compelled by circumstances to take such a position.

Supposing the captain of a frigate saw it right, or were by any chance obliged, to place his own son in the position of a common sailor; as he would then treat his son, he is bound always to treat every one of the men under him. So, also, supposing the master of a manufactory saw it right, or were by any chance obliged, to place his own son in the position of an ordinary workman; as he would then treat his son he is bound always to treat every one of his men. This is the only effective, true, or practical RULE which can be given on this point of political economy.

And as the captain of a ship is bound to be the last man to leave his ship in case of wreck, and to share his last crust with the sailors in case of famine, so the manufacturer, in any commercial crisis or distress, is bound to take the suffering of it with his men, and even to take more of it for himself than he allows his men to feel, as a father would in a famine, shipwreck, or battle, sacrifice himself for his son.

All which sounds very strange: the only real strangeness in the matter being, nevertheless, that it should so sound.

JOHN RUSKIN: *Unto this Last*.

22. REWARD.

Knowest thou not that a good man does nothing for the sake of seeming, but what he does is for the sake of doing right? 'What then', says one, 'is the advantage to him of doing right?' And what is the advantage to one who writes the name Dion as he ought to write it? 'To have written it correctly'. Is that then no reward? And dost thou seek for a good man a reward greater than the doing of what is right and just?

EPICETUS: *Discourses*.

23. PLOUGH AND NEEDLE.

The first requirement for the happiness of a nation is that it should understand the function in this world of these two great instruments: a happy nation may be defined as one in which the husband's hand is on the plough, and the housewife's on the needle; so in due time reaping its golden harvest, and shining in golden vesture: and an unhappy nation is one which, acknowledging no use of plough nor needle, will assuredly at last find its store-house empty in the famine, and its breast naked to the cold.

Perhaps you think this is a mere truism, which I am wasting your time in repeating. I wish it were.

By far the greater part of the suffering and crime which exist at this moment . . . arises simply from people not understanding this truism—not knowing that produce or wealth is eternally connected by the laws of heaven and earth with resolute labour; but hoping in some way to cheat or abrogate this everlasting law of life, and to feed where they have not furrowed, and be warm where they have not woven.

I repeat, nearly all our misery and crime result from this one misapprehension. The law of nature is, that a certain quantity of work is necessary to produce a certain quantity of good, of any kind whatever. If you want knowledge, you must toil for it: if food, you must toil for it; and if pleasure, you must toil for it. But men do not acknowledge this law, or strive to evade it, hoping to get their knowledge, and food, and pleasure for nothing; and in this effort they either fail of getting them, and remain ignorant and miserable, or they obtain them by making other men work for their benefit; and then they are tyrants and robbers. Yes, and worse than robbers. I am not one who in the least doubts or disputes the progress of this century in many things useful to mankind; but it seems to

me a very dark sign respecting us that we look with so much indifference upon dishonesty and cruelty in the pursuit of wealth.

JOHN RUSKIN: *The Work of Iron.*

24. Loss.

If instead of a man, a patient and social being, thou become a wild beast, harmful, plotting, and biting, hast thou lost nothing? But thou forsooth must needs lose a piece of money, in order to be damaged! And does the loss of nothing else damage a human being? . . . And if thou hast lost modesty, and self-control, and patience, dost thou consider the affair as nothing?

EPICTETUS: *Discourses.*

25. HONOURABLE RESTRAINT.

Wise laws and just restraints are to a noble nation not chains, but chain mail—strength and defence, though something also of an incumbrance. And this necessity of restraint, remember, is just as honourable to man as the necessity of labour. You hear every day greater numbers of foolish people speaking about liberty, as if it were such an honourable thing: so far from being that, it is, on the whole, and in the broadest sense, dishonourable, and an attribute of the lower creatures. No human being, however great, or powerful, was ever so free as a fish. There is always something that he must, or must not do; while the fish may do whatever he likes. All the kingdoms of the world put together are not half so large as the sea, and all the railroads and wheels that ever were, or will be, invented are not so easy as fins. You will find, on fairly thinking of it, that it is his Restraint which is honourable to man, not his Liberty; and, what is more, it is restraint which is honourable even in the lower animals. A butterfly is much more free than a bee; but you honour the bee more, just because it is subject to certain laws which fit it for

orderly function in bee society. And throughout the world, of the two abstract things, liberty and restraint, restraint is always the more honourable. It is true, indeed, that in these and all other matters you never can reason finally from the abstraction, for both liberty and restraint are good when they are nobly chosen, and both are bad when they are basely chosen; but of the two, I repeat, it is restraint which characterizes the higher creature, and betters the lower creature: and, from the ministering of the archangel to the labour of the insect,—from the poisoning of the planets to the gravitation of a grain of dust,—the power and glory of all creatures, and all matter, consist in their obedience, not in their freedom.

JOHN RUSKIN *The Work of Iron.*

26. FINDING FAULT.

‘But’, thou mayst say, ‘some things in life are disagreeable and hard. . . .’ Come, hast thou not received powers by which thou mayst bear all that befalls? Hast thou not received greatness of heart? Hast thou not received courage? Hast thou not received endurance? And if I am great-hearted, what care have I for anything that can arise? What shall put me out or perturb me, and what shall seem grievous to me? Shall I not use the power for that purpose for which I have received it, but, instead, wail and groan over what arises? ‘Well, but my nose runs’. Wherefore hast thou hands, slave? Is it not that thou mayst wipe it? ‘But is it reasonable that there should be such things as nose-runnings in this universe?’ And how much better is it to wipe thy nose than to accuse the universe?

EPICTETUS *Discourses.*

27. THE COMPANY OF BOOKS.

You will admit, doubtless, that according to the sincerity of our desire that our friends may be true, and our

companions wise,—and in proportion to the earnestness and discretion with which we choose both, will be the general chances of our happiness and usefulness.

But, granting that we had both the will and the sense to choose our friends well, how few of us have the power ! or, at least, how limited, for most, is the sphere of choice ! Nearly all our associations are determined by chance, or necessity; and restricted within a narrow circle. We cannot know whom we would; and those whom we know, we cannot have at our side when we most need them. All the higher circles of human intelligence are, to those beneath, only momentarily and partially open. We may, by good fortune, obtain a glimpse of a great poet, and hear the sound of his voice; or put a question to a man of science, and be answered good-humouredly. We may intrude ten minutes' talk on a cabinet minister, answered probably with words worse than silence, being deceptive; or snatch, once or twice in our lives, the privilege of throwing a bouquet in the path of a Princess, or arresting the kind glance of a Queen. And yet these momentary chances we covet; and spend our years, and passions, and powers in pursuit of little more than these; while, meantime, there is a society continually open to us, of people who will talk to us as long as we like, whatever our rank or occupation;—talk to us in the best words they can choose, and with thanks if we listen to them. And this society, because it is so numerous and so gentle,—and can be kept waiting round us all day long, not to grant audience, but to gain it;—kings and statesmen lingering patiently in those plainly furnished and narrow anterooms, our bookcase shelves,—we make no account of that company,—perhaps never listen to a word they would say, all day long !

You may tell me, perhaps, or think within yourselves, that the apathy with which we regard this company of the noble, who are praying us to listen to them, and the

passion with which we pursue the company, probably of the ignoble, who despise us, or who have nothing to teach us, are grounded in this,—that we see the faces of the living men, and it is themselves, and not their sayings, with which we desire to become familiar. But it is not so. Suppose you never were to see their faces;—suppose you could be put behind a screen in the statesman's cabinet, or the prince's chamber, would you not be glad to listen to their words, though you were forbidden to advance beyond the screen? And when the screen is only a little less, folded in two, instead of four, and you can be hidden behind the cover of the two boards that bind a book, and listen, all day long, not to the casual talk, but to the studied, determined, chosen addresses of the wisest men;—this station of audience, and honourable privy council, you despise!

JOHN RUSKIN: *Sesame and Lilies*.

28. LEARNING AND PRACTICE.

Each man is strengthened and preserved in his character by consistent work; the carpenter by carpenter's work, the grammarian by grammarian's work. And if the latter accustomed himself to write ungrammatically, his art would necessarily perish and come to destruction. Thus works of modesty preserve, and those of immodesty destroy, the modest man; deeds of good faith preserve, and their opposites destroy, the faithful man. And, again, the characters of men the opposites of the above are strengthened by deeds similarly opposite; the shameless by shameless action, the faithless by faithless action, the abusive by abuse, the angry by anger, the avaricious by takings that are not consistent with givings. On this account the philosophers exhort us not to be satisfied with merely learning of the virtues, but to add to this also exercise in them, and thence their habitual practice.

EPICTETUS: *Discourses*.

29. VIRTUE AND HEALTH.

If virtue depend on a number of good instincts or qualities in the agent's mind or heart—benevolence, sympathy, courage, and resolution—it would seem obvious that no one could be benefited by these particular endowments more than the fortunate owner of them himself. Who derives so much enjoyment from a fine ear for music as the musician who has one? Who profits by an exquisite sense of colour so much as the artist whom land, sea, and cloud keep in an ecstasy of delight? Much more, would one say, must the generous and passionate emotions of the heart supply an inward fountain of happiness to the richly endowed natures which possess them. To ask if virtue answers, or 'pays,' is like asking if fine health and bodily strength pay. Probably no one would be without them if he could help it. And yet there can be no doubt that great strength and fine health often lead their possessor into pain, and even death, by tempting him to overtax his powers. It may be said of all the higher qualities and gifts, that under certain conditions they are capable of causing as much pain as pleasure to their owners; but these owners do not wish, therefore, to be rid of them. The musician who is tortured by an organ out of tune would never think of purchasing peace by the loss or destruction of his musical ear. It is the same with regard to Friendship and Love: Their betrayal probably produces anguish as keen as any known to the human heart. But no one capable of either would ever regret his capacity for love and friendship.

JAMES COTTER MORISON *The Service of Man.*

30. SLAVERY AND RELEASE.

Lift up thy neck at last as one released from slavery! Dare to say, as thou lookest up to God,—‘Henceforward use me as Thou wilt; I am of one mind with Thee; I am Thine; I beg off nothing that seems right to Thee; where

Thou wishest, lead me; clothe me in what dress Thou wilt. Dost Thou wish me to be a ruler or a simple citizen, to stay at home or be an exile; to be poor or to be rich? I will speak for Thee before men in defence of all these conditions; I will show the nature of each of these as it is'

EPICETUS *Discourses*.

31. LOVE OF ANIMALS.

There is one other class of legends to which I desire to advert. I mean those which describe the connection between saints and the animal world. These legends are, I think, worthy of special notice in moral history, as representing probably the first, and at the same time one of the most striking efforts ever made in Christendom to inculcate a feeling of kindness and pity towards the brute creation. In Pagan antiquity, considerable steps had been made to raise this form of humanity to a recognized branch of ethics. The way had been prepared by numerous anecdotes growing for the most part out of simple ignorance of natural history, which all tended to diminish the chasm between men and animals, by representing the latter as possessing to a very high degree both moral and rational qualities. Elephants, it was believed, were endowed not only with reason and benevolence, but also with reverential feelings. They worshipped the sun and moon, and in the forests of Mauritania they were accustomed to assemble every new moon, at a certain river, to perform religious rites. The hippopotamus taught men the medicinal value of bleeding, being accustomed, when affected by plethory, to bleed itself with a thorn, and afterwards close the wound with slime. Pelicans committed suicide to feed their young; and bees, when they had broken the laws of their sovereign. A temple was erected at Sestos to commemorate the affection of an eagle which loved a young girl, and upon her death cast itself in despair into the flames by which her body was consumed. Numerous

anecdotes are related of faithful dogs which refused to survive their masters, and one of these had, it was said, been transformed into the dog-star. The dolphin, especially, became the subject of many beautiful legends, and its affection for its young, for music, and above all for little children, excited the admiration not only of the populace, but of the most distinguished naturalists. Many philosophers ascribed to animals a rational soul, like that of man. According to the Pythagoreans, human souls transmigrate after death into animals. According to the Stoics and others, the souls of men and animals were alike parts of the all-pervading Divine Spirit that animates the world.

We may even find traces from an early period of a certain measure of legislative protection for animals. By a very natural process, the ox, as a principal agent in agriculture, and therefore a kind of symbol of civilization, was in many different countries regarded with a peculiar reverence. The sanctity attached to it in Egypt is well known. That tenderness to animals, which is one of the most beautiful features in the Old Testament writings, shows itself, among other ways, in the command not to muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn, or to yoke together the ox and the ass. Among the early Romans, the same feeling was carried so far, that for a long time it was actually a capital offence to slaughter an ox, that animal being pronounced, in a special sense, the fellow-labourer of man. A similar law is said to have in early times existed in Greece. The beautiful passage in which the Psalmist describes how the sparrow could find shelter and a home in the altar of the temple, was as applicable to Greece as to Jerusalem. The sentiment of Xenocrates who, when a bird pursued by a hawk took refuge in his breast, caressed and finally released it, saying to his disciples, that a good man should never give up a suppliant, was believed to be shared by the gods, and it was regarded as an act of impiety to disturb the birds who had built their nests beneath the porticoes of

the temple. A case is related of a child who was even put to death on account of an act of aggravated cruelty to birds.

The general tendency of nations, as they advance from a rude and warlike to a refined and peaceful condition, from the stage in which the realizing powers are faint and dull, to that in which they are sensitive and vivid, is undoubtedly to become more gentle and humane in their actions; but this, like all other general tendencies in history, may be counteracted or modified by many special circumstances. The law I have mentioned about oxen was obviously one of those that belong to a very early stage of progress, when legislators are labouring to form agricultural habits among a warlike and nomadic people. The games in which the slaughter of animals bore so large a part, having been introduced but a little before the extinction of the republic,* did very much to arrest or retard the natural progress of humane sentiments. In ancient Greece, besides the bull-fights of Thessaly, the combats of quails and cocks were favourite amusements, and were much encouraged by the legislators, as furnishing examples of valour to the soldiers. The colossal dimensions of the Roman games, the circumstances that favoured them, and the overwhelming interest they speedily excited, I have described in a former chapter. We have seen, however, that, notwithstanding the gladiatorial shows, the standard of humanity towards men was considerably raised during the empire.† It is also well worthy of notice that, notwithstanding the passion for the combats of wild beasts, Roman literature and the later literature of the nations subject to Rome abound in delicate touches displaying in a very high degree a sensitiveness to the feelings of the animal world. This tender interest in animal life is one of the most distinctive features of the poetry of Virgil.

WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY.
The History of European Morals.

* The Roman republic.

† Of Rome.

32. GRATUITOUS TEACHING.

A very direct form of intellectual charity is that of gratuitous teaching, both in classes and by public lecture, open to all comers. A great deal of light has in this way been spread abroad in cities, but in country villages there is little encouragement to enterprises of this kind, the intelligence of farm labourers being less awakened than that of the corresponding urban population. Let us remember, however, that one of the very highest and last achievements of the cultivated intellect is the art of conveying to the uncultivated, the untaught, the unprepared, the best and noblest knowledge which they are capable of assimilating. No one who, like the writer of these pages, has lived much in the country, and much amongst a densely ignorant peasantry, will be likely in any plans of enlightenment to err far on the side of enthusiastic hopefulness. The mind of a farm labourer, or that of a small farmer, is almost always sure to be a remarkably stiff soil, in which few intellectual conceptions can take root; yet these few may make the difference between an existence worthy of a man, and one that differs from the existence of a brute in little beyond the possession of articulate language. We to whom the rich inheritance of intellectual humanity is so familiar as to have lost much of its freshness, are liable to underrate the value of thoughts and discoveries which to us have for years seemed commonplace. It is with our intellectual as with our material wealth; we do not realize how precious some fragments of it might be to our poorer neighbours. The old clothes that we wear no longer may give comfort and confidence to a man in naked destitution; the truths which are so familiar to us that we never think about them, may raise the utterly ignorant to a sense of their human brotherhood.

Above all, in the exercise of our intellectual charities, let us accustom ourselves to feel satisfied with humble results

and small successes; and here let me make a confession which may be of some possible use to others. When a young man, I taught a drawing-class gratuitously, beginning with thirty-six pupils, who dwindled gradually to eleven. Soon afterwards I gave up the work from dissatisfaction, on account of the meagre attendance. This was very wrong—the eleven were worth the thirty-six; and so long as one of the eleven remained I ought to have contentedly taught him. The success of a teacher is not to be measured by the numbers whom he immediately influences. It is enough, it has been proved to be enough in more than one remarkable instance, that a single living soul should be in unison with the soul of a master, and receive his thought by sympathy. The one disciple teaches in his turn, and the idea is propagated.

PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON:
The Intellectual Life.

33. THE SPIRIT OF LOVE.

You have that fine expression of St. Paul's, 'In Him we live, move, and have our being'. But it is the great distinguishing feature of Hinduism that it teaches with greater emphasis than any other religion the immanence of God,—call it higher Pantheism as Tennyson said, call it anything you like,—but it is the idea that God is here, there and everywhere. Europe is now trying to lay emphasis on the doctrine of the immanence of God; all European philosophers, all great religionists, all great teachers are now realizing more than ever the one fact that God is everywhere, in our hearts and in ourselves. To the people of this country this belief is not new; but it must be not a mere belief, it must be a conviction entering into the whole purpose of our lives. Otherwise the spirit of self-assertion, which is conspicuous just now in all the movements, in our social, political, industrial reforms and other activities, will kill us and will land us in darkness. While we are

in a way by means of our great books teaching Europe this idea of the immanence of God we have to learn from the West another idea, which is a dominating feature of Christianity; while we are giving to Christians this idea of the immanence of God, Christians have given to us the idea of the doctrine of love on which Christ has founded the religion He preached. This idea of brotherhood of man, you find also in Hindu religious books, the Mahabharat, the Bhagwadgîta, and Buddha proclaimed it with great emphasis. On account of the inherent defects of Hinduism, arising from caste, the spirit of love, the spirit of charity, as Christ and Buddha understood it, has not formed its predominant feature. While we are talking of nationality, there is no oneness of spirit, because love has not formed the distinguishing mark of present-day Hindu religion. We have therefore to borrow from the Christian Religion and from Buddhism the spirit of love. If we will only realize the fact that this spirit of love ought to be the guiding principle of every one of us, if we will go to all the religions and draw from them this spirit of charity and bring it to bear upon all our activities and our doings, this darkness which is facing us just now will become the dawn of an ampler day.

SIR NARAYAN G. CHANDAVARKAR.
Speeches and Writings.

34. WHEN DUTIES CLASH.

Man may be called on by his duty to the State to sacrifice his duties to his community, his family, himself. Or his duty to his family may oblige him to disobey his duty to the State. He must exercise his judgment and his will. His consciousness of what is right, his conscience, must develop. He must learn to know what in each case is the right path to take.

Thus a man's progress higher is a series of subordinations of a smaller self to a higher, wider self; each step is a lesson

in self-denial and self-effacement. Each means a progress too in the power of choice, for as he rises the paths along which he may travel increase, and along each points a finger-post of duty. When duties clash, which is the right one? There is no fixed answer. For he cannot say, 'The less must give way always to the greater'. That is not a truth for always. States are formed of communities and families, and for the State to be healthy so must be the component parts. A duty to the State which caused injury to the parts of which it is built would ruin the State also.

H. FIELDING HALL: *The Inward Light*.*

35. A FAMINE.

So morning after morning dawned upon the weary land; the hot sun shone upon the windswept slopes, the withered grass, the faded palms. For thirteen months there was no rain. And in the famine camps the long silent streams of workers came from out their huts to dig and carry and to live. They were become a ragged folk; their tattered garments fluttered in the wind. They earned enough to eat, and that was all. And every morning down the workers' lines there came the monks in slow procession. They made but a small company—two old and haggard monks preceded by one boy—for some were dead and some were gone. They did not wish to be a burden on a starving land. But the people would not let them all depart. 'Stay with us or we shall forget. And while we live, you shall not die. And if we die, shall we not die together?'

They stayed. And every morning going down the lines they gathered in their bowls enough to live.

The hungry workers kept a little back from their own hunger—a pinch of rice, a fruit.

Surely a famine even is not all bad. It makes for charity, for kinship, and for courage.

* 'Buddhism in Burma.'

The rich West gave from out its plenty to the starving Eastern folk—a charity magnificent.

And the starving people gave from out their poverty to keep their monks alive.

‘For, after all’, they said, ‘the monks are to us a soul, and we were better dead than soulless’.

H. FIELDING HALL: *The Inward Light*.

36. ONENESS.

Man is drawn into wider organisms, to family, community, and nation, and as the tie is strong, so does his power increase. The many little drops become the mountain rill, and many rills the river. It gives men strength and confidence and courage as they are drawn together. In their cohesion, in their fellowship, there is a solace and a power. A thousand men, what are they worth? A thousand grains of sand. They can do nothing till they feel that they are one, animated by one soul, a regiment and not just so many individuals. The strong man is much stronger, the weak is strong, because each feels that he no longer is alone; he has support. If he succeeds, then all succeed, and if he die, he does not die alone. What one man cannot do, a hundred can, working together; and where a hundred fail a nation stands.

Strength, knowledge, courage, all increase as men grow into wider organisms. And more. For what is duty? Our duty to our family, our community, our class, our nation, is the expression of the feeling that we are one. It then becomes clear to us. Duty is not a set of maxims or of rules. It is a sense of oneness; and with that larger ‘oneness’ comes the knowledge of what is right and wrong as regards it. We are not units separate for ever, but parts of wider organisms. We are not shifting grains of sand, but particles in stones built into spires that rise ever towards heaven.

H. FIELDING HALL. *The Inward Light*.

37. THE POWER OF DISCIPLINE.

It is not only that when you get an order you obey it, though it come from so very far away—that is wonderful enough to us—but you obey it willingly. You act as if it was something you wanted to do yourself, something you thought of in yourself for your own advantage. You understand not only what the order says but what it means, almost as if you yourself had said it. You are not servants who obey orders, you are as the hand or foot that acts as the brain designs. You live here widely separated, many thousand miles from your small island, but yet you are not divided from it. You are all held together by nerves in the invisible air that make you one. Therefore your Government is you, not your master, your teacher, your commander, but yourself. You feel as we do about our family and our village, that it is ourselves. That is what we notice and wonder at in you. When we see two or three Englishmen alone governing a great district, you appear to us not individuals but tiny finger-tips of a great living thing whose heart and brain are far away. Yet if the finger-tip be touched the whole responds. And what one of you does, that is the act of the whole.

H. FIELDING HALL. *The Inward Light.*

38. PERTURBATION.

If anyone were to make over thy body to whosoever passed by, thou wouldst be indignant. And when thou makest over thy own judgment to whosoever may chance by, so that, if he reviles thee, it is perturbed and confused, art thou not ashamed of this ?

EPICTETUS: *Manual.*

39. PRAISE.

Everything in any way fair is fair in itself, and is self-dependent, not having as any part of it the praise bestowed

on it. It does not become then either worse or better by being praised. This I affirm even of the things which are more commonly called beautiful, such as material objects and works of art. Then what need of anything has that which is really beautiful? None, whether it be law, or truth, or goodwill, or modesty. Which of these things is fair through being praised, or damaged when blamed? Does an emerald grow worse, if it is not praised? And what is the case with gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a blade, a flower, or plant?

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

40. THE TWO HANDLES.

Every affair has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, and the other by which it cannot be borne. If thy brother does thee an injustice, do not take it in this way, that he is unjust, for this is the handle of it by which it cannot be borne; but take it rather in this way, that he is thy brother, of one origin with thee, and thou wilt be taking it by the handle whereby it may be borne.

EPICETUS. *Manual*.

41. VIRILITY.

Keep as much on thy guard against flattering men as against being angry with them; for both acts are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this thought be ready to hand, in case of anger, that to be in a passion is not manly, but that mildness and patience as they are more human, are also more virile; and that strength, nerve, and courage are with him who has these, not with the man who is enraged and discontented. For the nearer to dispassionateness, the nearer to power; and as distress is characteristic of the weak man, so also is anger. For both the man who is distressed, and the man who is angered, on being hurt give way.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations*.

42. INJUSTICE.

Would you have the goodness also to inform me whether you think that an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another ?

No indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act better ?

Yes.

And this is because from injustice spring divisions and hatreds and fighting, as from justice harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus ?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also, if the effect of injustice is to cause hatred, will not injustice, whether existing among slaves or freemen, make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action ?

Certainly.

And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just ?

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power ?

Let us say that she retains her power.

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and also becomes its own enemy and at variance with all that oppose it, and with the just ? Is not this the case ?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally suicidal when existing in an individual; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just ? Is not that true, Thrasy-machus ?

Yes.

And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just ?

Let us assume that they are.

Then, as the gods are just, he will also be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be the friend of the gods ?

Take your fill of the argument, and fear nothing; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the rest of my feast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of evil-doers ever acting vigorously together is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but there must evidently have been some remnant of justice in them, or they would have injured one another as well as their victims, and they would have been unable to act together; they were but semi-villainous, for had they been whole villains, wholly unjust, they would have been wholly incapable of action.

PLATO. *The Republic* (Benjamin Jowett).

43. FELLOW-SLAVES.

There began at this time to be disseminated among the best and wisest thinkers a sense that slaves were made of the same clay as their masters, that they differed from freeborn men only in the externals and accidents of their position, and that kindness to them and consideration for their difficulties was a common and elementary duty of humanity. 'I am glad to learn', says Seneca, in one of his interesting letters to Lucilius, 'that you live on terms

of familiarity with your slaves; it becomes your prudence and your erudition. Are they slaves? Nay, they are men. Slaves? Nay, companions. Slaves? Nay, humble friends. Slaves? Nay, *fellow-slaves*, if you but consider that fortune has power over you both'. He proceeds to reprobate the haughty and inconsiderate fashion of keeping them standing for hours, mute and fasting, while their masters gorged themselves at the banquet. He deplores the cruelty which thinks it necessary to punish with terrible severity an accidental cough or sneeze. He quotes the proverb—a proverb which reveals a whole history—'So many slaves, so many foes', and proves that they are not foes, but that men *made* them so; whereas when kindly treated, when considerately addressed, they would be silent, even under torture, rather than speak to their master's disadvantage. 'Are they not sprung', he asks, 'from the same origin, do they not breathe the same air, do they not live and die just as we do?' The blows, the broken limbs, the clanking chains, the stinted food of the *ergastula* or slave-prisons, excited all Seneca's compassion, and in all probability presented a picture of misery which the world has rarely seen surpassed, unless it were in that nefarious trade which England to her shame once practised, and, to her eternal glory, resolutely swept away.

DEAN F. W. FARRAR. *Seekers after God.*

44. SLAVERY ITS OWN RETRIBUTION.

One hears with perfect amazement of the number of slaves in the wealthy houses.* A thousand slaves was no extravagant number, and the vast majority of them were idle, uneducated, and corrupt. Treated as little better than animals, they lost much of the dignity of men. Their masters possessed over them the power of life and death, and it is shocking to read of the cruelty with which they were often treated. An accidental murmur, a cough, a

* Of Rome.

sneeze, was punished with rods. Mute, motionless, fasting, the slaves had to stand by while their masters supped. A brutal and stupid barbarity often turned a house into the shambles of an executioner, sounding with scourges, chains, and yells. One evening the Emperor Augustus was supping at the house of Vedius Pollio, when one of the slaves, who was carrying a crystal goblet, slipped down and broke it. Transported with rage Vedius at once ordered the slave to be seized, and plunged into the fish-pond as food to the lampreys. The boy escaped from the hands of his fellow-slaves, and fled to Cæsar's feet to implore, not that his life should be spared—a pardon which he neither expected nor hoped—but that he might die by a mode of death less horrible than being devoured by fishes. Common as it was to torment slaves, and to put them to death, Augustus, to his honour be it spoken, was horrified by the cruelty of Vedius, and commanded both that the slave should be set free, that every crystal vase in the house of Vedius should be broken in his presence, and that the fish-pond should be filled up. Even women inflicted upon their female slaves punishments of the most cruel atrocity for faults of the most venial character. A brooch wrongly placed, a tress of hair ill-arranged, and the enraged matron orders her slave to be lashed and crucified. If her milder husband interferes, she not only justifies the cruelty, but asks in amazement. 'What ! is a slave so much of a human being ?' No wonder that there was a proverb, 'As many slaves, so many foes'. No wonder that many masters lived in perpetual fear, and that 'the tyrant's devilish plea, necessity' might be urged in favour of that odious law which enacted that, if a master was murdered by an unknown hand, the whole body of his slaves should suffer death—a law which more than once was carried into effect under the reigns of the Emperors. Slavery, as we see in the case of Sparta and many other nations, always involves its own retribution.

DEAN F. W. FARRAR: *Seekers after God.*

45. LIVING ACCEPTABLY.

When asked how it was possible to eat in a manner acceptable to the Gods, he said, 'If it is done justly, with good will, equably, with self-mastery, and in orderly fashion, is it not also done in such a way as to please the Gods? And when thou hast called for hot water and thy servant does not obey, or obeys but brings it tepid, or he is even not to be found in the house, then if thou dost not lose thy temper and dost not break out, is not that pleasing to the Gods?' 'But how', says one, 'can anyone bear with such fellows?' Slave, wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is born as a son of the same seed and of the same beginning and origin; but if thou hast been put in some superior place such as that of master, wilt thou straightway constitute thyself a tyrant? Wilt thou not remember what thou art, and whom thou rulest; that they are thy kinsmen, thy brothers by nature, the offspring of Zeus?

EPICETUS: *Discourses*.

46. THE FOOT AND THE BODY.

To the foot I shall say that it is natural for it to be clean; but, if thou takest it as a foot and not as something detached, it will be its duty both to step into the mud and to tread upon thorns, and, if occasion arises, to be cut off for the sake of the whole body of which it is a part; otherwise it will no longer be a foot. We must think some such thing also of ourselves. What art thou? A human being. If thou lookest at thyself as one detached, it is natural to live to an old age, to grow rich, to keep sound health. But if thou lookest at thyself as a human being and part of a certain whole, for the sake of that whole it befits thee now to suffer disease, now to run into danger upon the sea, now to be in want; and, if occasion arises, to die before thy

time. Why then dost thou rage against such a lot ? Dost thou not know that as the foot detached from the body will no longer be a foot, so wilt thou if detached from the social whole no longer be a human being ? For what is a human being ? A part of a State ; first of that City which comprises gods and men, and then of the State, which comes next to it, as they say, and is a little copy of the universe.

EPICETETUS · *Discourses*.

47. AIM HIGH.

Another of the constant precepts of Epictetus is that we should aim high ; we are not to be common threads in the woof of life, but like the laticlave on the robe of a senator, the broad purple stripe which gave lustre and beauty to the whole. But how are we to know that we are qualified for this high function ? How does the bull know, when the lion approaches, that it is his place to expose himself for all the herd ? If we have high powers we shall soon be conscious of them, and if we have them not we may gradually acquire them. Nothing great is produced at once—the vine must blossom, and bear fruit, and ripen, before we have the purple clusters of the grape—‘ first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear ’.

But whence are we to derive this high sense of duty and possible eminence ? Why, if Cæsar had adopted you, would you not show your proud sense of ennoblement in haughty looks ; how is it that you are not proud of being sons of God ? You have, indeed, a body, by virtue of which many men sink into close kinship with pernicious wolves, and savage lions, and crafty foxes, destroying the rational within them, and so becoming greedy cattle or mischievous vermin ; but above and beyond this, ‘ If ’, says Epictetus, ‘ a man have once been worthily interpenetrated with the belief that we all have been in some

special manner born of God, and that God is the Father of gods and men, I think that he will never have any ignoble, any humble thoughts about himself'.

DEAN F. W. FARRAR. *Seekers after God.*

48. PAYMENT.

The same principle, that Nature has assigned to us our proper place—that a task has been given us to perform, and that our only care should be to perform it aright, for the blessing of the great Whole of which we are but insignificant parts—dominates through the admirable precepts which the Emperor* lays down for the regulation of our conduct towards others. Some men, he says, do benefits to others only because they expect a return; some men even, if they do not demand any return, are not forgetful that they have rendered a benefit; but others do not even know what they have done, but *are like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has produced its proper fruit.* So we ought to do good to others as simply and as naturally as a horse runs, or a bee makes honey, or a vine bears grapes season after season, without thinking of the grapes which it has borne. And in another passage, 'What more dost thou want when thou hast done a service to another? Art thou not content to have done an act conformable to thy nature, and must thou seek to be paid for it, just as if the eye demanded a reward for seeing, or the feet for walking?'

DEAN F. W. FARRAR. *Seekers after God.*

49. AN IMPERIAL EXAMPLE.

From my father, the Emperor Antoninus, I had the example of patience, and unshakeable constancy in decisions deliberately made; indifference to seeming honours; laboriousness and tenacity; willingness to hear those who

* Marcus Aurelius.

had anything to say for the common weal; unswerving justice in giving to each his due; and experience, when to insist, when to remit . . .; and consideration for others, excusing friends from compulsion to dine with him or attend him abroad, being always found the same by those who had failed to accompany him because of any necessity; precise investigation in forming plans, and firm adherence to them, but no desisting from inquiry, satisfied with first appearances; constancy with friends, neither tiring, nor doting on them; self-reliance in everything, and cheerfulness; forethought and provision for the least concerns, without any show; discouragement of panegyrics and all forms of flattery; constant watchfulness over the essentials of empire, and management of the expenses, and endurance of the blame which he got for such things; neither superstitious fears of the gods, nor, for men, mob-oratory, subservience, or playing to the crowd; but moderation in all things, steadfastness and nothing mean or flashy; and as for those things which conduce to ease of life, of which plenty comes by fortune, he set an example of use without either vanity or apology, so as to enjoy them freely when there, and not to lack them when not there. . . . Besides this, the honouring of those who were truly philosophers, without disgracing the rest, nor yet being misled by them; being ever sociable and gracious, without cloying; taking reasonable care of the body, not as one clinging to life, nor out of vanity, nor yet careless, but so that, through his own circumspection, he very seldom needed surgeon or drugs or salves; and especially, ungrudging readiness to give way to those who possessed special qualifications, such as . . . knowledge of law or custom, or other affairs; keen support to such, that each might gain repute according to his due; always keeping the old ways without striving to seem to do so. Further, no love of change or restlessness, but inclination to dwell in the same places, and the same occupations; after paroxysms of headache straight-

way setting freshly and vigorously to his usual work; not keeping many secrets, but very few and rare, and those only about the common interest; prudence and moderation in exhibiting shows and constructing public buildings, in distributions, and so forth, looking to what ought to be done, not to the reputation for doing it. . . . No hardness, no scowls, no bluster, nor what one might call 'sweating' for it; but all things reckoned in their turn, as though at leisure, imperturbably, with order, vigour, and propriety. That would apply to him which is mentioned of Socrates, that he was able both to forbear from and to enjoy things, in forbearing from which many show weakness and in the enjoyment of which they yield to excess. But to be strong and staunch and moderate in either case is the characteristic of one who has a prepared and unconquered soul.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

50. ANTIDOTES.

When thou art offended with any one's shamelessness, straightway ask thyself 'Is it then possible that shameless people should not exist in the universe?' It is not possible. Then do not demand the impossible. For this is one of those shameless persons who must of necessity exist in the universe. And have the same thought ready for the knavish and the faithless, and all who transgress in any way. For when once thou recallest that it is impossible that the race of such men should not be found, thou wilt become more kindly towards them individually. This also is useful, straightway on each occasion to consider what virtue nature has given to man to meet the particular transgression. For nature has given, as an antidote, against the ill-willed, mildness; and against each some appropriate power. And, in general, it is possible for thee to teach him who has strayed, for every one who transgresses fails of the object that he set before him, and is astray. Moreover, in what way hast thou been harmed?

For thou wilt find that none of those, against whom thou art aroused, has done anything by which thy mind must be made worse; and evil and harm have their sole existence in the mind. What is there evil then or strange, if one who is unschooled does as the unschooled? See whether thou shouldst not rather accuse thyself for not expecting him to transgress in this way. For thou hadst means from reason to think that it was likely that he would transgress in this way, and none the less forgetting thou art now astonished that he has done so. And, especially, when thou findest fault with any one as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For clearly the transgression is thine; whether thou didst believe of one with his disposition, that he would keep faith; or thou didst not, in conferring a favour, confer it absolutely, and in such way as to receive all fruit of it straightway from thy action itself. For when thou hast done a man a kindness what further dost thou wish? Does it not suffice that thou hast done something in conformity with thy nature, but thou must seek a wage for it, as if the eye demanded a return because it sees, or the feet because they walk? For just as these are formed for this particular purpose, and by acting according to their several constitutions have their own sufficient reward, so also man, being formed by nature for benevolent action, when he has done anything benevolent, or even merely co-operated in things neutral or indifferent, has done that for which he was constituted, and has what belongs to him.

MARCUS AURELIUS *Meditations.*

FIRST SERIES

PART II

1. SOCIAL ACTION.

‘HAVE I done something socially? Then I have received a benefit’. Let this thought be ever at hand to meet thee, and faint not.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

2. EQUITY IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.

All infractions of love and equity in our social relations are speedily punished. They are punished by fear. Whilst I stand in simple relations to my fellow-man, I have no displeasure in meeting him. We meet as water meets water, or as two currents of air mix, with perfect diffusion and interpenetration of nature. But as soon as there is any departure from simplicity, and attempt at halfness, or good for me that is not good for him, my neighbour feels the wrong; he shrinks from me as far as I have shrunk from him; his eyes no longer seek mine; there is war between us; there is hate in him and fear in me.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON *Essays.*

3. A FAVOUR.

One man, when he has done a good turn to any one, is ready to reckon up the favour in an account with him. Another is not ready to do this, but still to himself he thinks of the other as his debtor, and knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but is like a vine producing grapes and seeking

nothing more, when once it has produced its proper fruit. So a horse runs, a dog hunts, a bee makes honey. And such a man when he has done a kindness does not proclaim it, but goes on to another act, as a vine to produce again grapes in their season.—‘Must one then be one of those, who in a way do such things without attention?’—Yes.—‘But one must attend to such things; for it may be said is the characteristic of a social being to perceive that he is acting socially, and, indeed, to wish that his associate should perceive it too.’—That is true which thou sayest; but thou misapprehendest the present saying; wherefore thou wilt be one of those of whom I spoke before; for they too are misled by a certain logical reasoning. But if thou wilt be willing to understand the saying, do not fear that thou wilt through it neglect any social work.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations*.

4. MOCKERY.

No man really, considering what he is, whence he came, how he is related, what he is capable of, can be despicable. Extreme naughtiness is indeed contemptible; but the unhappy person that is engaged therein is rather to be pitied than despised. However, charity bindeth us to stifle contemptuous motions of heart, and not to vent them in vilifying expression. Particularly, it is a barbarous practice, out of contempt to reproach persons for natural imperfections, for meanness of condition, for unlucky disasters, for any involuntary defects; this being indeed to reproach mankind, unto which such things are incident; to reproach Providence, from the disposal whereof they do proceed. ‘Whoso mocketh the poor, despiseth his Maker’, saith the Wise Man; and the same may be said of him that reproachfully mocketh him that is dull in parts, deformed in body, weak in health or strength, defective in any such way.

ISAAC BARROW *Sermons against Evil-Speaking*.

5. ILL-SPEAKING.

We should never speak concerning our neighbour from any other principle than charity, or to any other intent but what is charitable; such as tendeth to his good, or at least is consistent therewith. 'Let all your things', saith St. Paul, 'be done in charity'; and words are most of the *things* we do concerning our neighbour, wherein we may express charity. In all our speeches, therefore, touching him, we should plainly show that we have a care of his reputation, that we tender his interest, that we even desire his content and repose. Even when reason and need do so require that we should disclose and reprehend his faults, we may, we should, by the manner and scope of our speech signify thus much. Which rule, were it observed, if we should never speak ill otherwise than out of charity, surely most ill-speaking would be cut off; most, I fear, of our tattling about others, much of our gossiping, would be marred.

ISAAC BARROW. *Sermons against Evil-Speaking.*

6. THE AUTHORITY OF PARENTS.

The freedom then of man, and liberty of action according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs. This is that which puts the authority into the parents' hands to govern the minority of their children. God hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power, to apply it as His wisdom

designed it, to the children's good as long as they should need to be under it.

But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their offspring into an absolute, arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power reaches no farther than by such a discipline as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others, and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work when they are able for their own subsistence? But in this power the mother, too, has her share with the father.

Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of Nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them he loses his power over them, which goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed, and belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child as to the natural father of another.

JOHN LOCKE. *Two Treatises of Government.*

7. SUBJECTION TO THE LAWS.

Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man, entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds—*i.e.*, how far any shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it

at all. And to this I say, that every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

JOHN LOCKE: *Two Treatises of Government*.

8. PARTY SPIRIT.

There cannot a greater judgment befall a country than such a dreadful spirit of division as rends a government into two distinct people, and makes them greater strangers and more averse to one another, than if they were actually two different nations. The effects of such a division are pernicious to the last degree, not only with regard to those advantages which they give the common enemy, but to those private evils which they produce in the heart of almost every particular person. This influence is very fatal both to men's morals and their understandings; it sinks the virtue of a nation, and not only so, but destroys even common sense.

A furious party spirit, when it rages in its full violence, exerts itself in civil war and bloodshed; and when it is under its greatest restraints naturally breaks out in falsehood, detraction, calumny, and a partial administration of justice. In a word, it fills a nation with spleen and rancour, and extinguishes all the seeds of good-nature, compassion, and humanity.

Plutarch says very finely that a man should not allow himself to hate even his enemies, 'because', says he, 'if you indulge this passion on some occasions, it will rise of itself in others; if you hate your enemies, you will con-

tract such a vicious habit of mind, as by degrees will break out upon those who are your friends, or those who are indifferent to you.'

JOSEPH ADDISON.

The Spectator, No. 125 (July 24, 1711).

9. A GENTLEMAN.

When a good artist would express any remarkable character in sculpture, he endeavours to work up his figure into all the perfection his imagination can form; and to imitate not so much what is, as what may or ought to be. I shall follow their example, in the idea I am going to trace out of a fine gentleman, by assembling together such qualifications as seem requisite to make the character complete. In order to this I shall premise in general, that by a fine gentleman I mean a man completely qualified as well for the service and good as for the ornament and delight of society. When I consider the frame of mind peculiar to a gentleman, I suppose it graced with all the dignity and elevation of spirit that human nature is capable of. To this I would have joined a clear understanding, a reason free from prejudice, a steady judgment, and an extensive knowledge. When I think of the heart of a gentleman, I imagine it firm and intrepid, void of all inordinate passions, and full of tenderness, compassion, and benevolence. When I view the fine gentleman with regard to his manners, methinks I see him modest without bashfulness, frank and affable without impertinence, obliging and complaisant without servility, cheerful and in good-humour without noise. These amiable qualities are not easily obtained; neither are there many men that have a genius to excel this way. A finished gentleman is perhaps the most uncommon of all the great characters in life. Besides the natural endowments with which this distinguished man is to be born, he must run through a long series of education. Before he makes his appearance and shines in the

world, he must be principled in religion, instructed in all the moral virtues, and led through the whole course of the polite arts and sciences. He should be no stranger to courts and camps; he must travel to open his mind, to enlarge his views, to learn the policies and interests of foreign states, as well as to fashion and polish himself, and to get clear of national prejudices; of which every country has its share. To all these more essential improvements, he must not forget to add the fashionable ornaments of life, such as are the languages and the bodily exercises most in vogue: neither would I have him think even dress itself beneath his notice.

It is no very uncommon thing in the world to meet with men of probity; there are likewise a great many men of honour to be found. Men of courage, men of sense, and men of letters are frequent. But a true fine gentleman is what one seldom sees. He is properly a compound of the various good qualities that embellish mankind. As the great poet animates all the different parts of learning by the force of his genius, and irradiates all the compass of his knowledge by the lustre and brightness of his imagination; so all the great and solid perfections of life appear in the finished gentleman, with a beautiful gloss and varnish; everything he says or does is accompanied with a manner, or rather a charm, that draws the admiration and good-will of every beholder.

SIR RICHARD STEELE.

The Guardian, No. 34 (April 20, 1713).

10. CONVERSATION.

The secondary use of speech is to please and be entertaining to each other in conversation. This is in every respect allowable and right; it unites men closer in alliances and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the prosperity and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects serviceable to virtue, and to promote good behaviour in

the world. And provided there be not too much time spent in it, if it were considered only in the way of gratification and delight, men must have strange notion of God and of religion to think that . . . it is any way inconsistent with the strictest virtue. But the truth is, such sort of conversation, though it has no particular good tendency, yet it has a general good one; it is social and friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good-nature, and civility.

JOSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham:
Human Nature, and Other Sermons.

11. GOVERNMENT OVER THE TONGUE.

There is such a thing as a disposition to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often say anything, good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of discourse, according to the particular temper they themselves happen to be in, and to pass away the present time. There is likewise to be observed in persons such a strong and eager desire of engaging attention to what they say, that they will speak good or evil, truth or otherwise, merely as one or the other seems to be most hearkened to; and this, though it is sometimes joined, is not the same, with the desire of being thought important and men of consequence. There is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an offence of the slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other resentment, yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the tongue—puts it into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. This outrage, when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the lower rank of people by a peculiar term; and let it be observed, that though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same outrage and virulence indulged when he is absent is an offence of the same kind. But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, men run into faults and follies which cannot so properly be referred to any one general head as this—that they have not a due government over their tongue.

And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is the occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life. It begets resentment in him who is the subject of it, sows the seed of strife and dissension amongst others, and inflames little disgusts and offences which if let alone would wear away of themselves; it is often of as bad effect upon the good name of others as deep envy or malice; and to say the least of it in this respect, it destroys and perverts a certain equity of the utmost importance to society to be observed—namely, that praise and dispraise, a good or bad character, should always be bestowed according to desert. The tongue used in such a licentious manner is like a sword in the hand of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any good, and for the most part does a world of mischief.

BISHOP BUTLER: *Human Nature,
and Other Sermons.*

12. SPEAKING WELL AND SPEAKING ILL.

First, . . . though it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This therefore makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, a good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for it, besides barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless

he can also give some further account how he came to do so—a just indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one who does not deserve it.

BISHOP BUTLER. *Human Nature,
and Other Sermons.*

13. THE RECOMPENSE OF LABOUR.

The real recompense of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the course of the present century, increased perhaps in a still greater proportion than its money price. Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many other things from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and wholesome variety of food, have become a great deal cheaper. Potatoes, for example, do not at present, through the greater part of the kingdom, cost half the price which they used to do thirty or forty years ago. The same thing may be said of turnips, carrots, cabbages; things which were formerly never raised but by the spade, but which are now commonly raised by the plough. All sort of garden stuff too has become cheaper. The greater part of the apples and even of the onions consumed in Great Britain were in the last century imported from Flanders. The great improvements in the coarser manufactures of both linen and woollen cloth furnish the labourers with cheaper and better clothing; and those in the manufactures of the coarser metals, with cheaper and better instruments of trade, as well as with many agreeable and convenient pieces of household furniture. Soap, salt, candles, leather, and fermented liquors have, indeed, become a good deal dearer; chiefly from the taxes which have been laid upon them. The quantity of these, however, which the labouring poor are

under any necessity of consuming, is so very small, that the increase in their price does not compensate the diminution in that of so many other things. The common complaint that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people and that the labouring poor will not now be contented with the same food, clothing, and lodging which satisfied them in former times, may convince us that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompense, which has augmented.

Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society? The answer seems at first sight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.

ADAM SMITH. *The Wealth of Nations.*

14. MAXIMS OF TAXATION.

It is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to

their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. . . .

II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.

III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes.

IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out

and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.

ADAM SMITH: *The Wealth of Nations*.

15. PARTY POLITICS.

I do not wonder that the behaviour of many parties should have made persons of tender and scrupulous virtue somewhat out of humour with all sorts of connexion* in politics. I admit that people frequently acquire in such confederacies a narrow, bigoted, and proscriptive spirit; that they are apt to sink the idea of the general good in this circumscribed and partial interest. But where duty renders a critical† situation a necessary one, it is our business to keep free from the evils attendant upon it; and not to fly from the situation itself. If a fortress is seated in an unwholesome air, an officer of the garrison is obliged to be attentive to his health, but he must not desert his station. Every profession, not excepting the glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable to its own particular vices; which, however, form no argument against those ways of life; nor are the vices themselves inevitable to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are connexions in politics; essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty, accidentally liable to degenerate into faction. Commonwealths are made of families, free commonwealths of parties also; and we may as well affirm that our natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken those by which we are held to our country.

EDMUND BURKE: *The Present Discontents*.

16. RECOMPENSE.

It is a calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense—sugar-

* Party.

† Difficult.

plums of any kind in this world, or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor swearing soldier hired to be shot has his "honour of a soldier," different from drill, regulations, and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things, and vindicate himself under God's heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong men greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man. Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns up all lower considerations.

THOMAS CARLYLE *Heroes and Hero Worship.*

17. BENEFITS.

Experienced men of the world know very well that it is best to pay scot and lot as they go along, and that a man often pays dear for a small frugality. The borrower runs in his own debt. Has a man gained anything who has received a hundred favours and rendered none? Has he gained by borrowing, through indolence or cunning, his neighbour's wares, or horses, or money? There arises on the deed the instant acknowledgement of benefit on the one part, and of debt on the other; that is, of superiority and inferiority. The transaction remains in the memory of himself and his neighbour; and every new transaction alters, according to its nature, their relation to each other. He may soon come to see that he had better have broken his own bones than to have ridden in his neighbour's coach, and that 'the highest price he can pay for a thing is to ask for it'.

A wise man will extend this lesson to all parts of life, and know that it is the part of prudence to face every claimant, and pay every just demand on your time, your talents, or your heart. Always pay; for, first or last,

you must pay your entire debt. Persons and events may stand for a time between you and justice, but it is only a postponement. You must pay at last your own debt. If you are wise, you will dread a prosperity which only loads you with more. Benefit is the end of nature. But for every benefit which you receive, a tax is levied. He is great who confers the most benefits. He is base—and that is the one base thing in the universe—to receive favours and render none. In the order of nature we cannot render benefits to those from whom we receive them, or only seldom. But the benefit we receive must be rendered again, line for line, deed for deed, cent for cent, to somebody. Beware of too much good staying in your hand. It will fast corrupt and worm worms. Pay it away quickly in some sort.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON: *Essays*.

18. LABOURING MEN AND WOMEN.

See this wide society of labouring men and women. We allow ourselves to be served by them, we live apart from them, and meet them without a salute in the streets. We do not greet their talents, nor rejoice in their good fortune, nor foster their hopes, nor in the assembly of the people vote for what is dear to them. Thus we enact the part of the selfish noble and king from the foundation of the world. . . . In every knot of labourers, the rich man does not feel himself among his friends—and at the polls he finds them arrayed in a mass in distinct opposition to him. We complain that the politics of masses of the people are controlled by designing men, and led in opposition to manifest justice and the common weal, and to their own interest. But the people do not wish to be represented or ruled by the ignorant and base. They only vote for these, because they were asked with the voice and semblance of kindness. They will not vote for them long. They inevitably prefer wit and probity. To use an

Egyptian metaphor, it is not their will for any long time 'to raise the nails of wild beasts, and to depress the heads of the sacred birds'. Let our affection flow out to our fellows; it would operate in a day the greatest of all revolutions. It is better to work on institutions by the sun than by the wind. The state must consider the poor man, and all voices must speak for him. Every child that is born must have a just chance for his bread. Let the amelioration in our laws of property proceed from the concession of the rich, not from the grasping of the poor. Let us begin by habitual imparting. Let us understand that the equitable rule is, that no one should take more than his share, let him be ever so rich. Let me feel that I am to be a lover. I am to see to it that the world is the better for me, and to find my reward in the act. Love would put a new face on this weary old world in which we dwell as pagans and enemies too long, and it would warm the heart to see how fast the vain diplomacy of statesmen, the impotence of armies, and navies, and lines of defence, would be superseded by this unarmed child. Love will creep where it cannot go, will accomplish that by imperceptible methods—being its own lever, fulcrum, and power—which force could never achieve. Have you not seen in the woods, in a late autumn morning, a poor fungus or mushroom—a plant without any solidity, nay, that seemed nothing but a soft mush or jelly—by its constant, total, and inconceivably gentle pushing, manage to break its way up through the frosty ground, and actually to lift a hard crust on its head? It is the symbol of the power of kindness.

EMERSON: *Man the Reformer, a Lecture.*

19. INEQUALITIES OF CONDITION.

In the nature of the soul is the compensation for the inequalities of condition. The radical tragedy of nature seems to be the distinction of More and Less. How can

Less not feel the pain; how not feel indignation or malevolence towards More? Look at those who have less faculty, and one feels sad, and knows not well what to make of it. He almost shuns their eye; he fears they will upbraid God. What should they do? It seems a great injustice. But see the facts nearly, and these mountainous inequalities vanish. Love reduces them, as the sun melts the iceberg in the sea. The heart and soul of all men being one, this bitterness of *His* and *Mine* ceases. His is mine. I am my brother, and my brother is me. If I feel overshadowed and outdone by great neighbours, I can yet love; I can still receive; and he that loveth maketh his own the grandeur he loves. Thereby I make the discovery that my brother is my guardian, acting for me with the friendliest designs, and the estate I so admired and envied is my own.

EMERSON: *Essays*.

20. COMMON GROUND.

It is a proverb, that 'courtesy costs nothing'; but calculation might come to value love for its profit. Love is fabled to be blind; but kindness is necessary to perception; love is not a hood, but an eye-water. If you meet a sectary, or a hostile partisan, never recognize the dividing lines; but meet on what common ground remains—if only that the sun shines, and the rain rains for both; the area will widen very fast, and ere you know it the boundary mountains, on which the eye had fastened, have melted into air. If they set out to contend, Saint Paul will lie, and Saint John will hate. What low, poor, paltry, hypocritical people an argument on religion will make of the pure and chosen souls! They will shuffle, and crow, crook, and hide, feign to confess here, only that they may brag and conquer there, and not a thought has enriched either party, and not an emotion of bravery, modesty, or hope. So neither should you put yourself in a false position with your contemporaries, by indulging

a vein of hostility and bitterness. Though your views are in straight antagonism to theirs, assume an identity of sentiment, assume that you are saying precisely that which all think, and in the flow of wit and love roll out your paradoxes in solid column, with not the infirmity of a doubt. So at least shall you get an adequate deliverance. The natural motions of the soul are so much better than the voluntary ones, that you will never do yourself justice in dispute. The thought is not then taken hold of by the right handle, does not show itself proportioned, and in its true bearings, but bears extorted, hoarse, and half witness. But assume a consent, and it shall presently be granted, since, really, and underneath their external diversities, all men are of one heart and mind.

EMERSON: *Essays*.

21. THE GOOD HEART.

How much we forgive to those who yield us the rare spectacle of heroic manners! We will pardon them the want of books, of arts, and even of the gentler virtues. How tenaciously we remember them! Here is a lesson which I brought along with me in boyhood from the Latin School, and which ranks with the best of Roman anecdotes. Marcus Scaurus was accused by Quintus Varius Hispanus, that he had excited the Allies to take arms against the Republic. But he, full of firmness and gravity, defended himself in this manner: 'Quintus Varius Hispanus alleges that Marcus Scaurus, President of the Senate, excited the allies to arms: Marcus Scaurus, President of the Senate, denies it. There is no witness. Which do you believe, Romans? . . . ' When he had said these words, he was absolved by the assembly of the people.

I have seen manners that make a similar impression with personal beauty; that give the like exhilaration, and refine us like that; and, in memorable experiences, they are suddenly better than beauty, and make that superfluous

and ugly. But they must be marked by fine perception, the acquaintance with real beauty. They must always show self-control: you shall not be facile, apologetic, or leaky, but king over your word; and every gesture and action shall indicate power at rest. Then they must be inspired by the good heart. There is no beautifier of complexion, or form, or behaviour, like the wish to scatter joy and not pain around us. 'Tis good to give a stranger a meal, or a night's lodging. 'Tis better to be hospitable to his good meaning and thought, and give courage to a companion. We must be as courteous to a man as we are to a picture, which we are willing to give the advantage of a good light. Special precepts are not to be thought of: the talent of well-doing contains them all.

EMERSON: *The Conduct of Life*.

22. MARRIAGE.

Marriage is the most elementary and yet the most perfect mode of social life. It is the only association in which entire identity of interests is possible. In this union, to the moral completeness of which the language of all civilized nations bears testimony, the noblest aim of human life is realized, as far as it ever can be. For the object of human existence, is progress of every kind; progress in morality, that is to say, in the subjection of Self-interest to Social Feeling, holding the first rank. Now this unquestionable principle . . . leads us by a very sure and direct path to the true theory of marriage.

Different as the two sexes are by nature, and increased as that difference is by the diversity which happily exists in their social position, each is consequently necessary to the moral development of the other. In practical energy and in the mental capacity connected with it, Man is evidently superior to Woman. Woman's strength, on the other hand, lies in Feeling. She excels Man in love, as Man excels her in all kinds of force. It is impossible to conceive of

a closer union than that which binds these two beings to the mutual service and perfection of each other, saving them from all danger of rivalry. The voluntary character too of this union gives it a still further charm, where the choice has been on both sides a happy one. In the Positive theory, then, of marriage, its principal object is considered to be that of completing and confirming the education of the heart by calling out the purest and strongest of human sympathies. . . . Independently of the intrinsic value of this sacred union, we have to consider its importance from the social point of view. It is the first stage in our progress towards that which is the final object of moral education, namely, universal Love. Many writers of the so-called socialist school look upon conjugal love and universal benevolence, the two extreme terms in the scale of affections, as opposed to each other. . . . I pointed out the falseness and danger of this view. The man who is incapable of deep affection for one whom he has chosen as his partner in the most intimate relations of life, can hardly expect to be believed when he professes devotion to a mass of human beings of whom he knows nothing.

AUGUSTE COMTE *System of Positive Polity*
(C. T. Gorham's *Great French Rationalists*).

23. THE SOCIAL STATE.

The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society, becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human being. Now, society between human beings, except in

the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, every one is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual, interest, as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his *feelings* more and more with their good, or at least with an ever greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regards to others.

JOHN STUART MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

24. SOCIAL FEELING.

Already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow-creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness, whom he must desire to see defeated

in their object in order that he may succeed in his. The deeply-rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feeling and aims and those of his fellow-creatures. If differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual feelings—perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings—he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict; that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for, namely, their own good, but is, on the contrary, promoting it. This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether. But to those who have it, it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling. It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without.

J. S. MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

25. SELF-SACRIFICE.

Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man. I will add that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him: which once felt frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him,

like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end.

J. S. MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

26. VERACITY.

Inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who for the sake of convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies.

J. S. MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

27. HAPPINESS.

When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much cur-

tailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind—I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties—finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the future. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it; but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity.

J. S. MILL. *Utilitarianism*.

28. HAPPINESS.

Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the public good are possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought up human being. In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, everyone who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable; and unless such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find this enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils of life,

the great sources of physical and mental suffering—such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape; which, as things now are, cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious influences; while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which cut short our own lives, but, what concerns us still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments connected with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or bad or imperfect social institutions. All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort; and though their removal is grievously slow—though a long succession of generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made—yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small and inconspicuous, in the endeavour, will

draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent to be without.

J. S. MILL *Utilitarianism*.

29. EGOISM AND ALTRUISM.

What do we mean by a sense of duty, except a recognition of the claims of others, of neighbour, family, society, or God? In no respect do men differ more than in this sense of duty, because in no respect are men more unlike than in their endowment of egoistic and altruistic impulses. In some persons all sense of the claims of others seems left out from the first. They never seem to regard themselves as owing anything to anybody; but, contrariwise, they consider others always as owing them a great deal. Even borrowed money they repay with pain and regret, and often require the threat of the action of the law to bring them to repayment. This type of character is humorously exemplified in the alleged remark of a spendthrift, who said of a friend less hardened than himself: 'He wasted his money in paying his debts'; the use of money being only excusable, it would appear, when no credit was to be obtained. On the other hand, we have natures who not only are prompt in acknowledging claims upon them, who would fast and starve rather than withhold payment when it was due, but who perceive debts and duties which neither society nor individuals exact from them; who willingly offend the world, and, with open eyes, face its anger and resentment, so they may render it a service which no other is ready to offer. The saints, martyrs, and heroes have been of this type. Resistance to passion or strong temptation can only be rationally expected from a mind which combines a habit of postponing self-gratification to the interests and welfare of others, with an ample endowment of generous and benevolent impulses. The wave of egoistic passion is met by a counter-wave of

altruistic emotion, and according to the character and training one or the other prevails. The characteristic feeling of remorse for breach of duty, or gross gratification of selfish desire, is evidence of this. Genuine remorse, contrition as distinguished from attrition, always arises from a pain of the altruistic feelings, at having returned evil for good, for having injured a loving heart which deserved different treatment at our hands. Remorse is the note of tender and passionate, but ill-governed, natures. There is no anguish like it; but it is an anguish of which the cold and selfish are incapable. So little does it fear or wish to evade punishment that it seeks it and implores it. The grief over our own hard-heartedness is too acute to be assuaged except by sacrifice and penance; and only in bitter expiation is a slight relief derived for transgression. . . . In the naturally tender-hearted it soon appears and develops with the added years. Education can do much to aid or check its growth. The selfishness of children can be cultivated to any extent. A habit of regard for others may likewise be nurtured. The *proverbial* selfishness of princes largely depends on this fact.

Recognition of the 'claims' of others, arising from a sympathetic nature, is the root of duty, but by no means the full-grown tree. The size to which the tree will grow depends upon the mental power, upon the grasp of ideas, which reveals an almost infinite variety of 'claimants.' A kind heart coupled with a narrow mind cannot conceive the higher forms of duty to the State, to humanity, to unpopular causes. Culture and mental force combined regulate the quality of the duty paid.

JAMES COTTER MORISON. *The Service of Man.*

30. THE OLD ADAM.

The old Adam within us is the Adam of the pre-social stages of human history—the impulses of barbarism, the

unrectified egoistic emotions of the dweller in cave and wilderness, which will from day to day burst loose and declare themselves, despite the long discipline to which mankind has been subjected through centuries of progressing civilization. Every time we give way to such impulses the old barbarian rises within us, and temporarily reasserts his power. Scratch the Russian, and you will find the Tartar just beneath—so runs the proverb; and in the great mass of men the morality of civilization is as yet hardly more than skin deep. As with the ship in Ibsen's grim and terrible poem, our modern society carries with it a corpse in the cargo—the unbridled elemental passions, the brute instincts, the fierce anti-social tendencies transmitted to us by our far-off ancestors from the days before society and even humanity began.

What new significance is in this way given to the oft-repeated phrase which describes the criminal classes as the failures of civilization! They are the representatives of the savage left over in the midst of our more developed life, guided by the savage's predatory instincts, living in a state of natural enmity with those about them, preying upon their fellows, to whom they offer nothing in return, and thus remaining unintegrated into the great organization of mutual-dependent parts which constitutes society. The moral progress of man, as John Fiske epigrammatically put it, is the gradual process of 'throwing off the brute inheritance'. The law of morality thus becomes more emphatically than ever the law of the higher life; sin is degeneration, atavism, reversion to the pre-social or animal type; and the ethical ideal of evolution, in Tennyson's language, is to—

'Move upward, working out the beast.
And let the ape and tiger die'.

WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON *An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.*

31. OBEDIENCE.

That principle to which Polity owes its stability, Life its happiness, Faith its acceptance, and Creation its continuance, is Obedience.

Nor is it the least among the sources of more serious satisfaction which I have found in the pursuit of a subject* that at first appeared to bear but slightly on the grave interests of mankind, that the conditions of material perfection which it leads me in conclusion to consider, furnish a strange proof how false is the conception, how frantic the pursuit, of that treacherous phantom which men call Liberty: most treacherous, indeed, of all phantoms; for the feeblest ray of reason might surely show us, that not only its attainment, but its being, was impossible. There is no such thing in the universe. There never can be. The stars have it not; the earth has it not; the sea has it not; and we men have the mockery and semblance of it only for our heaviest punishment. . . . If there be any one principle more widely than another confessed by every utterance, or more sternly than another imprinted on every atom, of the visible creation, that principle is not Liberty, but Law.

The enthusiast would reply that by Liberty he meant the Law of Liberty. Then why use the single and misunderstood word? If by liberty you mean chastisement of the passions, discipline of the intellect, subjection of the will; if you mean the fear of inflicting, the shame of committing, a wrong; if you mean respect for all who are in authority, and consideration for all who are in dependence; veneration for the good, mercy to the evil, sympathy with the weak; if you mean watchfulness over all thoughts, temperance in all pleasures, and perseverance in all toils; if you mean, in a word, that Service which is defined in the liturgy of the English church to be perfect Freedom,

* Architecture.

why do you name this by the same word by which the luxurious mean licence, and the reckless mean change; by which the rogue means rapine, and the fool, equality; by which the proud mean anarchy, and the malignant mean violence? Call it by any name rather than this, but its best and truest, is Obedience. Obedience is, indeed, founded on a kind of freedom, else it would become mere subjugation, but that freedom is only granted that obedience may be more perfect; and thus, while a measure of licence is necessary to exhibit the individual energies of things, the fairness and pleasantness and perfection of them all consist in their Restraint. Compare a river that has burst its banks with one that is bound by them, and the clouds that are scattered over the whole face of the whole heaven with those that are marshalled into ranks and orders by its winds. So that though restraint, utter and unrelaxing, can never be comely, this is not because it is in itself an evil, but only because, when too great, it overpowers the nature of the thing restrained, and so counteracts the other laws of which that nature is itself composed.

JOHN RUSKIN *The Seven Lamps of Architecture.*

32. TRUE COMMERCE.

Now there can be no question but that the tact, foresight, decision, and other mental powers, required for the successful management of a large mercantile concern, if not such as could be compared with those of a great lawyer, general, or divine, would at least match the general conditions of mind required in the subordinate officers of a ship, or of a regiment, or in the curate of a country parish. If, therefore, all the efficient members of the so-called liberal professions are still, somehow, in public estimate of honour, preferred before the head of a commercial firm, the reason must lie deeper than in the measurement of their several powers of mind.

And the essential reason for such preference will be found

to lie in the fact that the merchant is presumed to act always selfishly. His work may be very necessary to the community; but the motive of it is understood to be wholly personal. The merchant's first object in all his dealings must be (the public believe) to get as much for himself, and leave as little to his neighbour (or customer) as possible. Enforcing this upon him, by political statute, as the necessary principle of his action; recommending it to him on all occasions, and themselves reciprocally adopting it; proclaiming vociferously, for law of the universe, that a buyer's function is to cheapen, and a seller's to cheat,—the public, nevertheless, involuntarily condemn the man of commerce for his compliance with their own statement, and stamp him for ever as belonging to an inferior grade of human personality.

This they will find, eventually, they must give up doing. They must not cease to condemn selfishness; but they will have to discover a kind of commerce which is not exclusively selfish. Or, rather, they will have to discover that there never was, or can be, any other kind of commerce; that this which they have called commerce was not commerce at all, but cozening; and that a true merchant differs as much from a merchant according to laws of modern political economy, as the hero of the *Excursion* from Autolycus. They will find that commerce is an occupation which gentlemen will every day see more need to engage in, rather than in the businesses of talking to men, or slaying them; that, in true commerce, as in true preaching, or true fighting, it is necessary to admit the idea of occasional voluntary loss;—that sixpences have to be lost, as well as lives, under a sense of duty; that the market may have its martyrdoms as well as the pulpit; and trade its heroisms, as well as war.

May have—in the final issue, must have—and only has not had yet, because men of heroic temper have always been misguided in their youth into other fields, not recog-

nizing what is in our days, perhaps, the most important of all fields; so that, while many a zealous person loses his life in trying to teach the form of a gospel, very few will lose a hundred pounds in showing the practice of one.

The fact is that people never have had clearly explained to them the true functions of a merchant with respect to other people. I should like the reader to be very clear about this.

Five great intellectual professions, relating to daily necessities of life, have hitherto existed—three exist necessarily, in every civilized nation:

The Soldier's profession is to *defend* it.

The Pastor's, to *teach* it.

The Physician's, to *keep it in health*.

The Lawyer's, to *enforce justice* in it.

The Merchant's, to *provide* for it.

And the duty of all these men is, on due occasion, to *die* for it.

'On due occasion', namely:—

The Soldier, rather than leave his post in battle.

The Physician, rather than leave his post in plague.

The Pastor, rather than teach Falsehood.

The Lawyer, rather than countenance Injustice.

The Merchant—What is *his* 'due occasion' of death?

It is the main question for the merchant, as for all of us. For, truly, the man who does not know when to die, does not know how to live.

Observe, the merchant's function (or manufacturer's, for in the broad sense in which it is here used the word must be understood to include both) is to provide for the nation. It is no more his function to get profit for himself out of that provision than it is a clergyman's function to get his stipend. The stipend is a due and necessary adjunct, but not the object, of his life, if he be a true clergyman, any more than his fee (or *honorarium*) is the object of life to a true physician. Neither is his fee the

object of life to a true merchant. All three, if true men, have a work to be done irrespective of fee—to be done even at any cost, or for quite the contrary of fee; the pastor's function being to teach, the physician's to heal, and the merchant's, as I have said, to provide. That is to say, he has to understand to their very root the qualities of the thing he deals in, and the means of obtaining or producing it; and he has to apply all his sagacity and energy to the producing or obtaining it in perfect state, and distributing it at the cheapest possible price where it is most needed.

And because the production or obtaining of any commodity involves necessarily the agency of many lives and hands, the merchant becomes in the course of his business the master and governor of large masses of men in a more direct, though less confessed way, than a military officer or pastor; so that on him falls, in great part, the responsibility for the kind of life they lead: and it becomes his duty, not only to be always considering how to produce what he sells in the purest and cheapest forms, but how to make the various employments involved in the production, or transference of it, most beneficial to the men employed.

And as into these two functions, requiring for their right exercise the highest intelligence, as well as patience, kindness, and tact, the merchant is bound to put all his energy, so for their just discharge he is bound, as soldier or physician is bound, to give up, if need be, his life, in such way as it may be demanded of him.

JOHN RUSKIN *Unto this Last*

33. THE USES OF MOUNTAINS.

It may not, therefore, even at this day, be altogether profitless or unnecessary to review briefly the nature of the three great offices which mountain ranges are appointed to fulfil, in order to preserve the health and increase

the happiness of mankind. Their first use is of course to give motion to *water*. Every fountain and river, from the inch-deep streamlet that crosses the village lane in trembling clearness, to the massy and silent march of the everlasting multitude of waters in Amazon or Ganges, owe their play, and purity, and power, to the ordained elevations of the earth. Gentle or steep, extended or abrupt, some determined slope of the earth's surface is of course necessary, before any wave can so much as overtake one sedge in its pilgrimage; and how seldom do we enough consider, as we walk beside the margins of our pleasant brooks, how beautiful and wonderful is that ordinance, of which every blade of grass that waves in their clear water is a perpetual sign; that the dew and rain fallen on the face of the earth shall find no resting-place; shall find, on the contrary, fixed channels traced for them, from the ravines of the central crests down which they roar in sudden ranks of foam, to the dark hollows beneath the banks of lowland pasture, round which they must circle slowly among the stems and beneath the leaves of the lilies; paths prepared for them, by which, at some appointed rate of journey, they must evermore descend, sometimes slow and sometimes swift, but never pausing; the daily portion of the earth they have to glide over marked for them at each successive sunrise, the place which has known them knowing them no more, and the gateways of guarding mountains opened for them in cleft and chasm, none letting them in their pilgrimage; and, from far off, the great heart of the sea calling them to itself ! . . .

The second great use of mountains is to maintain a constant change in the currents and nature of the *air*. Such change would, of course, have been partly caused by differences in soils and vegetation, even if the earth had been level; but to a far less extent than it is now by the chains of hills, which, exposing on one side their

masses of rock to the full heat of the sun (increased by the angle at which the rays strike on the slope), and on the other casting a soft shadow for leagues over the plains at their feet, divide the earth not only into districts, but into climates, and cause perpetual currents of air to traverse their passes, and ascend or descend their ravines, altering both the temperature and nature of the air as it passes, in a thousand different ways; moistening it with the spray of their waterfalls, sucking it down and beating it hither and thither in the pools of their torrents, closing it within clefts and caves, where the sunbeams never reach, till it is as cold as November mists, then sending it forth again to breathe softly across the slopes of velvet fields, or to be scorched among sunburnt shales and grassless crags; then drawing it back in moaning swirls through clefts of ice, and up into dewy wreaths above the snow-fields; then piercing it with strange electric darts and flashes of mountain fire, and tossing it high in fantastic storm-cloud, as the dried grass is tossed by the mower, only suffering it to depart at last, when chastened and pure, to refresh the faded air of the far-off plains.

The third great use of mountains is to cause perpetual change in the *soils* of the earth. Without such provision the ground under cultivation would in a series of years become exhausted, and require to be upturned laboriously by the hand of man. But the elevations of the earth's surface provide for it a perpetual renovation. The higher mountains suffer their summits to be broken into fragments and to be cast down in sheets of massy rock, full, as we shall see presently, of every substance necessary for the nourishment of plants: these fallen fragments are again broken by frost, and ground by torrents, into various conditions of sand and clay—materials which are distributed perpetually by the streams farther and farther from the mountain's base. Every shower which swells the rivulets enables their waters to carry certain portions of

earth into new positions, and exposes new banks of ground to be mined in their turn. That turbid foaming of the angry water,—that tearing down of bank and rock along the flanks of its fury,—are no disturbances of the kind course of nature; they are beneficent operations of laws necessary to the existence of man and to the beauty of the earth. The process is continued more gently, but not less effectively, over all the surface of the lower undulating country; and each filtering thread of summer rain which trickles through the short turf of the uplands is bearing its own appointed burden of earth to be thrown down on some new natural garden in the dingles below.

And it is not, in reality, a degrading, but a true, large, and ennobling view of the mountain ranges of the world, if we compare them to heaps of fertile and fresh earth, laid up by a prudent gardener beside his garden beds, whence, at intervals, he casts on them some scattering of new and virgin ground. That which we so often lament as convulsion or destruction is nothing else than the momentary shaking of the dust from the spade. The winter floods, which inflict a temporary devastation, bear with them the elements of succeeding fertility; the fruitful field is covered with sand and shingle in momentary judgement, but in enduring mercy; and the great river, which chokes its mouth with marsh, and tosses terror along its shore, is but scattering the seeds of the harvests of futurity, and preparing the seats of unborn generations.

JOHN RUSKIN: *Modern Painters*.

34. TRUE PATRIOTISM.

The love of mankind, no doubt, needs to be particularized in order to have any power over life and action. Just as there can be no true friendship except towards this or that individual, so there can be no true public spirit which is not localized in some way. The man whose desire to serve his kind is not centred primarily in some home, radiating from

it to a commune, a municipality, and a nation, presumably has no effectual desire to serve his kind at all. But there is no reason why this localized or nationalized philanthropy should take the form of a jealousy of other nations or a desire to fight them, personally or by proxy. Those in whom it is strongest are every day expressing it in good works which benefit their fellow-citizens without interfering with the men of other nations. Those who from time to time talk of the need of a great war to bring unselfish impulses into play, give us reason to suspect that they are too selfish themselves to recognize the unselfish activity that is going on all round them. Till all the methods have been exhausted by which nature can be brought into the service of man, till society is so organized that everyone's capacities have free scope for their development, there is no need to resort to war for a field in which patriotism may display itself.

THOMAS HILL GREEN *The Principles
of Political Obligation.*

35. DISINTERESTEDNESS PRESUPPOSED IN VIRTUE.

Our respect for a gallant but dangerous enemy, our contempt for a useful traitor, our care in the last moments of life for the interests of those who survive us, our clear distinction between intentional and unintentional injuries, and between the consciousness of imprudence and the consciousness of guilt, our conviction that the pursuit of interest should always be checked by a sense of duty, and that selfish and moral motives are so essentially opposed, that the presence of the former necessarily weakens the latter, our indignation at those who when honour or gratitude call them to sacrifice their interests pause to calculate remote consequences, our feelings of remorse which differ from every other emotion of our nature—in a word, the universal, unstudied sentiments of mankind all concur in leading us to separate widely our virtuous affections from our selfish ones. Just as pleasure and pain are ultimate

grounds of action, and no reason can be given why we should seek the former and avoid the latter, except that it is the constitution of our nature that we should do so, so we are conscious that the words right and wrong express ultimate intelligible motives, that these motives are generically different from the others, that they are of a higher order, and that they carry with them a sense of obligation. Any scheme of morals that omits these facts fails to give an accurate and adequate description of the states of feeling which consciousness reveals. The consciences of men in every age would have echoed the assertion of Cicero that to sacrifice pleasure with a view of obtaining any form or modification of pleasure in return, no more answers to our idea of virtue, than to lend money at interest to our idea of charity. The conception of pure disinterestedness is presupposed in all our estimates of virtue. It is the root of all the emotions with which we contemplate acts of heroism. We feel that man is capable of pursuing what he believes to be right although pain and disaster and mental suffering and an early death be the consequence, and although no prospect of future reward lighten upon his tomb. This is the highest prerogative of our being, the point of contact between the human nature and the divine.

WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY:
The History of European Morals.

36. OBSCURITY.

There is a very marked tendency amongst persons of culture to feel dissatisfied with themselves and their success in life when they do not exercise some direct and visible influence over a considerable portion of the public. To put the case in a more concrete form, it may be affirmed that if an intellectual young man does not exercise influence by literature or by oratory, or by one of the most elevated forms of art, he is apt to think that his culture and intelligence are lost upon the world, and either to blame himself for being

what he considers a failure, or else (and this is more common) to find fault with the world in general for not giving him a proper chance of making his abilities tell. The facilities for obtaining culture are now so many and great, and within the reach of so many well-to-do people, that hundreds of persons become really very clever in various ways who would have remained utterly uncultivated had they lived in any previous century. A few of these distinguish themselves in literature and other pursuits which bring notoriety to the successful, but by far the greater number have to remain in positions of obscurity, often being clearly conscious that they have abilities and knowledge not much, if at all, inferior to the abilities and knowledge of some who have achieved distinction. The position of a clever man who remains obscure is, if he has ambition, rather trying to the moral fibre, but there are certain considerations which might help to give a direction to his energy and so procure him a sure relief, which reputation too frequently fails to provide.

The first consideration is one which was offered to me many years ago by Mr. Matthew Arnold, and which I can give, though from memory, very nearly in his own words. The multiplicity of things which make claim to the attention of the public is in these days such that it requires either uncommon strength of will or else the force of peculiar circumstances to make men follow any serious study to good result, and the great majority content themselves with the general enlightenment of the epoch, which they get from newspapers and reviews. Hence the efforts of the intellectual produce little effect and it requires either extraordinary talent or extraordinary fanaticism to awaken the serious interest of any considerable number of readers. Yet, in spite of these discouragements, we ought to remember that our labours, if not applauded by others, may be of infinite value to ourselves, and also that beyond this gain to the individual, his

culture is a gain to the nation, whether the nation formally recognizes it or not. For the intellectual life of a nation is the sum of the lives of all intellectual people belonging to it, and in this sense your culture is a gain to England, whether England counts you amongst her eminent sons, or leaves you for ever obscure. Is it not a noble spectacle, a spectacle well worthy of a highly civilized country, when a private citizen, with an admirable combination of patriotism and self-respect, says to himself as he labours, 'I know that in a country so great as England, where there are so many able men, all that I do can count for very little in public estimation, yet I will endeavour to store my mind with knowledge and make my judgment sure, in order that the national mind of England, of which my mind is a minute fraction, may be enlightened by so much, be it never so little'? I think the same noble feeling might animate a citizen with reference to his native town; I think a good townsman might say to himself, 'Our folks are not much given to the cultivation of their minds, and they need a few to set them an example. I will be one of these few. I will work and think, in order that our town may not get into a state of perfect intellectual stagnation'. But if the nation or the city were too vast to call forth any noble feeling of this kind, surely the family is little enough and near enough. Might not a man say, 'I will go through a good deal of intellectual drudgery in order that my wife and children may unconsciously get the benefit of it; I will learn facts for them that they may be accurate, and get ideas for them that they may share with me a more elevated mental state; I will do something towards raising the tone of the whole household'?

PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON: *The Intellectual Life*.

37. THE REFORM OF THE HEART AND THE MIND.

What a society needs as the starting point of all healthy progress is an intelligent and earnest capacity of outlook

as regards both individual and social life. Before any particular reform there must be the reform of the heart and the mind, which can only come from the intelligent consciousness that a healthy society is that, the units of which are taught that every one of them is a responsible being, that every one of them is and ought to be a hopeful being, that every one of them has rights with attendant responsibilities and that the neglect or suffering of any unit must tell on the whole. This is social reform. You cut the whole into this and that item of reform for the sake of convenience to draw attention to the particular evils which mar society. But social reform goes behind the particular customs, and takes hold of the symptoms for the purpose of diagnosing the disease. To carry forward the struggle of society for a higher life, to fit it for the responsibilities and the stress of a strenuous life, you need to look at its customs in a wide, comprehensive spirit. What the social reformer must first equip himself with to make the reform really beneficial is what Emmanuel Kant called the spirit of 'illumination'—the sympathy and love which enables us to comprehend the solidarity of society and to work for the removal of all social evils whatever and wherever they are.

SIR NARAYAN G. CHANDAVARKAR.
Speeches and Writings.

38. DIFFICULTIES.

Troubles are what show the man. In short, when trouble befalls, remember that God has, as it were, matched thee as a trainer would against a rough young man. 'But why?' says one. In order that thou mayest become a victor in Olympic games; but without sweat this will not be. And to me it seems that no one ever had a better trouble than thou hast, if thou wishest to use it as an athlete would a young and vigorous opponent.

EPICETUS: *Discourses.*

39. CIVIC LIFE.

As thou art thyself a component member of a civic system, so let every action of thine tend to the completeness of civic life. Whatever action of thine then has no reference, either near or remote, to a social end, drags thy life asunder, and does not allow it to be one, and is seditious, like some individual who in a people separates himself factiously from the general agreement.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

40. INSULTS.

Remember this, that it is we who gall ourselves, it is we who push against ourselves; in other words, it is our own views which gall us and hustle us. What, for instance, is abuse in itself? Stand beside a stone and abuse it; and what wilt thou be doing? If, then, one listens like a stone, what advantage is there to the person who abuses? But if the abuser has for a foothold the weakness of the abused in listening to him, then he accomplishes something.

EPICTETUS: *Discourses.*

41. TRANSGRESSION.

If he has transgressed, with him is the evil. And haply he has not transgressed.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

42. RICHES AND REVERENCE.

The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the

same time not in need of the necessities of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying anything base; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own principles in practice.

PLATO: *Laws* (Benjamin Jowett).

43. A MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law, being a single magistrate of fifty years old at least—the father of children lawfully begotten, of both sexes, or of one at any rate. He who is elected and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, rightly tending to the perfection of its own nature, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized; but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to

become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every respect the best; him they shall do their best to appoint as guardian and superintendent.

PLATO: *Laws* (B. Jowett).

44. IMMODERATE GAINS.

The class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education—who, when compelled by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade and merchandise, and keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if, what I trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some dire necessity, the best women were compelled to follow a similar calling, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are; and all such occupations if they were carried on according to pure reason, would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse: but now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the desired resting-place, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy, and will not

release them until they have paid the highest, most abominable, and dishonest price—these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity.

PLATO: *Laws* (B. Jowett).

45. THE STAMP OF A MAN.

Whose stamp does this coin bear?—‘Trajan’s’.—Bring it. And this?—‘Nero’s’.—Throw it away; it is of no value, useless. And similarly in this case, what stamp do his principles bear? That of patience, sociableness, tolerance, responsiveness to affection. Bring him, I accept him, I make him a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour and comrade. Only see that there is nothing like the stamp of Nero on him. He is not in any way angry, malicious, discontented?—‘When it seems good to him he breaks the heads of those who pass his way’.—Why, then, didst thou say that he was a man? For, surely, everything that exists is not to be judged barely by its form? If so, then call a waxen form an apple. But that should have smell, and taste; the outward limit of mere shape is not sufficient. Neither then, in the case of a man, do the nose and the eyes suffice, but he should have the principles of a man. This fellow here does not listen to reason, pays no attention when he is refuted; he is an ass. In this other the sense of modesty is dead; he is unserviceable, anything rather than a man. This fellow seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite; so that he is neither sheep nor ass, but a sort of wild beast.

EPICETUS. *Discourses*.

46. THE ROAD.

Thus do those who travel with comparative safety. A traveller hears that the road is frequented by robbers. He does not venture to encounter them alone, but he awaits the companionship of an ambassador, or a quæstor,

or a pro-consul, and having ranged himself with him he passes safely. And in the world the sensible man does likewise. ‘Many are the bands of robbers, the tyrants, the storms, the difficulties, the losses of those dearest to us. How shall anyone escape them? By what means shall he pass unrobbed? For what companionship shall he wait so that he may come through safely? To whom shall he attach himself? To so and so, the wealthy, the man of consul’s rank? And what would be the advantage? He himself is stripped, bewails, laments. And what if my fellow-traveller himself should turn on me and rob me? What, then, shall I do? Say I become a friend of Cæsar’s: none will do me injustice if I am his companion. But first, in order that I may become so distinguished, how much must I endure and suffer; how often and by how many must I be robbed! And then if I become his friend, he too is mortal. And should he himself, through any trouble, become my enemy, whither then had I best retreat? Into the desert? And does not fever come there? What then shall be done? Is it not possible to find a safe comrade, faithful, strong, against whom no plots prevail?’ Thus he ponders, and considers within himself that if he shall range himself with God he will come through safely.

And what dost thou mean by ranging himself with God? I mean that what God wills man also shall will, and what God wills not shall man not will also.

EPICETETUS. *Discourses.*

47. THE FUTURE.

Say no more to me, ‘How will it be with me in the future?’ For whatsoever the event may be, thou shalt make good use of it and the issue shall be fortunate for thee. Who indeed would Hercules have been if he had said, ‘What shall I do, so that a great lion may not appear to me, nor a huge boar, nor savage men?’ And why dost

thou pay any heed to such matters? If a great boar appears to thee, the greater the prize for which thou wilt contend; if evil men assail thee, thou wilt in resisting them rid the earth of evil. — ‘But if in the contest I were to die?’ — Thou wouldst die as a good man, performing a noble action. For since it is absolutely necessary to die, a man must of necessity be found doing something at that time. . . . What then dost thou wish to be doing when found by Death? For my part I would wish to be doing work befitting a man; beneficent, for the common weal, noble. But if I cannot be found doing such great things, then at least let me be found doing what I cannot be hindered from doing, that which is given me to do, in other words, correcting myself, developing that faculty in me which makes use of the perceptions, striving to be free from passion, and paying to each relation of life its due.

EPICETETUS: *Discourses*.

48. FIRMNESS.

Be like the headland towards which the waves continually break; it stands firm and the fury of the water is lulled beside it.

‘Unfortunate am I, that this has befallen me!’ Not so; but ‘Fortunate am I, that, though this has befallen me, I continue undistressed, neither broken by the present nor fearing what is to come’. For some such thing could have befallen any man, whilst not everyone would have continued undistressed after it. Why then is the one circumstance a misfortune rather than the other a piece of good fortune? And dost thou call that a misfortune to a man at all, which is not a warping of man’s nature? And does that seem to thee to be a warping of man’s nature, which is not contrary to the purpose of his nature? Well then; thou hast learnt that purpose. Does this then which has befallen hinder thee from fulfilling it, that is being just, magnanimous, sober, prudent, deliberate, without

deceit, modest, free, and in fine having all qualities, through the presence of which man's nature is fulfilled. Remember then, on every occasion inclining thee to distress, to apply this principle—not, 'this is a misfortune', but, 'to bear this well is good fortune'.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

49. AGREEMENT WITH NATURE.

Everything is agreeable to me which is in agreement with thee, O ordered universe. Nothing for me is too early, or too late, which is well-timed for thee. Everything to me is fruit in season, which thy seasons bring, O Nature; from thee all things arise, in thee all things abide, to thee all things return. The poet says, 'Loved city of Cecrops*'; wilt not thou say, 'O loved City† of God'?

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

50. DISCONTENT.

Imagine everyone who is distressed at, or discontented with anything, to be like some pig at a sacrifice, kicking to get away and squealing. And such also is he who bewails, though in silence and alone on his bed, our bondage. And remember that it is given only to rational beings to follow willingly what befalls; and, in any case, to follow is a necessity for all.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

* Athens.

† Universe.

SECOND SERIES

PART I

1. HAPPINESS.

IF by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many, during some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost all.

JOHN STUART MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

2. THE COMMON GOOD.

There is no more certain symbol of a limited and crude personality than heedlessness of the common good—of which the political State, with its institutions, is the repre-

sentative. The ἀπολις,* the man who does not carry his city within his heart, is a spiritual starveling. The measure of manhood is the fulness and generosity of its interests. The diviner the man the wider the world for which he lives and dies. It does not matter what a man does or has, if the current of his life sets inwards he is but a greedy animal with an unusually voracious appetite. Of spiritual dignity he has none. If he cares for the State only as a means of securing his private ends, and uses its waters only to grind his own corn, or that of the class with whose interests he is immediately bound, he has but aggrandized his selfishness, and he is as great an enemy to his people as he is to himself.

SIR HENRY JONES: *Idealism as a Practical Creed.*

3. REVENGE.

Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. For as for the first wrong, it doth but offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong putteth the law out of office. Certainly, in taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy; but in passing it over, he is superior; for it is a Prince's part to pardon. And Solomon, I am sure, saith, 'It is the glory of a man to pass by an offence'. That which is past is gone, and irrevocable; and wise men have enough to do with things present and to come; therefore they do but trifle with themselves that labour in past matters. There is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake; but thereby to purchase to himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the like. Therefore why should I be angry with a man for loving himself better than me? And if any man should do wrong merely out of ill-nature, why yet it is but like the thorn or briar, which prick and scratch, because they can do no other. The most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law to remedy;

* *Apolis*, cityless man.

but then let a man take heed the revenge be such as there is no law to punish; else a man's enemy is still beforehand and it is two for one. Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh. This is the more generous. For the delight seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt as in making the party repent. But base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth in the dark. Cosmus, Duke of Florence, had a desperate saying against perfidious or neglecting friends, as if those wrongs were unpardonable: 'You shall read' (saith he) 'that we are commanded to forgive our enemies; but you never read that we are commanded to forgive our friends'. But yet the spirit of Job was in a better tune: 'Shall we' (saith he) 'take good at God's hands, and not be content to take evil also?' And so of friends in a proportion. This is certain that a man that studieth revenge keeps his own wounds green, which otherwise would heal and do well.

FRANCIS BACON, Lord Verulam,
Viscount St. Albans: *Essays*.

4. COVENANTS.

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice; but he questioneth, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God—for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God—may not sometimes stand* with that reason, which

* Be consistent.

4 ON DUTY TO THE STATE, AND KINDRED SUBJECTS

dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. . . . In a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man who can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction, without the help of confederates, where every one expects the same defence by the confederation, that any one else does; and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no longer other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received be retained in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore if he be left or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so as all men that contribute not to his destruction forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

THOMAS HOBBS. *Leviathan*.

5. EQUALS IN NATURE.

This equality of men by Nature the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are:

‘The like natural inducement hath brought men to

know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves; for, seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one measure, if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them. My desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality, between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant' (*Ecclesiastical Polity*).

JOHN LOCKE: *Two Treatises of Government*.

6. CHARITY.

In one of my last week's papers* I treated of good-nature, as it is the effect of constitution; I shall now speak of it as a moral virtue. The first may make a man easy in himself and agreeable to others, but implies no merit in him that is possessed of it. A man is no more to be praised upon this account, than because he has a regular pulse, or a good digestion. This good-nature however in the constitution, which Mr. Dryden somewhere calls a 'milkiness of blood', is an admirable groundwork for the other. In order, therefore, to try our good-nature, whether it arises from the body or the mind, whether it be founded in the animal or rational part of our nature; in a word, whether it be such as is entitled to any other reward,

* *The Spectator*, No. 169.

besides that secret satisfaction and contentment of mind which is essential to it, and the kind reception it procures us in the world, we must examine it by the following rules:

First, whether it acts with steadiness and uniformity in sickness and in health, in prosperity and in adversity; if otherwise, it is to be looked upon as nothing else but an irradiation of the mind from some new supply of spirits, or a more kindly circulation of the blood. Sir Francis Bacon mentions a cunning solicitor, who would never ask a favour of a great man before dinner; but took care to prefer his petition at a time when the party petitioned had his mind free from care, and his appetites in good humour. Such a transient temporary good-nature as this, is not that philanthropy, that love of mankind, which deserves the title of a moral virtue.

The next way of a man's bringing his good-nature to the test is, to consider whether it operates according to the rules of reason and duty; for if, notwithstanding its general benevolence to mankind, it makes no distinction between its objects, if it exerts itself promiscuously towards the deserving and the undeserving, if it relieves alike the idle and the indigent, if it gives itself up to the first petitioner and lights upon any one rather by accident than choice, it may pass for an amiable instinct, but must not assume the name of a moral virtue.

The third trial of good-nature will be the examining ourselves, whether or no we are able to exert it to our own disadvantage, and employ it on proper objects, notwithstanding any little pain, want, or inconvenience which may arise to ourselves from it. In a word, whether we are willing to risk any part of our fortune, our reputation, or health, or ease, for the benefit of mankind.

Among all these expressions of good-nature, I shall single out that which goes under the general name of charity, as it consists in relieving the indigent; that being a trial of this kind which offers itself to us almost at all times, and in every

place. I should propose it as a rule, to every one who is provided with any competency of fortune more than sufficient for the necessities of life, to lay aside a certain portion of his income for the use of the poor. This I would look upon as an offering to Him who has a right to the whole, for the use of those whom . . . He has described as His own representatives upon earth. At the same time we should manage our charity with such prudence and caution, that we may not hurt our own friends or relations, whilst we are doing good to those who are strangers to us.

JOSEPH ADDISON.

The Spectator, No. 177 (September 22, 1711).

7. THE PRINCIPLE OF ATTRACTION.

Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods; and, in many particular cases, persons are carried on to do good to others as the end their affections tend to and rest in, and manifest that they find real satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose. Thus relations, merely nominal, are sought and invented, not by governors, but by the lowest of the people; which are found sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and copartnerships; weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles of that union; but they are, in truth, merely the occasions, as anything may be of anything, upon which our nature carries us on according

to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions, therefore, would be nothing at all were there not this prior disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much one body that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these being distinct cements of society. And, therefore, to have no restraint from, nor regard to others in our behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.

JOSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham:
Human Nature, and Other Sermons.

8. SOCIETY AND SELF-LOVE.

From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that *there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good; and that the same objections lie against one of these assertions as against the other.* For—

First, there is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual. And if there lie in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is momentary love; if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another; this is itself benevolence, or the

love of another. Be it ever so short, be it ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for as really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you that though benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends most directly to public good and the latter to private, yet they are so perfectly coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made for both.

Secondly, this will further appear from observing that the several passions and affections which are distinct both from benevolence and self-love, do, in general, contribute and lead us to public good as really as to private. It might be thought too minute and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to distinguish between, and compare together, the several passions or appetites, distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is the security and good of society; and the passions distinct from self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and good of the individual. It is enough to the present argument that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation against successful vice, that these are public affections or passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise as private affections, as tending to private good, this does not hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good. . . .

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Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve, and disapprove their own actions. . . . And that this faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon.

BISHOP BUTLER. *Human Nature,
and Other Sermons.*

9. DUTY AND INTEREST.

The nature of man, considered in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world. The nature of man, considered in his public or social capacity, leads him to a right behaviour in society, to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain degree, but not entirely; their actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or respects, and they often violate their nature in both; i.e., as they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature is abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification, for the sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally so to both by the same actions.

BISHOP BUTLER. *Human Nature,
and Other Sermons.*

10. THE HEALTH OF THE STATE.

Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the human body could be preserved only

by a certain precise regimen of diet and exercise, of which every, the smallest, violation necessarily occasioned some degree of disorder proportioned to the degree of the violation. Experience, however, would seem to show that the human body frequently preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. M. Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered that in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his own condition is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy in some degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, though it no doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner as it has done in the natural body for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.

11. THE SERVICES OF FOREIGN TRADE.

The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole benefit which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually occupied in performing, to all the different countries between which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants and carrying out the superfluities of his own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver which may be wanted, into the countries which have no mines, is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.

It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of America has enriched Europe. By the

abundance of the American mines, those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what had been its usual price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater number of purchasers; perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those metals rather less fit for the purpose of money than they were before. In order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket where a groat would have done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling—this inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America, however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the ancient commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its

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produce increased in all the different countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants.

ADAM SMITH: *The Wealth of Nations*.

12. SOCIETY A CONTRACT.

Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts, for objects of mere occasional interest, may be dissolved at pleasure; but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact* sanctioned† by the inviolable oath‡ which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.

EDMUND BURKE: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

13. TWO MEN I HONOUR.

Two men I honour, and no third. First, the toilworn Craftsman that with earth-made Implement laboriously conquers the earth, and makes her man's. Venerable to

* Law.

† Established.

‡ Rule.

me is the hard Hand; crooked, coarse; wherein notwithstanding lies a cunning virtue, indefeasibly royal, as of the Sceptre of this Planet. Venerable too is the rugged face, all weather-tanned, besoiled, with its rude intelligence; for it is the face of a man living manlike. O, but the more venerable for thy rudeness, and because we must pity as well as love thee! Hardly entreated Brother! For us was thy back so bent, for us were thy straight limbs and fingers so deformed; thou wert our Conscript, on whom the lot fell, and fighting our battles wert so marred. For in thee too lay a god-created Form, but it was not to be unfolded; encrusted must it stand with the thick adhesions and defacements of Labour: and thy body, like thy soul, was not to know freedom. Yet toil on, toil on: thou art in thy duty, be out of it who may; thou toilest for the altogether indispensable, for daily bread.

A second man I honour, and still more highly; Him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread, but the bread of Life. Is not he too in his duty; endeavouring towards inward Harmony; revealing this, by act or by word, through all his outward endeavours, be they high or low? Highest of all, when his outward and his inward endeavour are one; when we can name him Artist; not earthly Craftsman only, but inspired Thinker, who with heaven-made Implement conquers Heaven for us! If the poor and humble toil that we have Food, must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that he have Light, have Guidance, Freedom, Immortality?—These two, in all their degrees, I honour; all else is chaff and dust, which let the wind blow whither it listeth.

Unspeakably touching is it, however, when I find both dignities united; and he that must toil outwardly for the lowest of man's wants, is also toiling inwardly for the highest. Sublimier in this world know I nothing than a Peasant Saint, could such now anywhere be met with. Such a one will take thee back to Nazareth itself; thou

wilt see the splendour of Heaven spring forth from the humblest depths of the Earth, like a light shining in great darkness.

THOMAS CARLYLE: *Sartor Resartus*.

14. HEROISM.

As I take it, Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, those great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered, were the history of these. Too clearly it is a topic we shall do no justice to in this place!

One comfort is, that Great Men, taken up in any way, are profitable company. We cannot look, however imperfectly, upon a great man, without gaining something by him. He is the living light-fountain, which it is good and pleasant to be near—the light which enlightens, which has enlightened the darkness of the world; and this not as a kindled lamp only, but rather as a natural luminary shining by the gift of Heaven; a flowing light-fountain, as I say, of native original insight, of manhood and heroic nobleness—in whose radiance all souls feel that it is well with them. On any terms whatsoever, you will not grudge to wander in such neighbourhood for a while. These. . . Heroes, chosen out of widely-distant countries and epochs, and in mere external figure differing altogether, ought, if we look faithfully at them, to illustrate several things for us. Could we see *them* well, we should get some glimpses into the very marrow of the world's history. How happy, could I but, in any measure, in such times as these, make

manifest to you the meanings of Heroism; the divine relation (for I may well call it such) which in all times unites a Great Man to other men; and thus, as it were, not exhaust my subject, but so much as break ground on it! At all events, I must make the attempt.

CARLYLE: *Heroes and Hero Worship.*

15. POET AND PROPHET.

Poet and Prophet differ greatly in our loose modern notions of them. In some old languages, again, the titles are synonymous; *Vates* means both Prophet and Poet: and indeed at all times, Prophet and Poet, well understood, have much kindred of meaning. Fundamentally indeed they are still the same; in this most important respect especially, That they have penetrated both of them into the sacred mystery of the Universe; what Goethe calls 'the open secret'. 'Which is the great secret?' asks one.—'The *open* secret'—open to all, seen by almost none! That divine mystery, which lies everywhere in all Beings, 'the Divine Idea of the World, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance', as Fichte styles it; of which all Appearance, from the starry sky to the grass of the field, but especially the Appearance of Man and his work, is but the *vesture*, the embodiment that renders it visible. This divine mystery *is* in all times and in all places; veritably is. In most times and places it is greatly overlooked: and the Universe, definable always in one or the other dialect, as the realized Thought of God, is considered a trivial, inert, commonplace matter—as if, says the Satirist, it were a dead thing, which some upholsterer had put together! It could do no good, at present, to *speak* much about this; but it is a pity for every one of us if we do not know it, live ever in the knowledge of it. Really a most mournful pity—a failure to live at all, if we live otherwise!

But now, I say, whoever may forget this divine mystery, the *Vates*, whether Prophet or Poet, has penetrated into

it; is a man sent hither to make it more impressively known to us. That always is his message; he is to reveal that to us—that sacred mystery which he more than others lives ever present with. While others forget it, he knows it—I might say, he has been driven to know it; without consent asked of *him*, he finds himself living in it, bound to live in it. Once more, here is no Hearsay, but a direct Insight and Belief; this man too could not help being a sincere man! Whosoever may live in the shows of things, it is for him a necessity of nature to live in the very fact of things. A man once more, in earnest with the Universe, though all others were but toying with it! He is a *Vates*, first of all, in virtue of being sincere. So far Poet and Prophet, participators in the ‘open secret’, are one.

CARLYLE: *Heroes and Hero Worship*.

16. GOOD AND BAD MANNERS.

We imperatively require a perception of and a homage to beauty in our companions. Other virtues are in request in the field and workyard, but a certain degree of taste is not to be spared in those we sit with. I could better eat with one who did not respect the truth or the laws, than with a sloven and unrepresentable person. Moral qualities rule the world, but at short distances the senses are despotic. The same discrimination of fit and fair runs out, if with less rigour, into all parts of life. The average spirit of the energetic class is good sense, acting under certain limitations and to certain ends. It entertains every natural gift. Social in its nature, it respects everything which tends to unite men. It delights in measure. The love of beauty is mainly the love of measure or proportion. The person who screams, or uses the superlative degree, or converses with heat, puts whole drawing-rooms to flight. If you wish to be loved, love measure. You must have genius, or a prodigious usefulness, if you

will hide the want of measure. This perception comes in to polish and perfect the parts of the social instrument. Society will pardon much to genius and special gifts, but, being in its nature a convention, it loves what is conventional, or what belongs to coming together. That makes the good and bad of manners, namely, what helps or hinders fellowship. For, fashion is not good sense absolute, but relative; not good sense private, but good sense entertaining company. It hates corners and sharp points of character, hates quarrelsome, egotistical, solitary, and gloomy people; hates whatever can interfere with total blending of parties; whilst it values all peculiarities as in the highest degree refreshing, which can consist with good fellowship.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON. *Essays.*

17. HOUSEKEEPING.

Is our housekeeping sacred and honourable? Does it raise and inspire us, or does it cripple us instead? I ought to be armed by every part and function of my household, by all my social function, by my economy, by my feasting, by my voting, by my traffic. Yet I am almost no party to any of these things. Custom does it for me, gives me no power therefrom, and runs me in debt to boot. We spend our incomes for paint and paper, for a hundred trifles, I know not what, and not for the things of a man. Our expense is almost all for conformity. It is for cake that we run in debt; 'tis not the intellect, not the heart, not beauty, not worship, that costs so much. Why needs any man be rich? Why must he have horses, fine garments, handsome apartments, access to public houses and places of amusement? Only for want of thought. Give his mind a new image, and he flees into a solitary garden or garret to enjoy it, and is richer with that dream, than the fee of a county could make him. But we are first thoughtless, and then find that we are moneyless. We

are first sensual, and then must be rich. We dare not trust our wit for making our house pleasant to our friend, and so we buy ice-creams. He is accustomed to carpets, and we have not sufficient character to put floor-cloths out of his mind whilst he stays in the house, and so we pile the floor with carpets. . . .

Let us learn the meaning of economy. Economy is a high, humane office, a sacrament, when its aim is grand; when it is the prudence of simple tastes, when it is practised for freedom, or love, or devotion. Much of the economy which we see in houses is of a base origin, and is best kept out of sight. Parched corn eaten to-day that I may have roast fowl to my dinner on Sunday, is a baseness; but parched corn and a house with one apartment, that I may be free of all perturbations, that I may be serene and docile to what the mind shall speak, and girt and road-ready for the lowest mission of knowledge or good-will, is frugality for gods and heroes.

Can we not learn the lesson of self-help? Society is full of infirm people, who incessantly summon others to serve them. They contrive everywhere to exhaust for their single comfort the entire means and appliances of that luxury to which our invention has yet attained. Sofas, ottomans, stoves, wine, game-fowl, spices, perfumes, rides, the theatre, entertainments—all these they want, they need, and whatever can be suggested more than these, they crave also, as if it was the bread which should keep them from starving; and if they miss any one, they represent themselves as the most wronged and most wretched persons on earth. One must have been born and bred with them to know how to prepare a meal for their learned stomach. Meantime, they never bestir themselves to serve another person; not they! they have a great deal more to do for themselves than they can possibly perform; nor do they once perceive the cruel joke of their lives, but the more odious they grow, the sharper is the tone of their

complaining and craving. Can anything be so elegant as to have few wants and to serve them one's self, so as to have somewhat left to give, instead of being always prompt to grab ?

EMERSON: *Man the Reformer, a Lecture.*

18. MANNERS.

Manners are the happy ways of doing things; each once a stroke of genius or of love—now repeated and hardened into usage. They form at last a rich varnish, with which the routine of life is washed, and its details adorned. If they are superficial, so are the dew-drops which give such a depth to the morning meadows. Manners are very communicable; men catch them from each other. Consuelo, in the romance, boasts of the lessons she had given the nobles in manners, on the stage; and, in real life, Talma taught Napoleon the arts of behaviour. Genius invents fine manners, which the baron and the baroness copy very fast, and, by the advantage of a palace, better the instruction. They stereotype the lesson they have learned into a mode.

The power of manners is incessant—an element as unconcealable as fire. The nobility cannot in any country be disguised, and no more in a republic or a democracy than in a kingdom. No man can resist their influence. There are certain manners which are learned in good society, of that force, that, if a person have them, he or she must be considered, and is everywhere welcome, though without beauty, or wealth, or genius. Give a boy address and accomplishments, and you give him the mastery of palaces and fortunes where he goes. He has not the trouble of earning or owning them; they solicit him to enter and possess.

EMERSON: *The Conduct of Life.*

19. THE WISDOM OF HUMANITY.

In groups where debate is earnest, and especially on high questions, the company become aware that the

thought rises to an equal level in all bosoms, that all have a spiritual property in what was said, as well as the sayer. They all become wiser than they were. It arches over them like a temple, this unity of thought, in which every heart beats with nobler sense of power and duty, and thinks and acts with unusual solemnity. All are conscious of attaining to a higher self-possession. It shines for all. There is a certain wisdom of humanity which is common to the greatest men with the lowest, and which our ordinary education often labours to silence and obstruct. The mind is one, and the best minds, who love truth for its own sake, think much less of property in truth. They accept it thankfully everywhere, and do not label or stamp it with any man's name, for it is theirs long beforehand, and from eternity. The learned and the studious of thought have no monopoly of wisdom. Their violence of direction in some degree disqualifies them to think truly. We owe many valuable observations to people who are not very acute or profound, and who say the thing without effort, which we want and have long been hunting in vain. The action of the soul is oftener in that which is felt and left unsaid, than in that which is said in any conversation. It broods over every society, and they unconsciously seek for it in each other. We know better than we do. We do not yet possess ourselves, and we know at the same time that we are much more. I feel the same truth how often in my trivial conversation with my neighbours, that somewhat higher in each of us overlooks this by-play, and Jove nods to Jove from behind each of us.

Men descend to meet. In their habitual and mean service to the world, for which they forsake their native nobleness, they resemble those Arabian sheiks, who dwell in mean houses, and affect an external poverty, to escape the rapacity of the Pacha, and reserve all their display of wealth for their interior and guarded retirements.

As it is present in all persons, so it is in every period of

life. It is adult already in the infant man. In my dealing with my child, my Latin and Greek, my accomplishments and my money stead me nothing; but as much soul as I have avails. If I am wilful, he sets his will against mine, one for one, and leaves me, if I please, the degradation of beating him by my superiority of strength. But if I renounce my will, and act for the soul, setting that up as umpire between us two, out of his young eyes looks the same soul; he reveres and loves with me.

EMERSON: *Essays*.

20. NOBLE MANNERS.

High behaviour is as rare in fiction as it is in fact. Scott is praised for the fidelity with which he painted the demeanour and conversation of the superior classes. Certainly, kings and queens, nobles and great ladies, had some right to complain of the absurdity that had been put in their mouths, before the days of *Waverley*; but neither does Scott's dialogue bear criticism. His lords brave each other in smart epigrammatic speeches, but the dialogue is in costume, and does not please on the second reading; it is not warm with life. In Shakespeare alone, the speakers do not strut and bridle, the dialogue is easily great, and he adds to so many titles that of being the best-bred man in England, and in Christendom. Once or twice in a lifetime we are permitted to enjoy the charm of noble manners, in the presence of a man or woman who have no bar in their nature, but whose character emanates freely in their word and gesture. A beautiful form is better than a beautiful face; a beautiful behaviour is better than a beautiful form; it gives a higher pleasure than statues or pictures; it is the finest of the fine arts. A man is but a little thing in the midst of the objects of nature, yet, by the moral quality radiating from his countenance, he may abolish all considerations of magnitude, and in his manners equal the majesty of the world. I have seen an individual,

whose manners, though wholly within the conventions of elegant society, were never learned there, but were original and commanding, and held out protection and prosperity; one who did not need the aid of a court-suit, but carried the holiday in his eye; who exhilarated the fancy by flinging wide the doors of new modes of existence; who shook off the captivity of etiquette, with happy, spirited bearing, good-natured and free as Robin Hood; yet with the port of an emperor—if need be, calm, serious, and fit to stand the gaze of millions.

EMERSON: *Essays*.

21. KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION.

But even one step farther our infidelity has gone. It appears that some doubt is felt by good and wise men, whether really the happiness and probity of men is increased by the culture of the mind in those disciplines to which we give the name of education. Unhappily, too, the doubt comes from scholars, from persons who have tried these methods. In their experience, the scholar was not raised by the sacred thoughts amongst which he dwelt, but used them to selfish ends. He was a profane person, and became a showman, turning his gifts to a marketable use, and not to his own sustenance and growth. It was found that the intellect could be independently developed, that is, in separation from the man, as any single organ can be invigorated, and the result was monstrous. A canine appetite for knowledge was generated, which must still be fed, but was never satisfied, and this knowledge not being directed on action, never took the character of substantial, humane truth, blessing those whom it entered. It gave the scholar certain powers of expression, the power of speech, the power of poetry, of literary art, but it did not bring him to peace, or to beneficence.

When the literary class betray a destitution of faith, it is not strange that society should be disheartened and

sensualized by unbelief. What remedy? Life must be lived on a higher plane. We must go up to a higher platform, to which we are always invited to ascend; there, the whole aspect of things changes. I resist the scepticism of our education, and of our educated men. I do not believe that the differences of opinion and character in men are organic. I do not recognize, beside the class of the good and the wise, a permanent class of sceptics, or a class of conservatives, or of malignants, or of materialists. I do not believe in two classes. You remember the story of the poor woman who importuned King Philip of Macedon to grant her justice, which Philip refused: the woman exclaimed, 'I appeal'; the king, astonished, asked to whom she appealed; the woman replied, 'From Philip drunk to Philip sober'. The text will suit me very well. I believe not in two classes of men, but in man in two moods, in Philip drunk and Philip sober. I think, according to the good-hearted word of Plato, 'Unwillingly the soul is deprived of truth'. Iron conservative, miser, or thief, no man is, but by a supposed necessity, which he tolerates by shortness or torpidity of sight. The soul lets no man go without some visitations and holy days of a diviner presence. It would be easy to show, by a narrow scanning of any man's biography, that we are not so wedded to our paltry performances of every kind, but that every man has at intervals the grace to scorn his performances, in comparing them with his belief of what he should do, that he puts himself on the side of his enemies, listening gladly to what they say of him, and accusing himself of the same things.

EMERSON: *New England Reformers*.

22. CITIES AND MANNERS.

Cities give us collision. 'Tis said London and New York take the nonsense out of a man. A great part of our education is sympathetic and social. Boys and girls who have been brought up with well-informed and superior

people, show in their manners an inestimable grace. Fuller says that 'William, Earl of Nassau, won a subject from the King of Spain every time he put off his hat'. You cannot have one well-bred man without a whole society of such. They keep each other up to any high point. Especially women; it requires a great many cultivated women—saloons of bright, elegant, reading women, accustomed to ease and refinement, to spectacles, pictures, sculpture, poetry, and to elegant society—in order that you should have one Madame de Staël. The head of a commercial house, or a leading lawyer or politician, is brought into daily contact with troops of men from all parts of the country, and those too the driving-wheels, the business men of each section, and one can hardly suggest for an apprehensive man a more searching culture. Besides, we must remember the high social possibilities of a million of men. The best bribe which London offers to-day to the imagination is that, in such a vast variety of people and conditions, one can believe there is room for persons of romantic character to exist, and that the poet, the mystic, and the hero may hope to confront their counterparts.

EMERSON *The Conduct of Life.*

23. THE PERSONAL AND THE BENEVOLENT INSTINCTS.

The religion of Humanity establishes the discipline of the affections when it secures a direct and continual appeal to the nobler instincts; which although, in themselves, the less active, are at once the most delightful to experience and the most capable of a great expansion. Without doubt this form of discipline implies a constant struggle against the ascendancy of the personal instincts. But this conflict within would be far more desperate, and far less capable of conclusion, under a system of personal gratification. For beside the constant effort to repress the benevolent emotions, it would be necessary to restrain the antagonism of the various lower inclinations. Even when

one of the personal instincts had succeeded in effectively crushing the benevolent within, the energy of the individual would still fail in the vain task of resisting the world without, against which the ascendancy of egoism necessarily forms a permanent rebellion. On the contrary, the altruistic system of discipline, which holds a continual rein upon the personal instincts, is the one destined to true success in the task. Beside the important help which the world without supplies, it is far from requiring the sacrifice of personality—but requires only its due subordination to sociability. The religion of Humanity ennobles indeed our lower instincts; even whilst training them to discipline. For the cares of every description, required day by day for the preservation of the individual, find in this religion a sanction, as the means which enable each to accomplish better his social duties; so long as they are not pushed beyond the natural limits, which men are too ready to neglect. Sound religion especially condemns all habitual austerities; which, however respectable in intention, would lessen the general force of every servant of Humanity, and hamper the exercise of his ordinary duties. It must be said also for the system of altruism, that not only does it sanction all reasonable regard for the person, but it largely assists such regard when treated in the whole; for it does much to strengthen the physical health, as several physicians have judiciously remarked. The entire freedom from anxiety and the sweet sense of expansiveness which invariably follow the active cultivation of the nobler feelings, have a direct part in producing a balance in the physical nature.

AUGUSTE COMTE. *System of Positive Polity*
(C. T. Gorham's *Great French Rationalists*).

24. THE GENERAL GOOD.

To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach

to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.

JOHN STUART MILL. *Utilitarianism*.

25. GOOD ACTIONS.

It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights—that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations—of any one else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue; the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words, to be a public benefactor,

are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general need concern themselves habitually about so large an object.

J. S. MILL: *Utilitarianism*.

26. PRESSURE OF POPULATION.

The excess of fertility has itself rendered the process of civilization inevitable; and the process of civilization must inevitably diminish fertility, and at last destroy its excess. From the beginning, pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress. It produced the original diffusion of the race. It compelled men to abandon predatory habits and take to agriculture. It led to the clearing of the Earth's surface. It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments. It has stimulated to progressive improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelligence. It is daily thrusting us into closer contact and more mutually-dependent relationships. And after having caused, as it ultimately must, the due peopling of the globe, and the raising of all its habitable parts into the highest state of culture—after having brought all processes for the satisfaction of human wants to perfection—after having, at the same time, developed the intellect into complete competency for its work, and the feelings into complete fitness for social life—after having done all this, the pressure of population, as it gradually finishes its work, must gradually bring itself to an end.

HERBERT SPENCER: *The Principles of Biology*.

27. ALTRUISM.

A creature can be on no terms of reciprocity with his Creator: he can only be a recipient from God, never a

renderer back of good. The very thought of performing an act of kindness or sympathy to God is absurd. The infinite disparity between the two beings, man and his Maker, has as a consequence that 'every good gift and every perfect gift is from above'. Only to his fellows can man be completely altruistic, 'hoping for nothing again'. That numbers of men and women among the higher races are capable of acts of unalloyed altruism, in which there is not a vestige of after-thought tending to self-advantage, will be denied by the naturally cynical, or by those educated in an evil religious or philosophic system. The mother who tends her sick child and scorns any counsels to spare her health and strength; the rough miner who bids his mate seize the one chance of escape up the shaft, as he has a wife and children, whereas the speaker is a bachelor; the surgeon who sucks diphtheric poison from a dying child's throat and dies himself in consequence—are examples of the love and sacrifice even now to be found in the nobler hearts. And it is denying evolution in fact and theory to question the certainty that they will become less exceptional than they now are. But in this capacity of sacrifice regardless of self we have the purest essence of the best religions—a human quality which exists, which has been evolved in the long travail of the world, but which may be cultivated with prospects of vastly greater increase now that its supreme beauty and price are perceived and valued. When the mental and moral qualities of man are regarded as subject, in common with other forms of life, to the law of heredity and variation, their cultivation and improvement will be conducted on the scientific basis which has already produced such surprising results in other parts of the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The plasticity of human nature is even yet but little appreciated, though what the Spartans, the Stoics, and the Jesuits succeeded in doing with their imperfect empirical methods is suggestive enough. But these, or the two latter at least, only

contemplated the education of the individual. What is wanted is the conscious cultivation, enlightened by science, of society as a whole.

As regards the end to which religions have in an unconscious way more or less tended—the general well-being—there will probably be little difficulty in admitting that it is an object which civilized man has proved himself capable of attaining in a considerable measure already. The superiority of the modern nations, not only to savages, but even to their own not very remote ancestors, is beyond dispute; and this not only in reference to physical well-being, but to all the higher sentiments and endowments of man. Imperfect as our social state still is, heartrending as the condition of the poor in town and country must be pronounced to be, it is, nevertheless, vastly in advance of previous conditions, and our own sensitiveness and shame on the subject, though we are not yet sensitive and ashamed enough, are in themselves evidence of improvement.

JAMES COTTER MORISON · *The Service of Man.*

28. POSTERITY.

The benevolent regards and purposes of men in masses seldom can be supposed to extend beyond their own generation. They may look to posterity as an audience, may hope for its attention, and labour for its praise: they may trust to its recognition of unacknowledged merit, and demand its justice for contemporary wrong. But all this is mere selfishness, and does not involve the slightest regard to, or consideration of, the interest of those by whose numbers we would fain swell the circle of our flatterers, and by whose authority we would gladly support our presently disputed claims. The idea of self-denial for the sake of posterity, of practising present economy for the sake of debtors yet unborn, of planting forests that our descendants may live under their shade, or of raising cities for future nations to inhabit, never, I suppose, efficiently takes place

among publicly recognized motives of exertion. Yet these are not the less our duties; nor is our part fitly sustained upon the earth, unless the range of our intended and deliberate usefulness include, not only the companions but the successors, of our pilgrimage. God has lent us the earth for our life; it is a great entail. It belongs as much to those who are to come after us, and whose names are already written in the book of creation, as to us; and we have no right, by anything that we do or neglect, to involve them in unnecessary penalties, or to deprive them of benefits which it was in our power to bequeath. And this the more, because it is one of the appointed conditions of the labour of men that, in proportion to the time between the seed-sowing and the harvest, is the fullness of the fruit; and that generally, therefore, the farther off we place our aim, and the less we desire to be ourselves the witnesses of what we have laboured for, the more wide and rich will be the measure of our success. Men cannot benefit those that are with them as they can benefit those who come after them; and of all the pulpits from which human voice is ever sent forth, there is none from which it reaches so far as from the grave.

Nor is there, indeed, any present loss, in such respect for futurity. Every human action gains in honour, in grace, in all the true magnificence, by its regard to things that are to come. It is the far sight, the quiet and confident patience, that above all other attributes, separate man from man, and near him to his Maker; and there is no action nor art, whose majesty we may not measure by this test.

JOHN RUSKIN *The Seven Lamps of Architecture.*

29. THE DIGNITY OF WOMAN.

Not less wrong—perhaps even more foolishly wrong (for I will anticipate thus far what I hope to prove)—is the idea that woman is only the shadow and attendant image of her lord, owing him a thoughtless and servile obedience, and

supported altogether in her weakness by the pre-eminence of his fortitude.

This, I say, is the most foolish of all errors respecting her who was made to be the helpmate of man. As if he could be helped effectively by a shadow, or worthily by a slave!

Let us try, then, whether we cannot get at some clear and harmonious idea (it must be harmonious if it is true) of what womanly mind and virtue are in power and office, with respect to man's; and how their relations, rightly accepted, aid, and increase, the vigour, and honour, and authority of both.

And now I must repeat one thing I said in the last lecture: namely, that the first use of education was to enable us to consult with the wisest and the greatest men on all points of earnest difficulty. That to use books rightly, was to go to them for help: to appeal to them, when our own knowledge and power of thought failed; to be led by them into wider sight, purer conception than our own, and receive from them the united sentence of the judges and councils of all time, against our solitary and unstable opinion.

Let us do this now. Let us see whether the greatest, the wisest, the purest-hearted of all ages are agreed in any wise on this point: let us hear the testimony they have left respecting what they held to be the true dignity of woman, and her mode of help to man.

And first let us take Shakespeare.

Note broadly in the outset, Shakespeare has no heroes;—he has only heroines. There is not one entirely heroic figure in all his plays, except the slight sketch of Henry the Fifth, exaggerated for the purposes of the stage; and the still slighter Valentine in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*. In his laboured and perfect plays you have no hero. Othello would have been one, if his simplicity had not been so great as to leave him the prey of every base practice round him; but he is the only example even approximating

to the heroic type. Coriolanus—Cæsar—Antony, stand in flawed strength, and fall by their vanities;—Hamlet is indolent, and drowsily speculative; Romeo an impatient boy; the Merchant of Venice languidly submissive to adverse fortune; Kent, in *King Lear*, is entirely noble at heart, but too rough and unpolished to be of true use at the critical time, and he sinks into the office of a servant only. Orlando, no less noble, is yet the despairing toy of chance, followed, comforted, saved, by Rosalind. Whereas there is hardly a play that has not a perfect woman in it, steadfast in grave hope, and errorless purpose: Cordelia, Desdemona, Isabella, Hermione, Imogen, Queen Katherine, Perdita, Sylvia, Viola, Rosalind, Helena, and last, and perhaps loveliest, Virgilia, are all faultless; conceived in the highest heroic type of humanity.

Then observe, secondly,

The catastrophe of every play is caused always by the folly or fault of a man; the redemption, if there be any, is by the wisdom and virtue of a woman, and, failing that, there is none. The catastrophe of *King Lear* is owing to his own want of judgement, his impatient vanity, his misunderstanding of his children; the virtue of his one true daughter would have saved him from all the injuries of the others, unless he had cast her away from him; as it is, she all but saves him.

Of *Othello* I need not trace the tale—nor the one weakness of his so mighty love; nor the inferiority of his perceptive intellect to that even of the second woman character in the play, the Emilia who dies in wild testimony against his error:—‘Oh, murderous coxcomb! What would such a fool Do with so good a wife?’

In *Romeo and Juliet*, the wise and entirely brave stragem of the wife is brought to ruinous issue by the reckless impatience of her husband. In *Winter’s Tale*, and in *Cymbeline*, the happiness and existence of two princely households lost through long years, and imperilled to the

death by the folly and obstinacy of the husbands, are redeemed at last by the queenly patience and wisdom of the wives. In *Measure for Measure*, the injustice of the judge, and the corrupt cowardice of the brother, are opposed to the victorious truth and adamantine purity of a woman. In *Coriolanus*, the mother's counsel, acted upon in time, would have saved her son from all evil; his momentary forgetfulness of it is his ruin; her prayer, at last granted, saves him—not, indeed, from death, but from the curse of living as the destroyer of his country.

And what shall I say of Julia, constant against the fickleness of a lover who is a mere wicked child?—of Helena, against the petulance and insult of a careless youth?—of the patience of Hero, the passion of Beatrice, and the calmly devoted wisdom of the 'unlessoned girl', who appears among the helplessness, the blindness, and the vindictive passions of men, as a gentle angel, to save merely by her presence, and defeat the worst intensities of crime by her smile?

Observe, further, among all the principal figures in Shakespeare's plays, there is only one weak woman—Ophelia; and it is because she fails Hamlet at the critical moment, and is not, and cannot in her nature be, a guide to him when he needs her most, that all the bitter catastrophe follows. Finally, though there are three wicked women among the principal figures, Lady Macbeth, Regan, and Goneril, they are felt at once to be frightful exceptions to the ordinary laws of life; fatal in their influence also in proportion to the power for good which they have abandoned.

Such, in broad light, is Shakespeare's testimony to the position and character of women in human life. He represents them as infallibly faithful and wise counsellors,—incorruptibly just and pure examples—strong always to sanctify, even when they cannot save.

30. WOMAN'S EDUCATION.

'A countenance in which did meet
Sweet records, promises as sweet'.

The perfect loveliness of a woman's countenance can only consist in that majestic peace, which is founded in the memory of happy and useful years,—full of sweet records; and from the joining of this with that yet more majestic childishness, which is still full of change and promise;—opening always,—modest at once, and bright, with hope of better things to be won, and to be bestowed. There is no old age where there is still that promise—it is eternal youth.

Thus, then, you have first to mould her physical frame, and then, as the strength she gains will permit you, to fill and temper her mind with all knowledge and thoughts which tend to confirm its natural instincts of justice, and refine its natural tact of love.

All such knowledge should be given her as may enable her to understand, and even to aid, the work of men: and yet it should be given, not as knowledge,—not as if it were, or could be, for her an object to know; but only to feel, and to judge. It is of no moment, as a matter of pride or perfectness in herself, whether she knows many languages or one; but it is of the utmost, that she should be able to show kindness to a stranger, and to understand the sweetness of a stranger's tongue. It is of no moment to her own worth or dignity that she should be acquainted with this science or that; but it is of the highest that she should be trained in habits of accurate thought; that she should understand the meaning, the inevitableness, and the loveliness of natural laws, and follow at least some one path of scientific attainment, as far as to the threshold of that bitter Valley of Humiliation, into which only the wisest and bravest of men can descend, owning themselves for ever children, gathering pebbles on a boundless shore.

It is of little consequence how many positions of cities she knows, or how many dates of events, or how many names of celebrated persons—it is not the object of education to turn a woman into a dictionary; but it is deeply necessary that she should be taught to enter with her whole personality into the history she reads; to picture the passages of it vitally in her own bright imagination; to apprehend, with her fine instincts, the pathetic circumstances and dramatic relations, which the historian too often only eclipses by his reasoning, and disconnects by his arrangement: it is for her to trace the hidden equities of divine reward, and catch sight, through the darkness, of the fateful threads of woven fire that connect error with its retribution. But, chiefly of all, she is to be taught to extend the limits of her sympathy with respect to that history which is being for ever determined, as the moments pass in which she draws her peaceful breath; and to the contemporary calamity which, were it but rightly mourned by her, would recur no more hereafter. She is to exercise herself in imagining what would be the effects upon her mind and conduct, if she were daily brought into the presence of the suffering which is not the less real because shut from her sight. She is to be taught somewhat to understand the nothingness of the proportion which that little world in which she lives and loves, bears to the world in which God lives and loves;—and solemnly she is to be taught to strive that her thoughts of piety may not be feeble in proportion to the number they embrace, nor her prayer more languid than it is for the momentary relief from pain of her husband or her child, when it is uttered for the multitudes of those who have none to love them,—and is ‘for all who are desolate and oppressed’ . . .

And indeed, if there were to be any difference between a girl's education and a boy's, I should say that of the two the girl should be earlier led, as her intellect ripens

faster, into deep and serious subjects; and that her range of literature should be, not more, but less frivolous, calculated to add the qualities of patience and seriousness to her natural poignancy of thought and quickness of wit; and also to keep her in a lofty and pure element of thought. I enter not now into any question of choice of books; only be sure that her books are not heaped up in her lap as they fall out of the package of the circulating library, wet with the last and lightest spray of the fountain of folly.

JOHN RUSKIN. *Sesame and Lilies*.

31. THE RIGHT TO FREE LIFE.

We content ourselves with enacting that no man shall be used by other men as a means against his will, but we leave it to be pretty much a matter of chance whether or no he shall be qualified to fulfil any social function, to contribute anything to the common good, and to do so freely (*i.e.*, under the conception of a common good). The only reason why a man should not be used by other men simply as a means to their ends, is that he should use himself as a means to an end which is really his and theirs at once. But while we say that he shall not be used as a means, we often leave him without the chance of using himself for any social end at all.

THOMAS HILL GREEN. *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

32. TAKING SIDES.

There may be clear ground for saying, in regard to any conflict, that one side rather than the other ought to have been taken, not because those on one side were, those on the other were not, entitled to say that they had a right to act as they did, but because the common good of a nation or mankind was clearly prompted by one line of action, not by the other. *E.g.* in the American War of secession,

though it would be difficult to say that a man had not as much a right to fight for his seceding state as for the Union, yet as the special interest of the seceding states was that of maintaining slavery, there was reason for holding that the side of the Union, not that of the seceding states, was the one which ought to be taken. On the other hand, it does not follow that in a struggle for sovereignty the good of man is more served by one of the competing powers than by the other. Good may come out of the conflict without one power contributing more to it than the other. There may thus be as little ground retrospectively for saying that one side or the other ought to have been taken, as that men had a right to take one and not the other. At the same time, as regards the individual, there is no reason for doubting that the better the motive which determines him to take this side or that, the more he is actuated in doing so by some unselfish desire for human good, the more free he is from egotism, and that conceit or opinionatedness which is a form of egotism, the more good he will do whichever side he adopts.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

33. SUBMISSION TO THE STATE.

To ask why I am to submit to the power of the state, is to ask why I am to allow my life to be regulated by that complex of institutions without which I literally should not have a life to call my own, nor should be able to ask for a justification of what I am called on to do. For that I may have a life which I can call my own, I must not only be conscious of myself and of ends which I present to myself as mine; I must be able to reckon on a certain freedom of action and acquisition for the attainment of those ends, and this can only be secured through common recognition of this freedom on the part of each other by members of a society, as being for a common good. Without this, the very consciousness of having ends of his own

and a life which he can direct in a certain way, a life of which he can make something, would remain dormant in a man.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

34. THE BASIS OF POLITICAL OBEDIENCE.

The relation of constraint, in the one case between the man and the externally imposed law, in the other between some particular desire of the man and his consciousness of something absolutely desirable, we naturally represent in English, when we reflect on it, by the common term 'must'. 'I *must* connect with the main drainage', says the householder to himself, reflecting on an edict of the Local Board. 'I *must* try to get A. B. to leave off drinking', he says to himself, reflecting on a troublesome moral duty of benevolence to his neighbour. And if the 'must' in the former case represents in part the knowledge that compulsion may be put on the man who neglects to do what he must, which is no part of its meaning in the second, on the other hand the consciousness that the constraint is for a common good, which wholly constitutes the power over inclination in the second case, must always be an element in that obedience which is properly called obedience to law, or civil or political obedience. Simple fear can never constitute such obedience. To represent it as the basis of civil subjection is to confound the citizen with the slave, and to represent the motive which is needed for the restraint of those in whom the civil sense is lacking and for the occasional reinforcements of the law-abiding principle in others, as if it were the normal influence in habits of life of which the essential value lies in their being independent of it. How far in any particular act of conformity to law the fear of penalties may be operative, it is impossible to say. What is certain is, that a habit of subjection founded upon such fear could not be a basis of political or free society; for to this it is necessary, not

indeed that every one subject to the laws should take part in voting them, still less that he should consent to their application to himself, but that it should represent an idea of common good, which each member of the society can make his own so far as he is rational, *i.e.*, capable of the conception of a common good, however much particular passions may lead him to ignore it and thus necessitate the use of force to prevent him from doing that which, so far as influenced by the conception of a common good, he would willingly abstain from.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

35. THE COMMON GOOD.

The idea of a common good which the state fulfils has never been the sole influence actuating those who have been agents in the historical process by which states have come to be formed; and even so far as it has actuated them, it has been only as conceived in some very imperfect form that it has done so. This is equally true of those who contribute to the formation and maintenance of states rather as agents, and of those who do so rather as patients. No one could pretend that even the most thoughtful and dispassionate publicist is capable of the idea of the good served by the state to which he belongs, in all its fulness. He apprehends it only in some of its bearings, but it is as a common good that he apprehends it, *i.e.* not as a good for himself or for this man or that more than another, but for all members equally in virtue of their relation to each other and their common nature. The idea which the ordinary citizen has of the common good served by the state is much more limited in content. Very likely he does not think of it at all in connection with anything that the term 'state' represents to him. But he has a clear understanding of certain interests and rights common to himself with his neighbours, if only such as consist in getting his wages paid at the end of the week, in getting

his money's worth at the shop, in the inviolability of his own person and that of his wife. Habitually and instinctively, *i.e.* without asking the reason why, he regards the claim which in these respects he makes for himself as conditional upon his recognizing a like claim in others, and thus as in the proper sense a right—a claim of which the essence lies in its being common to himself with others. Without this instinctive recognition he is one of the 'dangerous classes', virtually outlawed by himself. With it, though he have no reverence for the 'state' under that name, no sense of an interest shared with others in maintaining it, he has the needful elementary conception of a common good maintained by law. It is the fault of the state if this conception fails to make him a loyal subject, if not an intelligent patriot. It is a sign that the state is not a true state; that it is not fulfilling its primary function of maintaining law equally in the interest of all, but is being administered in the interest of classes; whence it follows that the obedience which, if not rendered willingly, the state compels the citizen to render, is not one that he feels any spontaneous interest in rendering, because it does not present itself to him as the condition of the maintenance of those rights and interests, common to himself with his neighbours, which he understands.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

36. SOCIAL AND SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES.

All virtues are really social; or, more properly, the distinction between social and self-regarding virtues is a false one. Every virtue is self-regarding in the sense that it is a disposition, or habit of will, directed to an end which the man presents to himself as his good; every virtue is social in the sense that unless the good to which the will is directed is one in which the well-being of society in

some form or other is involved, the will is not virtuous at all.

The virtues are dispositions to exercise positively, in some way contributory to social good, those powers which, because admitting of being so exercised, society should secure to him ; the powers which a man has a right to possess, which constitute his rights.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

37. THE SELFISH THEORY.

The universal sentiment of mankind represents self-sacrifice as an essential element of a meritorious act, and means by self-sacrifice the deliberate adoption of the least pleasurable course without the prospect of any pleasure in return. A selfish act may be innocent, but cannot be virtuous, and to ascribe all good deeds to selfish motives, is not the distortion but the negation of virtue. No Epicurean could avow before a popular audience that the one end of his life was the pursuit of his own happiness without an outburst of indignation and contempt. No man could consciously make this—which according to the selfish theory is the only rational and indeed possible motive of action—the deliberate object of all his undertakings, without his character becoming despicable and degraded. Whether we look within ourselves or examine the conduct either of our enemies or of our friends or adjudicate upon the characters in history or in fiction, our feelings on these matters are the same. In exact proportion as we believe a desire for personal enjoyment to be the motive of a good act is the merit of the agent diminished. If we believe the motive to be wholly selfish the merit is altogether destroyed. If we believe it to be wholly disinterested the merit is altogether unalloyed. . . . Selfish moralists deny the possibility of that which all ages, all nations, all popular judgements pronounce to have been the characteristic of every noble act that has ever been

performed. Now when a philosophy which seeks by the light of consciousness to decipher the laws of our moral being proves so diametrically opposed to the conclusions arrived at by the great mass of mankind, who merely follow their consciousness without endeavouring to frame systems of philosophy, that it makes most of the distinctions of common ethical language absolutely unmeaning, this is, to say the least, a strong presumption against its truth. If Molière's hero had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it, this was simply because he did not understand what prose was. In the present case we are asked to believe that men have been under a total delusion about the leading principles of their lives which they had distinguished by a whole vocabulary of terms.

WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY: *The History of European Morals.*

38. DUTY.

The Stoics asserted two cardinal principles—that virtue was the sole legitimate object to be aspired to, and that it involved so complete an ascendancy of the reason as altogether to extinguish the affections. The Peripatetics and many other philosophers, who derived their opinions chiefly from Plato, endeavoured to soften down the exaggerations of these principles. They admitted that virtue was an object wholly distinct from interest, and that it should be the leading motive of life; but they maintained that happiness was also a good, and a certain regard for it legitimate. They admitted that virtue consisted in the supremacy of the reason over the affections, but they allowed the exercise of the latter within restricted limits. The main distinguishing features, however, of Stoicism, the unselfish ideal and the controlling reason, were acquiesced in, and each represents an important side of the ancient conception of excellence which we must now proceed to examine.

In the first we may easily trace the intellectual expression of the high spirit of self-sacrifice which the patriotic enthusiasm had elicited. The spirit of patriotism has this peculiar characteristic, while it has evoked acts of heroism which are both very numerous and very sublime, it has done so without presenting any prospect of personal immortality as a reward. Of all the forms of human heroism, it is probably the most unselfish. The Spartan and the Roman died for his country because he loved it. The martyr's ecstasy of hope had no place in his dying hour. He gave up all he had, he closed his eyes, as he believed, for ever, and he asked for no reward in this world or in the next. Even the hope of posthumous fame—the most refined and supersensual of all that can be called reward—could exist only for the most conspicuous leaders. It was examples of this nature that formed the culminations or ideals of ancient systems of virtue, and they naturally led men to draw a very clear and deep distinction between the notions of interest and of duty. It may indeed be truly said, that while the conception of what constituted duty was often very imperfect in antiquity, the conviction that duty, as distinguished from every modification of selfishness, should be the supreme motive of life, was more clearly enforced among the Stoics than in any later society.

W. E. H. LECKY · *The History of European Morals.*

39. CIVILIZATION A REVELATION.

Civilization is nothing but the process of revealing and realizing the Nature of Man, and the revelation is still going on, mysteriously and tortuously enough. The intrinsic might of man's will and reason, the slumbering splendour of his spirit, are still in process of being liberated. Human nature is capable of a greater variety of kinds than any other 'nature', and is ever breaking out into new forms; for every individual is in his degree unique.

No individual, however great, embodies all its possibilities, nor is he at his best when he is singular in his greatness, and his

‘towering mind
O'erlooks its prostrate fellows’.

For only as a member of society which is worthy of him, ‘as the citizen of a good state’, and in the interaction of his peers in virtue, can man’s powers shine forth fully. And a State which is strong in all its fibres, all of whose elements are in harmony, in which no one is ignorant of the best or heedless of the highest—such a State as Hegel called ‘The Kingdom of Heaven on Earth’—is, verily, not ‘at hand’. Thoughtful men who are lovers of their kind and know something of the toilsome road which civilization has had to travel in order to reach the meagre results they see in the social and political life around them, are appalled by the contrast of what we are and what we might be: so much is yet to learn till our swords are beaten into ploughshares, and man is adequate to himself and to the framework in which his life is set.

SIR HENRY JONES. *Idealism as a Practical Creed.*

40. THE FEELING OF COMMUNITY.

At first in the far days when men emerged slowly from the lower forms the family alone obtained. But as men grew there came from heaven another force, another love. As the first love drew man and woman into one and made the family, so the second love drew families together into communities. It comes from heaven, it is another ray. Think you that it is from within, that men reason themselves together? No more does a man reason himself into love of a woman, than the family reasons itself into that feeling of community with its neighbours, of identity with them, that makes the village. It is a force that comes

when men are fit to manifest it; it makes magnets of the lesser parts and draws them into a greater. It is the analogy of the love of men and women. It is as great, as true, as independent of all thought.

And like the earlier love it brings with it a righteousness that is its law, and as its justification it offers an extended vision towards eternity.

What are its laws? What are men's duties to their village? As a man feels towards his family, so does the family to the community? A father or mother will suffer and will die to save their children willingly, gladly, if necessity arise; the family will suffer and will die to save the village. Because they think it right? Not so; because the love that has come to them makes them do so, whispers in their ear, 'You must, you must; it is my law, my righteousness'.

And for justification of this law, this righteousness, there is another stronger, wider Immortality. What a man does for his children is repaid not to him but them, what is done for a community is paid to the community. Not to the little 'I' but the greater 'I'. A man may not see or understand, but that is what love does and says. And if we cannot see or understand how a man profit should he and his family perish for his community, it is because we do not understand what life is. We think of it as an unit — 'I' am 'I', and 'I' exist alone for ever. But all the loves, all these forces that come to us direct from the immensity, say, 'No!' Life is a stream. The unit is Infinity. And the 'I' can persist only by merging itself ever into greater 'I's'.

HENRY FIELDING HALL *The Inward Light*.*

* 'Buddhism in Burma.'

41. THE GUARDIANS OF THE STATE.

We must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that the interest of the State is to be the rule of all their actions. We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way ?

Yes.

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will give further proof of the same qualities.

Very right, he replied.

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take colts amid noises and cries to see if they are of a timid nature, so we must take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and try them more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, in order to discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the man himself and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. Him we must choose, and reject the opposite of him. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.

PLATO: *The Republic* (Benjamin Jowett).

42. THE CHARACTER OF A CITIZEN.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both in heaven and on earth; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane; so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary. Worthy of honour too is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has is not to be undervalued because possessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race and defames no man; but the envious, who thinks that

he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable, acts of injustice done by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unjust and the unfortunate are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not giving way to passion, and continuing wrathful like a woman who has been piqued. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore, I say that good men ought, when occasion arises, to be both gentle and passionate. The greatest evil to men, generally, is one which is innate in their souls, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying, 'that every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend'. Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the

honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer his own interest to the truth. But he who would be a great man, ought to regard what is just, and not himself or his interests, whether in his own actions, or those of others.

PLATO: *Laws* (B. Jowett).

43. OFFENCE.

Remember that it is not the reviler or the striker who causes one to be offended, but the thought that these actions are offensive. When then anyone occasions anger in thee, know that it is thy own opinion that hath angered thee. Wherefore, in the first place, strive not to be carried away by first appearances; for if once thou gain time and delay, thou wilt more easily command thyself.

EPICTETUS: *Manual*.

44. INFIDELITY.

A human being is formed by nature for good faith, and he who subverts this subverts the special characteristic of man. . . . If then, discarding this good faith, for which we were formed by nature, we have designs upon our neighbour's wife, what are we doing? What but destroying and demolishing? Whom? The faithful, the modest, the pious, in ourselves. Anything further? And do we not demolish neighbourhood, and friendship, and the state? And in what place do we put ourselves? As what may I use thee, man? As a neighbour, as a friend? Of what sort, pray? As a citizen? What shall I trust to thee? If then thou wert a vessel so rotten that one could not use thee for anything at all, thou wouldst be thrown out on the dung-heap, and no one would lift thee thence. And if, being a human being, thou canst not fill any post suitable to a man, what shall we do with thee? For granted that thou canst not hold the place of a friend,

canst thou hold that of a slave? And again, who will trust thee? Art thou not willing then that thou also shouldst be thrown out on the dung-heap as an unserviceable vessel?

EPICETETUS: *Discourses.*

45. EPICUREANISM.

Epicurus, when he wishes to do away with the natural social feeling of men towards one another, joins them in using the very thing that he is doing away with. For what says he? 'O men, be not deceived or led astray, fall not into error; believe me, there is no natural social feeling in rational beings towards one another; those who say otherwise deceive you and reason falsely'. Then why, pray, dost thou pay any heed to the matter? Allow us to be deceived. Thou wilt surely not come off any the worse, if all the rest believe that we have a natural social feeling towards one another, and that we must in every way preserve this? On the contrary, thou wilt come off much better and safer. Why, man, dost thou take thought for us, why lie awake at night for us, why light thy lamp, why rise early, why write so many books, lest any of us be deceived into thinking that the gods pay any heed to men, or lest any of us be of opinion that the substance of good is anything but pleasure? For if things are really so, lie down and sleep, and do as the worm does, of whose life thou judgest thyself worthy!

EPICETETUS *Discourses.*

46. THE WILL AND THE USE OF THINGS.

The materials of our daily life are indifferent, but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall one keep steady and unperturbed, and at the same time also careful, not purposeless, nor as it were dragged along by chance. . . . Divide affairs and separate them, and say, 'External

things are not in my control; Will is in my control'. And in which of these shall I seek good and evil? Within, in the Will, in my own mind. But among the things which are outside these never call anything either good or evil, either gain or harm, or any such name.

What then, should one use these external things carelessly? By no means; for this again is bad for the Will, and in this way is contrary to nature. But make use of them carefully, because the manner of using them is not indifferent; and at the same time act steadily and without perturbation, because the material is indifferent. For where things are not indifferent, that is, where my mind is concerned, there no one is able to hinder or constrain me, and I alone am responsible and must use caution. Where I am liable to be hindered and constrained, that is in things external to myself, the obtaining of the things is not indeed in my control, neither is it good or evil; but the use of the occasion is either evil or good; and is in my control and demands care. But it is hard to mingle and combine these—the carefulness of the man who is attached to these external matters and the steadiness of one who does not regard them. Yet it is not impossible. Otherwise happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do on a voyage. What can I do? I can choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the time. Then a storm falls upon us. What further, since my part is fulfilled, have I to heed? The business is another's, the pilot's. But now the ship is sinking! What then have I to do? Let me do that which alone I can do now; drown without fear, neither screaming, nor accusing God, but knowing that what was born must needs also die. For I am not everlasting, but a human being, a part of the whole universe as an hour is of the day. I must needs like the hour be here, and like the hour be gone.

47. CALM.

Withdraw into thyself. The rational guiding faculty has this nature, that it finds its satisfaction in itself, when it acts justly; and by so doing attains calm.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

48. JUDGMENT.

Affairs themselves do not touch the soul at all; nor have they entrance to the soul; nor can they turn or move the soul; but it turns and moves alone of itself; and according to the judgment which it thinks fit to form for itself, such it makes for itself the things that present themselves.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations.*

49. UNWILLING ERROR.

No soul, says Plato, is willingly deprived of truth; and so too in the case of justice, and sobriety, and kindliness, and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to remember this continually, for so wilt thou be more mild to all.

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations.*

50. A CITIZEN OF A GREAT CITY.

Thou hast been a citizen of this great City, the world. What difference does it make, man, whether for five years, or less, or more? For that which is in accordance with the laws is for each equally just. What is there grievous then, if thou art sent back from the city, not by a tyrant, nor by an unjust judge, but by the nature which brought thee there? It is as if the officer who has engaged an actor releases him from the stage. 'But', thou criest, 'in my case the five acts are not finished, but only three'.

Thou sayest truly; but in life, as it proves, three are the whole drama. For the limit is set to the finished thing by one who was the responsible cause of its composition then, and is now responsible for its dissolution. Thou art responsible for neither. Depart then serenely, for He who releases thee is serene.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *Meditations.*

SECOND SERIES

PART II

(ADVANCED PASSAGES)

1. UNREWARDED WORK.

THE higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness', but doing the will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him stand fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first object, but to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that of others there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no happiness he would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest natures; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that can be the first principle of morals which is hardly regarded in their own case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?'

BENJAMIN JOWETT. *Introduction to
Plato's 'Philebus'.*

2. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM.

The sovereign, and the state itself as distinguished by the existence of a sovereign power, presupposes rights and is

an institution for their maintenance. But these rights do not belong to individuals as they might be in a state of nature, or as they might be if each acted irrespectively of the others. They belong to them as members of a society in which each recognizes the other as an originator of action in the same sense in which he is conscious of being so himself (as an 'ego', as himself the object which determines the action), and thus regards the free exercise of his own powers as dependent upon his allowing an equally free exercise of his powers to every other member of the society. There is no harm in saying that they belong to individuals as such, if we understand what we mean by 'individual', and if we mean by it a self-determining subject, conscious of itself as one among other such subjects, and of its relation to them as making it what it is; for then there is no opposition between the attachment of rights to the individuals as such and their derivation from society. They attach to the individual, but only as a member of a society of free agents, as recognizing himself and recognized by others to be such a member, as doing and done by accordingly. A right, then, to act unsocially—to act otherwise than as belonging to a society of which each member keeps the exercise of his powers within the limits necessary to like exercise by all the other members—is a contradiction. No one can say that, unless he has consented to such a limitation of his powers, he has a right to resist it. The fact of his not consenting would be an extinction of all right on his part.

THOMAS HILL GREEN. *The Principles of Political Obligation.*

3. RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

There cannot be innate rights in any other sense than that in which there are innate duties, of which, however, much less has been heard. Because a group of beings are capable each of conceiving an absolute good of himself

and of conceiving it to be good for himself as identical with, and because identical with, the good of the rest of the group, there arises for each a consciousness that the common good should be the object of action, *i.e.* a duty, and* a claim in each to a power of action that shall be at once secured and regulated by the consciousness of a common good on the part of the rest, *i.e.* a right. There is no ground for saying that the right arises out of a primary human capacity, and is thus 'innate', which does not apply equally to the duty.

The dissociation of innate rights from innate duties has gone along with the delusion that such rights existed apart from society. Men were supposed to have existed in a state of nature, which was not a state of society, but in which certain rights attached to them as individuals, and then to have formed societies by contract or covenant. Society having been formed, certain other rights arose through positive enactment; but none of these, it was held, could interfere with the natural rights which belonged to men antecedently to the social contract or survived it.

Such a theory can only be stated by an application, to an imaginary state of things prior to the formation of societies as regulated by custom or law, of terms that have no meaning except in relation to such societies. 'Natural right', as equal to right in a state of nature which is not a state of society, is a contradiction. There can be no right without a consciousness of common interest on the part of members of a society. Without this there might be certain powers on the part of individuals, but no recognition of these powers by others as powers of which they allow the exercise, nor any claims to such recognition; and without this recognition or claim to recognition there can be no right.

T. H. GREEN. *The Principles of Political Obligation.*

* There arises also.

4. TWO IDEALS.

Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day; one seen more clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still retaining a silent hope of we know not what, hidden in the heart of man. The first ideal is the future of the human race in this world; the second the future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect realization of our own present life; the second the abnegation of it: the one, limited by experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of action; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual existence the more egotistical of the two motives. But when men have learned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or for the world into the will of God—‘not my will, but Thine’—the difference between them falls away; and they may be allowed to make either of them the basis of their lives, according to their own individual character or temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to work for an unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it inconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another generation, or to another century, almost as strongly as to his own; or that living always in the presence of God, he may realize another world as vividly as he does this.

B. JOWETT: *Introduction to Plato's 'Republic'*.

5. THE COMMON CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.

To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs—*i.e.*, such as attend men in the state of Nature,

there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves by ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves. They knew that, however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might, in reason, take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore, that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another.

RICHARD HOOKER: *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

6. WISDOM FOR A MAN'S SELF.

An ant is a wise creature for itself, but it is a shrewd* thing in an orchard garden. And certainly men that are great lovers of themselves waste the public. Divide with reason between self-love and society; and be so true to thyself, as thou be not false to others; especially to thy king and country. It is a poor centre of a man's actions, himself. It is right earth. For that only stands fast upon his own centre; whereas all things that have affinity with the heavens, move upon the centre of another, which they benefit. The referring of all to a man's self is more tolerable in a sovereign prince; because themselves are

* Vicious.

not only themselves, but their good and evil is at the peril of the public fortune. But it is a desperate evil in a servant to a prince, or a citizen in a republic. For whatsoever affairs pass such a man's hands, he crooketh them to his own ends; which must needs be often eccentric to the ends of his master or state. Therefore let princes or states choose such servants as have not this mark; except they mean their service should be made but the accessory. That which maketh the effect more pernicious is that all proportion is lost. It were disproportion enough for the servant's good to be preferred before the master's; but yet it is a greater extreme, when a little good of the servant shall carry things against a great good of the master's. And yet that is the case of bad officers, treasurers, ambassadors, generals, and other false and corrupt servants; which set a bias upon their bowl, of their own petty ends and envies, to the overthrow of their master's great and important affairs, and for the most part, the good such servants receive is after the model of their own fortune; but the hurt they sell for that good is after the model of their master's fortune. And certainly it is the nature of extreme self-livers as they will set an house on fire, and* it were but to roast their eggs; and yet these men many times hold credit with their masters, because their study is but to please them and profit themselves; and for either respect they will abandon the good of their affairs.

Wisdom for a man's self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing. It is the wisdom of rats that will be sure to leave a house somewhat before it fall. It is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger, who digged and made room for him. It is the wisdom of crocodiles, that shed tears when they would devour. But that which is specially to be noted is, that those which (as Cicero says of Pompey) are *sui amantes sine rivali* † are many times un-

* If.

† Lovers of themselves without a rival.

fortunate. And whereas they have all their time sacrificed to themselves, they become in the end themselves sacrifices to the inconstancy of fortune.

FRANCIS BACON, Baron Verulam,
Viscount St. Albans: *Essays*.

7. TRADING WITHOUT RELIGION.

A wealthy man, addicted to his pleasure and to his profits, finds religion to be a traffic so entangled, and of so many piddling accounts, that of all mysteries he cannot skill to keep a stock going upon that trade. What should he do? Fain he would have the name to be religious; fain he would bear up with his neighbours in that. What does he, therefore, but resolve to give over toiling, and to find himself out some factor, to whose care and credit he may commit the whole managing of his religious affairs; some divine of note and estimation that must be. To him he adheres, resigns the whole warehouse of his religion, with all the locks and keys, into his custody; and indeed makes the very person of that man his religion; esteems his associating with him a sufficient evidence and commendatory of his own piety. So that a man may say, his religion is now no more within himself, but is become a dividual moveable, and goes and comes near him, according as that good man frequents the house. He entertains him, gives him gifts, feasts him, lodges him; his religion comes home at night, prays, is liberally supped, and sumptuously laid to sleep; rises, is saluted, and after the malmsey, or some well-spiced beverage, and better breakfasted than he whose morning appetite would have gladly fed on green figs between Bethany and Jerusalem, his religion walks abroad at eight, and leaves his kind entertainer in the shop, trading all day without his religion.

JOHN MILTON: *Areopagitica*.

8. THE CLOISTERED VIRTUE.

Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably; and the knowledge of

good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds, which were imposed on Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out and sort asunder were not more intermixed. It was from out the rind of one apple tasted that the knowledge of good and evil as two twins cleaving together leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil, that is to say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is, what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world; we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental* whiteness, which was the reason why our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas, describing true temperance under the person of Guion, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon and the Bower of Earthly Bliss, that he might see and know, and yet abstain. Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely and with less danger scout

* Outside.

into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.

JOHN MILTON: *Areopagitica*.

9. SEEK PEACE AND FOLLOW IT.

Because the condition* of man, as hath been declared in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one (in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies), it followeth, that in such a condition every man has a right to everything, even to one another's body, and therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept or general rule of reason, 'that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war'. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of Nature; which is, 'to seek peace, and follow it'. The second, the sum of the right of Nature; which is, 'by all means we can, to defend ourselves'.

From this fundamental law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; 'that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself'. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he

* Natural condition.

liketh, so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for any one to divest himself of his; for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; 'whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them'; and that law of all men, *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris* [*what you do not wish to be done unto you, you should not do unto another.*]

THOMAS HOBBES: *Leviathan.*

10. THE MEANS OF PEACE.

The laws of Nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.

The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.

And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is 'good' and 'evil', in the conversation and society of mankind. 'Good' and 'evil' are names that signify our appetites, and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different; and divers men differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight, but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good,

what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil; from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil; and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace (which, as I have showed before, are 'justice', 'gratitude', 'modesty', 'equity', 'mercy', and the rest of the laws of Nature) are good, that is to say 'moral virtues'; and their contrary 'vices', evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of Nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions; as if not the cause,* but the degree, of daring made fortitude; or not the cause, but the quantity, of a gift made liberality.

These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws. HOBBS. *Leviathan*.

11. BENEVOLENCE AND LOVE OF POWER.

Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon human nature, and to show in several parts of it that he had an insight into the subject he was considering; amongst other things, the following one would require to be accounted for; the appearance of benevolence or good-

* Object.

will in men towards each other in the instances of natural relation and in others. Cautious of being deceived with outward show, he retires within himself to see exactly what that is in the mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds, and, upon deep reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it. Would not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for another? That the philosopher was contemplating and accounting for some other human actions, some other behaviour of man to man? And could any one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence or goodwill was really the affection meant, but only by being made to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis to which the appearance of goodwill could no otherwise be reconciled? That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than hunger, of the two; but in reality that passion does no more account for the whole appearance of goodwill than this appetite does. Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another which he knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before another to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to another. Again, suppose goodwill in the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be restrained by distant and accidental considerations; but these restraints being removed, they

would have a disposition to and delight in mischief as an exercise and proof of power. And this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle in the mind as, a disposition to and delight in charity! Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the same in the mind of man as goodwill: that one tends to the happiness, the other to the misery of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally stamped upon it; the traces of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man.

JOSEPH BUTLER (Bishop of Durham).
Human Nature, and Other Sermons.

12. RANKS OF SOCIETY.

The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below the middling rank, it must be observed, is in every country much greater, not only in quantity, but in value, than that of the middling and of those above the middling rank. The whole expense of the inferior is much greater than that of the superior ranks. In the first place, almost the whole capital of every country is annually distributed among the inferior ranks of people, as the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue arising from both the rent of land and the profits of stock is annually distributed among the same rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial servants, and other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock belongs to the same rank, as a revenue arising from the employment of their small capitals. The amount of the profits annually made by small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and retailers of all kinds, is everywhere very considerable, and makes a very considerable portion of the

annual produce. Fourthly, and lastly, some part even of the rent of land belongs to the same rank; a considerable part to those who are somewhat below the middling rank, and a small part even to the lowest rank; common labourers sometimes possessing in property an acre or two of land. Though the expense of those inferior ranks of people, therefore, taking them individually is very small, yet the whole mass of it, taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the whole expense of the society; what remains of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country for the consumption of the superior ranks being always much less, not only in quantity but in value.

ADAM SMITH: *The Wealth of Nations*.

13. PARTY POLITICS.

In order to throw an odium on political* connexion, these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it, that you are blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition to your own clear ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexions (except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as to impose. Men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise in the course of public business are related to, or dependent on, some great *leading general principles in government*, a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political company if he does not agree with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these general principles upon which the party is founded, and which necessarily draw on concurrence in their application, he ought from the beginning to have chosen some other, more comformable to his opinions. When the question is in its nature doubtful,

* Party.

or not very material, the modesty which becomes an individual, and (in spite of our court-moralists) that partiality which becomes a well-chosen friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence in the general sentiment. Thus the disagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom, without violating concord, or disturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was required for a character of the greatest uniformity and steadiness in connexion. How men can proceed without any connexion at all, is to me utterly incomprehensible. Of what sort of materials must that man be made, how must he be tempered and put together, who can sit whole years in parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his fellow-citizens, amidst the storm of such tempestuous passions, in the sharp conflict of so many wits, and tempers, and characters, in the agitation of such mighty questions, in the discussion of such vast and ponderous interests, without seeing any one sort of men, whose character, conduct, or disposition, would lead him to associate himself with them, to aid and be aided, in any one system of public utility?

EDMUND BURKE: *The Present Discontents*.

14. THE DUTY WHICH LIES NEAREST.

Conviction, were it never so excellent, is worthless till it convert itself into Conduct. Nay properly Conviction is not possible till then; inasmuch as all Speculation is by nature endless, formless, a vortex amid vortices: only by a felt indubitable certainty of Experience does it find any centre to revolve round, and so fashion itself into a system. Most true is it, as a wise man teaches us, that 'Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by Action'. On which ground, too, let him who gropes painfully in darkness or uncertain light, and prays vehemently that the dawn may ripen into day, lay this other precept well to heart, which to me was of invaluable service: '*Do the Duty*

which lies nearest thee’, which thou knowest to be a duty ! Thy second Duty will already have become clearer.

May we not say, however, that the hour of Spiritual Enfranchisement is even this: When your Ideal World, wherein the whole man has been dimly struggling and inexpressibly languishing to work, becomes revealed, and thrown open, and you discover, with amazement enough, like the Lothario in *Wilhelm Meister*, that your ‘America* is here or nowhere’? The Situation that has not its Duty, its Ideal, was never yet occupied by man. Yes here, in his poor, miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or nowhere is thy Ideal: work it out therefrom; and working, believe, live, be free. Fool ! the Ideal is in thyself, the impediment too is in thyself: thy Condition is but the stuff thou art to shape that same Ideal out of: what matters whether such stuff be of this sort or of that, so the Form thou give it be heroic, be poetic ? O thou that pinest in the imprisonment of the Actual, and criest bitterly to the gods for a kingdom wherein to rule and create, know this of a truth: the thing thou seekest is already with thee, ‘here or nowhere’, couldst thou only see !

CARLYLE. *Sartor Resartus*.

15. WORK DONE.

The spoken Word, the written Poem, is said to be an epitome of the man; how much more the done work. Whatsoever of morality and of intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness, of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of Strength the man had in him will lie written in the Work he does. To work: why, it is to try himself against Nature, and her everlasting unerring Laws: these will tell a true verdict as to the man. So much of virtue and of faculty did *we* find in him; so much and no more ! He had such capacity of harmonizing himself with *me* and my unalterable ever-

* Your opportunity.

veracious Laws; of co-operating and working as *I* bade him—and has prospered, and has not prospered, as you see! Working as great Nature bade him: does not that mean virtue of a kind; nay of all kinds? Cotton can be spun and sold, Lancashire operatives can be got to spin it, and at length one has the woven webs and sells them, by following Nature's regulations in that matter; by not following Nature's regulations, you have them not. You have them not; there is no Cotton-web to sell; Nature finds a bill against you; your 'Strength' is not Strength, but Futility! Let faculty be honoured, so far as it is faculty. A man that can succeed in working is to me always a man.

How one loves to see the burly figure of him, this thick-skinned, seemingly opaque, perhaps sulky, almost stupid Man of Practice, pitted against some light adroit Man of Theory, all equipt with clear logic, and able anywhere to give you Why for Wherefore! The adroit Man of Theory, so light of movement, clear of utterance, with his bow full-bent and quiver full of arrow-arguments—surely he will strike down the game, transfix everywhere the heart of the matter, triumph everywhere, as he proves that he shall and must do? To your astonishment, it turns out oftenest No. The cloudy-browed, thick-soled, opaque Practicality, with no logic-utterance, in silence mainly, with here and there a low grunt or growl, has in him what transcends all logic-utterance; a Congruity with the Unuttered. The Speakable, which lies atop, as a superficial film, or outer skin, is his or is not his; but the Do-able, which reaches down to the World's centre—you find him there!

The rugged Brindley has little to say for himself; the rugged Brindley when difficulties accumulate on him, retires silent, 'generally to his bed'; retires 'sometimes for three days together to his bed, that he may be in perfect privacy there', and ascertain in his rough head

how the difficulties can be overcome. The ineloquent Brindley, behold he has chained seas together; his ships do visibly float over valleys, invisibly through the hearts of mountains; the Mersey and the Thames, the Humber and the Severn, have shaken hands. Nature most audibly answers, Yea! The Man of Theory twangs his full-bent bow; Nature's fact ought to fall stricken, but does not; his logic-arrow glances from it as from a scaly dragon, and the obstinate Fact keeps walking its way. How singular! At bottom, you will have to grapple closer with the dragon; take it home to you, by real faculty, not by seeming faculty; try whether you are stronger, or it is stronger. Close with it, wrestle it: sheer obstinate toughness of muscle; but much more, what we call toughness of heart, which will mean persistence hopeful and even desperate, unsubduable patience, composed candid openness, clearness of mind; all this shall be 'strength' in wrestling your dragon; the whole man's real strength is in this work, we shall get the measure of him here.

THOMAS CARLYLE: *Past and Present*.

16. CONSISTENCY.

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day.—'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood'.—Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

I suppose no man can violate his nature. All the sallies of his will are rounded in by the law of his being, as the

inequalities of Andes and Himmaleh are insignificant in the curve of the sphere. Nor does it matter how you gauge and try him. A character is like an acrostic or Alexandrian stanza—read it forward, backward, or across, it still spells the same thing. . . . We pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.

There will be an agreement in whatever variety of actions, so they be each honest and natural in their hour. For, of one will, the actions will be harmonious, however unlike they seem. These varieties are lost sight of at a little distance, at a little height of thought. One tendency unites them all. The voyage of the best ship is a zigzag line of a hundred tacks. See the line from a sufficient distance, and it straightens itself to the average tendency. Your genuine action will explain itself, and will explain your other genuine actions. Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON: *Essays*.

17. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL FEELINGS.

It is one of the first principles of Biology that organic life always preponderates over animal life.* By this principle the Sociologist explains the superior strength of the self-regarding instincts, which are all connected more or less closely with the instinct of self-preservation. But although there is no evading this fact, Sociology shows that it is compatible with the existence of benevolent affections. . . . The great problem, then, is to raise social feeling by artificial effort to the position which, in the natural condition, is held by selfish feeling. The solution is to be found in another biological principle,

* The needs of its organs dominate the life of the animal.

namely, that functions and organs are developed by constant exercise, and atrophied by prolonged inaction. Now, the effect of the Social state is that, while our sympathetic instincts are constantly stimulated, the selfish propensities are restricted; since, if free play were given to them, human intercourse would very shortly become impossible. Thus it compensates to some extent the natural weakness of the Sympathies that they are capable of almost indefinite extension; whilst Self-love meets inevitably with a more or less efficient check. Both these tendencies naturally increase with the progress of humanity, and their increase is the best measure of the degree of perfection that we have attained. Their growth, though spontaneous, may be materially hastened by the organized intervention both of individuals and of society, the object being to increase all favourable influences and diminish the unfavourable. This is the object of the art of Morals. Like every other art, it is restricted within certain limits. But in this case the limits are less narrow, because the phenomena, being more complex, are also more modifiable.

AUGUSTE COMTE. *System of Positive Polity*
(C. T. Gorham's *Great French Rationalists*).

18. THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOCIAL.

In 'Social Statics'* almost everything is made to turn upon the doctrine—previously hardly more than hinted at—that from the very beginning of social life down to present time there has been going on and that still there is going on, a process of slow, but none the less certain, adjustment of the natures of men to society, and of the social organization to the natures of its constituent units; this adjustment being the result of a perpetual interaction between units and aggregate which ever tends to bring them into more perfect adaptation the one to the other. Such adaptation, it is further contended, is

* Herbert Spencer's.

produced by the natures of men, and by the preservation and accumulation by inheritance from generation to generation of the modifications thus initiated; though another process comes in for passing recognition—the process of the dying out of those individuals who fail to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of their environment; which process may be conversely stated as the survival of those only who so far change as to fit themselves to the necessities imposed upon them by the totality of their surroundings. Here, it will be seen, is a faint and partial adumbration of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. Moreover another important point is emphasized—that all our social evils and imperfections are due to want of complete adjustment between men and the conditions of social life—are, indeed, nothing more than the temporary jarrings and wrenchings of a machine the parts of which are not yet brought into thorough working order. Yet, as the process of adaptation is still continuing, and is in the nature of things tending ever to produce between units and aggregate a state of more perfect equilibrium, the inevitable if optimistic corollary is, that the evil which we deplore will in the end work itself out altogether, and that eventually all friction will entirely disappear: a prophecy which seems to point to a realization of the gorgeous dreams of revolutionary speculators like Condorcet and Godwin, far as the arguments upon which it is based differ from their own. Finally, all these special changes in man and in society are regarded as phases only of a process of universal development or unfolding, which is everywhere conducing in obedience to an inherent metaphysical tendency, to the production in man, as throughout the whole of the animate creation, of more complete individuation and higher and higher types.

WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON: *An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.*

19. SOCIETY AN ORGANISM.

The comparison between society and an individual organism had been instituted before Spencer's time, but in a way too vague for it to be productive of much result. Spencer, in taking the matter up among his earlier studies, endeavoured to do something more than point out more or less fanciful analogies. Utilizing the comprehensive generalizations of modern biology, he undertook to indicate the real parallelisms.

These are four in number, and may be summarized in succinct statement thus:—

1. Commencing as small aggregations, both societies and individual organisms insensibly augment in mass, in some instances eventually reaching a bulk ten thousand times greater than their original size.

2. At first so simple in structure as to be considered structureless, both societies and individual organisms assume in the course of their growth a continually increasing complexity of structure.

3. In a society in its early undeveloped state, as in an individual organism in its early and undeveloped state, there exists scarcely any mutual dependence of parts; in both cases the parts gradually acquire a mutual dependence, and this becomes at last so great that the life and activity of each part are made possible only by the life and activity of the rest.

4. The life and development of a society, like the life and development of an individual organism, are independent of and far more prolonged than the life and development of any of its component units, who severally are born, grow, reproduce, and die, while the body politic composed of them survives generation after generation, increasing in mass, completeness of structure, and functional activity.

Consideration of these striking parallelisms will reveal

the fact that the most important of them—the second and third in the above tabulation—present elements that bring the growth of society directly under the general law of evolution. Societies, like individual organisms, pass, during the course of their development, from simplicity to complexity of structure, at the same time that their various parts gradually acquire greater and greater mutual dependence; in other words, the changes undergone by them are in the direction at once of increasing heterogeneity and of increasing unity. It may, indeed, be remarked incidentally that no more conspicuous illustrations of the formula of evolution can be found than those furnished by the study of social growth. Barbarous tribes, lowest in the scale of development, are nothing but loose, almost homogeneous, aggregations of individuals and families, living in contiguity, but hardly at all depending one upon another. Powers and functions are practically alike, the only marked differences being those which accompany differences of sex. ‘Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman, toolmaker, builder; every woman performs the same drudgeries’—that is, there is as yet no specialization of parts; and similarly, ‘every family is self-sufficing, and, save for purposes of aggression and defence, might as well live apart from the rest’—there is little or no mutual dependence. Very early, however, important changes manifest themselves. Differentiation begins. With the appearance of some kind of chieftainship arises distinction between the governing and the governed; and as this distinction grows more and more decided, the controlling agencies themselves gradually break up, and in course of time develop into the highly complex political organizations of semi-civilized and civilized lands. Meanwhile the accompanying industrial divergencies are even more significant. Individuals no longer continuing to perform for themselves all the functions necessary for the preservation of their own lives and the

lives of those immediately connected with them, begin to devote themselves to separate kinds of occupation; whence arise the first suggestions of that industrial specialization which has been carried to such an extreme in our own day, and which with every year is tending to become more marked. But one all-important fact must never be lost sight of. These changes along the line of ever-increasing heterogeneity can go on step by step only in combination with corresponding changes along the line of ever-increasing integration. The governing agency can assume the labours and responsibilities of oversight, guidance, and direction only by being relieved, to a degree proportionate to the demand of these upon it, of the daily strain of providing for its own wants. In this way alone can the regulative and maintaining agencies become distinct. Similarly with the industrial changes themselves. As soon as any one individual limits himself to the performance of one particular life-sustaining function, for which he may possess unusual aptitude, he must necessarily become dependent upon the rest of the community to the extent of the functions left unfulfilled by him; while he performs certain functions in excess, and thereby benefits others, others must also perform functions in excess for his benefit. Hence, it is clear that if society is to maintain its corporate life, no differentiation can take place without integration; increase of specialization in social changes is not only accompanied by increase of mutual dependence, but is absolutely impossible without it.

From the first stages of social growth to the developments recorded in yesterday's newspaper, what we call progress has everywhere been marked by the same characteristics. All changes in the line of advance have been changes rendering the social structure more complex while increasing its organic unity; and this double-sided movement has by this time gone so far that we are to-day witnessing its effects in the modified inter-relations of the

great nations of the civilized world. The new thought of the solidarity of the human race simply reminds us of the application of the evolutionary principle to the widest possible issues. For not only are the great nations becoming more and more completely specialized and unified within themselves, but the civilized world is itself slowly developing into a vast organic whole, made up of many such highly differentiated but mutually dependent aggregations.

W. H. HUDSON: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.*

20. EVOLUTION.

It is perhaps worth while to notice that, in ethical speculations on the influence of the doctrine of evolution, survival of the fittest is too often taken to mean survival of the physically strongest. This, for instance, is the mistake made by Oliver Luttrell in Sir Walter Besant's *Bell of St. Paul's*; and his reasoning upon the subject is characteristic of a widespread error in general thought. The idea of the preservation of altruistic instincts by the selection of the groups in which these are strongest, and of the development of clan-sympathies and paternal feelings through the part these play in social evolution, never seems to enter the popular mind. Nor is the great fact commonly recognized that the qualities which ensure the survival of a society may not be of advantage to the individual, except that indirectly he gains or suffers with the group of which he is a unit.

W. H. HUDSON: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.*

21. DUTY.

The marvellous efficacy of duty in edifying and giving peace to the soul is the explanation of a phenomenon common enough in the history of philosophy—I mean the

apparent contradiction* which presents itself in the number of noble minds who have believed in virtue alone. When the Aristotle of modern times—Kant—applied the axe of criticism to the very root of human intelligence, resolved to stop before† that which was absolutely free from doubt, he found nothing clear but duty. Before that supreme revelation doubt was not possible to him. On the sole basis of the moral science, the inflexible critic reconstructed all that which he had at first overthrown; God, religion, liberty, which reason had enveloped in contradictions, appeared to him outside the field of controversy in a sweet and pure light, based, not on syllogisms, but on the inflexible needs of human nature, and sheltered from all discussion. This great and daring attitude of the German thinker is the history of all those who have traversed incessantly the whole circle of thought. An object of eternal dispute to the dialectician, a clear intuition to the moral sentiment, religion is thus the lot of those who are worthy of it, and who find its demonstration in the welcome voices of their own heart.

ERNEST RENAN *Essays Moral and Critical*
(C. T. Gorham's *French Rationalists*).

22. PROGRESS.

Man is not a divine being except by virtue of his soul. Let him realize in some measure intellectual and moral perfection, and the aim of his existence is attained. Nothing which can help this sublime end is indifferent; but it is a grave error to believe that there is any value in material ameliorations which do not lead to mental and moral progress. Exterior things have no value except by the human sentiments to which they correspond. The most ordinary garden of to-day contains splendid flowers, which were in former times possessed by royalty alone. What matters it if the flowers of the field, just as God made

* Anomaly.

† Only in the presence of.

them, speak better to the heart of man, and reveal a more delicate sentiment of nature ? The women of our days can adorn themselves as queens alone could do in the olden times : what matter if they are neither more beautiful nor more amiable ? The means of enjoyment are refined in a thousand ways and infinitely multiplied : what matters it should ennui and disgust embitter them if the poverty of our fathers was more happy and gay ? Has the progress of intelligence been in proportion to the progress of industry ? . . . Is education conducted on more liberal principles ? Have our characters gained in strength and elevation ? Do we find in the men of our own times more dignity, nobility, and intellectual culture, more faith in their own opinions, more firmness against the seductions of wealth and power ? I make no attempt to answer such questions. I will only say that progress does not consist in these things alone. As far as such progress is accomplished, it will be a slender consolation for well-born souls to have in exchange for the virtues of the past nothing but an augmentation of the means of happiness which does not make us any happier, and an assurance of repose which we still sigh for in vain.

ERNEST RENAN: *Essays Moral and Critical*
(C. T. Gorham's *French Rationalists*).

23. ACTIONS OVERRULED FOR GOOD.

The pure desire for social good does not indeed operate in human affairs unalloyed by egotistic motives, but on the other hand what we call egotistic motives do not act without direction from an involuntary reference to social good — 'involuntary' in the sense that it is so much a matter of course that the individual does not distinguish it from his ordinary state of mind. The most conspicuous modern instance of a man who was instrumental in working great and in some ways beneficial changes in the political order of Europe, from what we should be apt to call the

most purely selfish motives, is Napoleon. Without pretending to analyze these motives precisely, we may say that a leading one was the passion for glory; but if there is to be truth in the statement that this passion governed Napoleon, it must be qualified by the farther statement that the passion was itself governed by social influences, operative on him, from which it derived its particular direction. With all his egotism, his individuality was so far governed by the action of the national spirit in and upon him, that he could only glorify himself in the greatness of France; and though the national spirit expressed itself in an effort after greatness which was in many ways of a mischievous and delusive kind, yet it again had so much of what may be called the spirit of humanity in it, that it required satisfaction in the belief that it was serving mankind. Hence the aggrandizement of France, in which Napoleon's passion for glory satisfied itself, had to take at least the semblance of a deliverance of oppressed peoples, and in taking the semblance it to a great extent performed the reality; at any rate in western Germany and northern Italy, wherever the Code Napoléon was introduced.

It is thus that actions of men, whom in themselves we reckon bad, are 'overruled' for good.

THOMAS HILL GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation.*

24. SELFISH INSTRUMENTS OF GOOD.

Not only must we thus correct our too abstract views of the particular agency of such a man as Napoleon. If we would understand the apparent results of his action, we must bear in mind how much besides his particular agency has really gone to produce them, so far as they were good; how much of unnoticed effort on the part of men obscure because unselfish, how much of silent process in the general heart of man. Napoleon was called the 'armed soldier of revolution', and it was in that character that he rendered what

service he did to men; but the revolution was not the making of him or his likes. Cæsar again we have learnt to regard as a benefactor of mankind, but it was not Cæsar that made the Roman law, through which chiefly or solely the Roman empire became a blessing. The idiosyncrasy, then, of the men who have been most conspicuous in the production of great changes in the condition of mankind, though it has been an essential element in their production, has been so only so far as it has been overborne by influences and directed to ends, which were indeed not external to the men in question—which on the contrary helped to make them inwardly and spiritually what they really were—but which formed no part of their distinguishing idiosyncrasy. If that idiosyncrasy was conspicuously selfish, it was still not through their selfishness that such men contributed to mould the institutions by which nations have been civilized and developed, but through their fitness to act as organs of impulses and ideas which had previously gained a hold on some society of men, and for the realization of which the means and conditions had been preparing quite apart from the action of those who became the most noticeable instruments of their realization.

The assertion, then, that an idea of social good is represented by, or realized in, the formation of states, is not to be met by pointing to selfishness and bad passions of men who have been instrumental in forming them, if there is reason to think that the influences, under the direction of which these passions became thus instrumental, are due to the action of such an idea. And when we speak thus we do not refer to any action of the idea otherwise than in the consciousness of men. It may be legitimate, as we have seen, to consider ideas as existing and acting otherwise, and perhaps, on thinking the matter out, we should find ourselves compelled to regard the idea of social good as a communication to the human consciousness, a consciousness developing itself in time, from an eternally

complete consciousness. But here we are considering it as a source of the moral action of men, and therefore necessarily as having its seat in their consciousness, and the proposition advanced is that such an idea is a determining element in the consciousness of the most selfish men who have been instrumental in the formation or maintenance of states; that only through its influence in directing and controlling their actions could they be so instrumental; and that, though its active presence in their consciousness is due to the institutions, the organization of life, under which they are born and bred, the existence of those institutions is in turn due to the action, under other conditions, of the same idea in the minds of men.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of
Political Obligation.*

25. DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS.

For the convenience of analysis, we may treat the obligations correlative to rights, obligations which it is the proper office of law to enforce, apart from moral duties and from the virtues which are tendencies to fulfil those duties. I am properly *obliged* to those actions and forbearances which are necessary to the general freedom, necessary if each is not to interfere with the realization of another's will. My *duty* is to be interested positively in my neighbour's well-being. And it is important to understand that, while the enforcement of obligations is possible, that of moral duties is impossible. But the establishment of obligations by law or authoritative custom, and the gradual recognition of moral duties, have not been separate processes. They have gone on together in the history of man. The growth of the institutions by which more complete equality of rights is gradually secured to a wider range of persons, and of those interests in various forms of social well-being by which the will is moralized, have been related to each other as the outer and inner side of the same

spiritual development, though at a certain stage of reflection it comes to be discovered that the agency of force, by which the rights are maintained, is ineffectual for eliciting the moral interests. The result of the twofold process has been the creation of the actual content of morality; the articulation* of the definite consciousness that there is something that should be (a true well-being to be aimed at other than any pleasure or succession of pleasures) into the sentiments and interests which form an 'enlightened conscience'. It is thus that when the highest stage of reflective morality is reached, and upon interests in this or that mode of social good there supervenes an interest in an ideal of goodness, that ideal has already a definite filling; and the man who pursues duty for duty's sake, who does good for the sake of being good or in order to realize an idea of perfection, is at no loss to say what in particular his duty is, or by what particular methods the perfection of character is to be approached.

T. H. GREEN: *The Principles of Political Obligation.*

26. THE STATE DIVIDED.

The existence of competing powers, each affecting to control men in the same region of outward action, and each having partisans who regard it alone as entitled to exercise such control, implies that there is not that unity of supreme control over the outward actions of men which constitutes sovereignty and which is necessary to the complete organization of a state. The state has either not reached complete organization, or is for the time disorganized, the disorganization being more or less serious according to the degree to which the everyday rights of men (their ordinary freedom of action and acquisition) are interfered with by this want of unity in the supreme control.

In such a state of things, the citizen has no rule of 'right' (in the strict sense of the word) to guide him.

* Development.

He is pretty sure to think that one or other of the competing powers has a right to his obedience because, being himself interested (not necessarily selfishly interested) in its support, he does not take account of its lacking that general recognition as a power necessary to the common good, which is requisite in order to give it a right. But we looking back may see that there was no such right. Was there then nothing to direct him either way? Simply, I should answer, the general rule of looking to the moral good of mankind to which a necessary means is the organization of the state, which again requires unity of supreme control, in the common interest, over the outward actions of men. The citizen ought to have resisted or obeyed either of the competing authorities, according as by so doing he contributed most to the organization of the state in the sense explained. It must be admitted that without more knowledge and foresight than the individual can be expected to possess, this rule, if he had recognized it, could have afforded him no sure guidance; but this is only to say that there are times of political difficulty in which the line of conduct adopted may have the most important effect, but in which it is very hard to know what is the proper line to take. On the other side must be set the consideration that the man who brings with him the character most free from egotism to the decision even of these questions of conduct, as to which established rules of right and wrong are of no avail, is most sure on the whole to take the line which yields the best results.

T. H. GREEN. *The Principles of
Political Obligation.*

27. THE COMMON CITY.

The stoical philosophy was admirably fitted to preside over this extension of sympathies. Although it proved itself in every age the chief school of patriots, it recognized also, from the very first, and in the most unequivocal

manner, the fraternity of mankind. The Stoic taught that virtue alone is a good, and that all other things are indifferent; and from this position he inferred that birth, rank, country, or wealth are the mere accidents of life, and that virtue alone makes one man superior to another. He taught also that the Deity is an all-pervading Spirit, animating the universe, and revealed with especial clearness in the soul of man; and he concluded that all men are fellow-members of a single body, united by participation in the same Divine Spirit. These two doctrines formed part of the very first teaching of the Stoics, but it was the special glory of the Roman teachers, and an obvious result of the condition of affairs I have described, to have brought them into full relief. One of the most emphatic as well as one of the earliest extant assertions of the duty of 'charity to the human race', occurs in the treatise of Cicero upon duties, which was avowedly based upon stoicism. Writing at a period when the movement of amalgamation had for a generation been rapidly proceeding, and adopting almost without restriction the ethics of the Stoics, Cicero maintained the doctrine of universal brotherhood as distinctly as it was afterwards maintained by the Christian Church. 'This whole world', he tells us, 'is to be regarded as the common city of gods and men'. 'Men were born for the sake of men, that each should assist the others'. 'Nature ordains that a man should wish the good of every man, whoever he may be, for this very reason, that he is a man'. 'To reduce man to the duties of his own city, and to disengage him from duties to the members of other cities, is to break the universal society of the human race'. 'Nature has inclined us to love men, and this is the foundation of the law'. The same principles were reiterated with increasing emphasis by the later Stoics. Adopting the well-known line which Terence had translated from Menander, they maintained that man should deem nothing human foreign to his interest. Lucan expatiated with all the

fervour of a Christian poet upon the time when 'the human race will cast aside its weapons, and when all nations will learn to love'. 'The whole universe', said Seneca, 'which you see around you, comprising all things, both divine and human, is one. We are members of one great body. Nature has made us relatives when it begat us from the same materials and for the same destinies. She planted in us a mutual love, and fitted us for a social life'. 'What is a Roman knight, or freedman, or slave? These are but names springing from ambition or from injury'. 'I know that my country is the world, and my guardians are the gods'. 'You are a citizen', said Epicetetus, 'and a part of the world. . . . The duty of a citizen is in nothing to consider his own interest distinct from that of others, as the hand or foot, if they possessed reason and understood the law of nature, would do and wish nothing that had not some relation to the rest of the body'. 'As Antonine', said Marcus Aurelius, 'my country is Rome; as a man, it is the world'.

So far stoicism appears fully equal to the moral requirements of the age. It would be impossible to recognize more cordially or to enforce more beautifully that doctrine of universal brotherhood for which the circumstances of the Roman empire had made men ripe. Plato had said that no one is born for himself alone, but that he owes himself in part to his country, in part to his parents, and in part to his friends. The Roman Stoics, taking a wider survey, declared that man is born not for himself but for the whole world. And their doctrine was perfectly consistent with the original principles of their school.

WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECCKY.
The History of European Morals.

28. STOICISM.

The coarser forms of self-interest were in stoicism absolutely condemned. It was one of the first principles

of these philosophers that all things that are not in our power should be esteemed indifferent; that the object of all mental discipline should be to withdraw the mind from all the gifts of fortune, and that worldly prudence must in consequence be altogether excluded from the motives of virtue. To enforce these principles they continually dilated upon the vanity of human things, and upon the majesty of the independent mind, and they indulged, though scarcely more than other sects, in many exaggerations about the impassive tranquillity of the sage. In the Roman empire stoicism flourished at a period which, beyond almost any other, seemed unfavourable to such teaching. There were reigns when, in the emphatic words of Tacitus, 'virtue was a sentence of death'. In no period had brute force more completely triumphed, in none was the thirst for material advantages more intense, and in very few was vice more ostentatiously glorified. Yet in the midst of all these circumstances the Stoics taught a philosophy which was not a compromise, or an attempt to moderate the popular excesses, but which in its austere sanctity was the extreme antithesis of all that the prevailing examples and their own interests could dictate. And these men were no impassioned fanatics, fired with the prospect of coming glory. They were men from whose motives of action the belief in the immortality of the soul was resolutely excluded. In the scepticism that accompanied the first introduction of philosophy into Rome, in the dissolution of the old fables about Tartarus and the Styx, and the dissemination of Epicureanism among the people, this doctrine, notwithstanding the beautiful reasonings of Cicero and the religious faith of a few who clung like Plutarch to the mysteries in which it was perpetuated, had sunk very low. An interlocutor in Cicero expressed what was probably a common feeling, when he acknowledged that, with the writings of Plato before him, he could believe and realize it; but when he

closed the book, the reasonings seemed to lose their power, and the world of spirits grew pale and unreal. If Ennius could elicit the plaudits of a theatre when he proclaimed that the gods took no part in human affairs, Cæsar could assert in the senate, without scandal and almost without dissent, that death was the end of all things. Pliny, perhaps the greatest of Roman scholars, adopting the sentiment of all the school of Epicurus, describes the belief in a future life as a form of madness, a puerile and pernicious illusion. The opinions of the Stoics were wavering and uncertain. Their first doctrine was that the soul of man has a future and independent, but not an eternal existence, that it survives until the conflagration that was to destroy the world, when all finite things would be absorbed in the all-pervading soul of nature. Chrysippus, however, restricted to the best and noblest souls this future existence, which Cleanthes had awarded to all, and among the Roman Stoics even this was greatly doubted. The belief that the human soul is a detached fragment of the Deity, naturally led to the belief that after death it would be reabsorbed into the parent Spirit. The doctrine that there is no real good but virtue deprived the Stoics of the argument for a future world derived from unrequited merit and unpunished crimes, and the earnestness with which they contended that a good man should act irrespectively of reward, inclined them, as it is said to have inclined some Jewish thinkers, to the denial of the existence of the reward. Panætius, the founder of Roman stoicism, maintained that the soul perished with the body, and his opinion was followed by Epictetus and Cornutus. Seneca contradicted himself on the subject. Marcus Aurelius never rose beyond a vague and mournful aspiration. Those who believed in a future world believed in it faintly and uncertainly, and even when they accepted it as a fact, they shrank from proposing it as a motive. The whole system of social ethics, which carried self-sacrifice to a point that

has scarcely been equalled, and exercised an influence which has rarely been surpassed, was evolved without any assistance from the doctrine of a future life. Pagan antiquity has bequeathed us few nobler treatises of morals than the 'De Officiis'* of Cicero, which was avowedly an expansion of a work of Panætius. It has left us no grander example than that of Epictetus, the sickly, deformed slave of a master who was notorious for his barbarity, enfranchised late in life, but soon driven into exile by Domitian, who, while sounding the very abyss of human misery, and looking forward to death as to simple decomposition, was yet so filled with the sense of the Divine presence that his life was one continued hymn to Providence, and his writings and his example, which appeared to his contemporaries almost the ideal of human goodness, have not lost their consoling power through all the ages and the vicissitudes they have survived.

W. E. H. LECKY: *The History of European Morals.*

29. LAW AND PHILOSOPHY.

A . . . still more important service which stoicism rendered to popular morals was in the formation of Roman jurisprudence. Of all the many forms of intellectual exertion in which Greece and Rome struggled for the mastery this is perhaps the only one in which the superiority of the latter is indisputable. 'To rule the nations' was justly pronounced by the Roman poet the supreme glory of his countrymen, and their administrative genius is even now unrivalled in history. A deep reverence for law was long one of their chief moral characteristics, and in order that it might be inculcated from the earliest years it was a part of the Roman system of education to oblige the children to repeat by rote the code of the decemvirs. The laws of

* On Duties.

the republic, however, being an expression of the contracted, local, military and sacerdotal spirit that dominated among the people, were necessarily unfit for the political and intellectual expansion of the empire, and the process of renovation which was begun under Augustus by the Stoic Labeo, was continued with great zeal under Hadrian and Alexander Severus, and issued in the famous compilations of Theodosius and Justinian. In this movement we have to observe two parts. There were certain general rules of guidance laid down by the great Roman lawyers which constituted what may be called the ideal of the jurisconsults—the ends to which their special enactments tended—the principles of equity to guide the judge when the law was silent or ambiguous. There were also definite enactments to meet specific cases. The first part was simply borrowed from the Stoics, whose doctrines and methods thus passed from the narrow circle of a philosophic academy, and became the avowed moral beacons of the civilized globe. The fundamental difference between stoicism and early Roman thought was that the former maintained the existence of a bond of unity among mankind which transcended or annihilated all class or national limitations. The essential characteristic of the stoical method was the assertion of the existence of a certain law of nature to which it was the end of philosophy to conform. These tenets were laid down in the most unqualified language by the Roman lawyers. ‘As far as natural law is concerned’, said Ulpian, ‘all men are equal’. ‘Nature’, said Paul, ‘has established among us a certain relationship’. ‘By natural law’, Ulpian declared, ‘all men are born free’. ‘Slavery’ was defined by Florentinus as ‘a custom of the law of nations, by which one man, contrary to the law of nature is subjected to the dominion of another’. In accordance with these principles it became a maxim among the Roman lawyers that in every doubtful case where the alternative of slavery or freedom was at

issue, the decision of the judge should be towards the latter.

The Roman legislation was in a twofold manner the child of philosophy. It was in the first place itself formed upon the philosophical model, for, instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to the existing requirements of society, it laid down absolute principles of right to which it endeavoured to conform; and, in the next place, these principles were borrowed directly from Stoicism. The prominence the sect had acquired among Roman moralists, its active intervention in public affairs, and also the precision and brevity of its phraseology, had recommended it to the lawyers, and the union then effected between the legal and philosophical spirit is felt to the present day. To the Stoics and the Roman lawyers, is mainly due the clear recognition of the existence of a law of nature above and beyond all human enactments which has been the basis of the best moral and of the most influential though most chimerical political speculation of later ages, and the renewed study of Roman law was an important element in the revival that preceded the Reformation.

W. E. H. LECKY: *The History of European Morals.*

30. PREPARATION FOR DEATH.

Men who had formed such high conceptions of duty, who had bridled so completely the tumult of passion, and whose lives were spent in a calm sense of virtue and of dignity, were little likely to be assailed by the superstitious fears that are the nightmare of weaker men. The preparation for death was deemed one of the chief ends of philosophy. The thought of a coming change assisted the mind in detaching itself from the gifts of fortune, and the extinction of all superstitious terrors completed the type of self-reliant majesty which stoicism had chosen for its ideal. But while it is certain that no philosophers expatiated upon

death with a grander eloquence, or met it with a more placid courage, it can hardly be denied that their constant disquisitions forced it into an unhealthy prominence, and somewhat discoloured their whole view of life. 'The Stoics', as Bacon has said, 'bestowed too much cost on death, and by their preparations made it more fearful'. There is a profound wisdom in the maxims of Spinoza, that 'the proper study of a wise man is not how to die, but how to live', and that 'there is no subject on which the sage will think less than death'. A life of active duty is the best preparation for the end, and so large a part of the evil of death lies in its anticipation, that an attempt to deprive it of its terrors by constant meditation almost necessarily defeats its object, while at the same time it forms an unnaturally tense, feverish, and tragical character, annihilates the ambition and enthusiasm that are essential to human progress, and not unfrequently casts a chill and a deadness over the affections.

Among the many half-pagan legends that were connected with Ireland during the middle ages, one of the most beautiful is that of the islands of life and death. In a certain lake in Munster, it is said there were two islands; into the first death could never enter, but age and sickness, and the weariness of life, and the paroxysms of fearful suffering were all known there, and they did their work till the inhabitants, tired of their immortality, learned to look upon the opposite island as a haven of repose: they launched their barks upon its gloomy waters; they touched its shores and they were at rest.

This legend, which is far more akin to the spirit of paganism than to that of Christianity, and is in fact only another form of the myth of Tithonus, represents with great fidelity the aspect in which death was regarded by the exponents of stoicism.

W. E. H. LECKY: *The History of
European Morals.*

31. FORGIVENESS.

Aristotle is inclined to regard forgiveness as a form of weakness, but allied to virtue in so far as it involves resistance to passion. The ground of Christian forgiveness is very different. The duty of it follows partly of course from a consideration of the common human nature which the offender shares with the injured; partly also from a dispassionate view of the injury inflicted. In exercising forgiveness we suppress that false self-love or partiality which magnifies a private injury. The Christian loves himself *not more* than he loves his neighbour. He can put himself in the offender's place, and consider what is for his highest good. He will not allow the sense of injury to interfere with, or override the exercise of good-will even towards enemies. Certainly, the sense of his own moral frailty, and of his indebtedness to Divine mercy, will restrain the Christian from vindictiveness or harshness in regard to the faults of others; while the fact of the equality of men in relation to their common Father invests even the anti-social sinner with the dignity of brotherhood.

R. L. OTTLEY: *Christian Ethics* (in *Lux Mundi*, edited by Bishop Gore).

32. PROPERTY.

Christianity is certainly not pledged to uphold any particular form of property as such. Whether property had better be held by individuals, or by small groups, as in the case of the primitive Teutonic villages, or of the modern Russian or Indian village communities, or again by the State, as is the proposal of Socialists, is a matter for experience and common sense to decide. But where Christian ethics steps in is, firstly, to shew that property is secondary not primary, a means and not an end. Thus, in so far as Socialism looks to the moral regeneration of society by a merely mechanical alteration of the distribution of the

products of industry or of the mode of holding property, it has to be reminded that a change of heart and will is the only true starting-point of moral improvement. On the other hand, it cannot be too often asserted that the accumulation of riches is not in itself a good at all. Neither riches nor property make men better in themselves. Their effect on character depends on the use made of them, though no doubt the responsibility of those who have property is greater, because they have one instrument the more for the purposes of life. And so, secondly, Christianity urges that *if* there is private property, its true character as a trust shall be recognized, its rights respected and its attendant duties performed. These truths it keeps steadily before men's eyes by the perpetual object-lesson of the life of the early Church of Jerusalem, in which those who had property sold it, and brought the proceeds and laid them at the Apostles' feet, and distribution was made unto every man according to his needs, an object-lesson enforced and renewed by the example of the monastic communities, with their vow of voluntary poverty, and their common purse. So strongly did the early Fathers insist on the duty, almost the debt, of the rich to the poor, that isolated passages may be quoted which read like a condemnation of all private property, but this was not their real drift. The obligation which they urged was the obligation of charity.

W. J. H. CAMPION: *Christianity and Politics*
(in *Lux Mundi*, edited by Bishop Gore).

33. SOLIDARITY AND FREEDOM.

Impossible and even absurd as socialistic schemes generally are, it is Socialism in some form or other alone that evinces any consciousness of the deepened solidarity of modern citizenship, or dreams of a constructive statesmanship that will fit its exigencies. Its gravest error of all probably is that its attention has so far been confined to

impracticable changes in economic conditions; and that there is little consciousness of the need of the ethical change which would make these conditions tolerable. It is not seen that a socialized State brought upon a people morally unprepared would be the deepest calamity any nation could be called upon to meet. No State requires governors so enlightened or so unselfish as the State in which all are governors. A genuine democracy demands the highest civic virtues, with the alternative of the deepest and most irremediable civic tragedy; for the actions of the citizens of such a State are scanned only by themselves, and the only critics their deeds can have are the consequences which follow from them.

Thus, then, the expansion of the range of ethical responsibility; the greater complexity of the modern State; the deeper implication of the lives of the individual citizens therein; the increase of the variety of its functions, and therefore in its capacity either for mischief or for good; its more democratic character, which subjects it only to its own caprice and with the removal of external restraints makes inner restraint imperative; the irrelevance of the Individualism of the past to its more highly organic character, and the impractical and un-ethical character of the Socialism of the present—all these things taken together constitute a reason, which is also a necessity, for the more earnest questioning of our ideals of life.

Nor is it difficult to believe that the only ideals which can sustain, and be sustained by, the new conditions of greater social solidarity, are those which inspire that social solidarity which leaves its members free. Nothing can save the highly-organized and many-functioned States of the future from being the most remorseless and ubiquitous of tyrannies except the consciousness of fellowship and brotherhood amongst its members and free devotion to its welfare.

34. FREEDOM AND SERVICE.

Such freedom as this—the freedom of perfect service—has hardly become the conscious purpose of any modern State so far. Our most generous political impulses, so far, have too often as their aim the freedom which is Emancipation, and which is only the alphabet of true liberty. The spirit of our most revolutionary socialism is, as a matter of fact, deeply tainted with the selfishness of Individualism. The aspiration is still to endow individuals with the right and power to hold their own. Nor is this wrong. Has not the lowest life the task of maintaining itself against the whole environing world, and of preventing forces which are foreign from invading the sanctuary of its inner being? Negation, resistance against, and the exclusion of, all that is alien, is a necessary condition of the humblest individuality. Without this self-assertion and repulsion, nothing could live *its own* life. But these forces reach their crisis in the life of Spirit. Mind ruthlessly excludes, nay reduces into meaninglessness and nonentity, all that refuses to bend to its yoke. What Spirit does not know or purpose is as good as nothing for it: things come *to be* for it in acquiring meaning.

But the freedom which is merely freedom *from* the world is, we say, only a preliminary stage of true liberty. The man who makes most of his detached and irresponsible personality is not free, but capricious. He is unjust to himself, for the capricious spirit is the least rational; his pure independence is utter weakness, and he is ungrateful to the world. The objective order, physical and social, against whose necessities he is in revolt, and from which he desires to be free, is the world which has nourished him. The laws and institutions he would overthrow, the State which he would overturn—or, what is worse and more common amongst both classes and masses, ruthlessly use as mere means of private ends—have been to him a shelter

and a refuge. But in their ardour for emancipation and the energy of the assertion of their Individuality men do not remember this. The Church may have fostered learning, cherished the virtues, shed the light of eternity on the things of time; the State may have founded freedom, instituted and protected every right of person and property that the individual can claim or seek to enhance—all this is forgotten. When the Spirit of Individualism is abroad the stable strength and the unobtrusive benevolence of the ancient authorities seem to be in the way, a standing obstacle to the one thing which is now desired, namely freedom. The cry at such periods is for Emancipation. The motto is 'Let me be', 'Laissez faire; laissez aller'.

SIR HENRY JONES: *Idealism as a Practical Creed.*

35. THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION.

Man *finds* his true ideas: his making of them is the finding. Every valid invention is also a discovery. The ideas which have power over the world, are the powers of the world; and the poet, philosopher or statesman only sets them free. Hence, when man's history is truly written, written from within, what we shall read is not the succession of one Royal House to another—of the House of Hanover to the House of Stuart, or of the House of Stuart to the Tudors and Plantagenets: we shall witness, rather, the succession of dynasties of ideas, liberated, set on the throne of the age of which they are the natural rulers, by the great minds which have caught the first glimpse of them. For generations, and sometimes for centuries together, such conceptions direct the thoughts and purposes of the general mind; and they do so with a power so absolute that their presence is not suspected, for they have insinuated themselves into the very disposition of the men whom they control.

Such absolute, such subtle dominion is exercised by the idea of Evolution in our own day. There is no science,

from Geology to Theology, which does not contemplate the object of its enquiry in its light. The old static, cataclysmic way of regarding objects is well-nigh obsolete. We do not consider that we understand anything rightly—nor plant, nor animal, nor man, nor even the fixed strata of the earth's crust, or the planet itself—till we can indicate its place in a process. The whole order of Nature is in movement for modern science. On the level of biology, and thence upwards, it is a grand march, the process onwards of one inexhaustible life, multitudinous in its energy, within which every individual form has its own particular place. Poetry, and philosophy, and even theology when it has the courage of its cause, take up the tale of natural science and continue it. They proclaim that the whole Scheme of spirit is also in movement: the psychologist, moralist and sociologist but mark its steps, explaining, or striving to explain, all things by what they were and are about to be. Thus the history of mankind presents itself, through the medium of this conception of development, which finds the past in the present and first of all the future, as the gradual unveiling of a purpose which is universal and therefore omnipresent—a purpose which overcomes the discrete distinctions of time even while maintaining them, and, like the Snake of the Ancients, is coiled round the changing order of the world of reality, and has neither beginning nor end.

In a word, the Idea of Evolution is the lord of all our present thinking—the subtle presupposition which suffuses all our endeavour, whether in the sphere of knowledge or in that of social and moral practice. It is the author of our very temperament, and determines the mental disposition of our times. It has given to the modern age its characteristic ways of action, and unique features, making our era distinct and distinguishable amongst the ages of the world in all its thinking and striving, whether in science or in philosophy, in morals or in politics, in poetry or in religion.

Now, it is customary to attribute the first use of this Idea of Evolution to Charles Darwin. In a narrow sense this is just. Darwin was the first to apply it in a great way in one particular field. He did so with such mastering power of observation and scientific imagination as to arrest the attention and compel the belief of the general mind. His success, in his own relatively confined department, facilitated the application of this idea to others, and gave to it concrete form and convincing force.

But the idea was working powerfully in the world before the days of Darwin. To trace it no further—to ignore its use by Aristotle, who is the source of so many of the ideas of modern science—the conception was not only familiar to the poet-philosophers of Germany, to Lessing and Goethe, to Kant and Hegel, to Fichte and Schelling and Schiller, it constituted, one may almost say, the medium through which they observed the world and by which they sought to arrange its phenomena in a rational order. In it, and in the Idealism which it implied for them, in one form or another, was their sole hope of overcoming the dualisms into which the world had fallen, and of breaking down the hard contradictions which harassed modern civilization.

But it is vain to seek the first beginnings of a great conception, not less vain than to seek to mark the first beginnings of the blossom of a tree, which is as old as the life that it expresses and adorns. There are no absolute origins in a continuous world. These poets and philosophers themselves found the conception of Evolution to their hand; they only liberated it from the mass of modern history within which it was operative. When they arrived the world was already endeavouring to escape from the harsh contrasts and to break down the intolerable antagonisms of the Middle Age, which had set the next world against this, spirit against nature, the sacred against the secular.

36. LAWS.

Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for the social state of man; or knowing, always able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private, but with public, good—for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them; nor do men always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and the state, when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this principle or to persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. Yet these look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them.

37. THE SCALE OF RANKS.

Speak, he said, and fear not.

Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be informed that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were in process of formation and nourishment in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; and when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.

I think, he said, that you did well to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

Nay, I replied, there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and these He has composed of gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has made of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as you are of the same original family, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims to the rulers, as a first principle, that above all they should watch over their offspring, and see what elements mingle in their nature; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not

be pitiful towards his child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be others sprung from the artisan class who are raised to honour and become guardians and auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; I do not see any way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another.

PLATO · *The Republic* (B. Jowett).

38. THE SHIP OF STATE.

Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. Now the sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering; every one is of opinion that he ought to steer, though he has never learned and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will even assert that the art of navigation cannot be taught, and is ready to cut in pieces him who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, and do all that they can to make him commit the helm to them; and if he refuses them and others prevail, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's sense with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make themselves at home with the stores; and thus, eating and drinking, they continue their voyage with such success as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and zealous in the design of getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own, whether

by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man and call him a good-for-nothing; but they have not even a notion that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship; while at the same time he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not; and they think that to combine the exercise of command with the steerer's art is impossible.* Now in vessels which are thus circumstanced and among sailors of this class, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by the mutineers a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

I do not suppose, I said, that you would care to hear the interpretation of the figure, which is an allegory of the true philosopher in his relation to the State, for you understand already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take the parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities, and explain to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best of the votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but he ought to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature; neither are the wise to go to the doors of the rich (the ingenious author of this saying told a lie), for the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, he must go to the physician's door—the physician will not come† to him—

* See lines 6-10 of the passage.

† Come first.

and he who is asking to be governed, to the door of him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to ask his subjects to obey him; he is not like the present governors of mankind, who may be compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsman to those whom they call good-for-nothings and star-gazers.

Precisely, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by her adversaries; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by them, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

PLATO: *The Republic* (B. Jowett).

39. THE DEN AND THE UPPER WORLD.

And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:—Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; they have been here from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them; for the chains are arranged in such a manner as to prevent them from turning round their heads.* Above and behind them the light of a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall, some apparently talking and others silent, carrying vessels, and various materials, which appear over the wall?

* To the light.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall* of the cave ?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads ?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows ?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to talk with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them ?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side,† would they not be sure to fancy that the voice which they heard was that of a passing shadow ?

No question, he replied.

Beyond question, I said, the truth would be to them just nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see how they are released and cured of their folly. At first, when any one of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to turn his neck round and go up and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then imagine some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being,‡ and has a truer sight and vision of more real things—what will be his reply ? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them—will he not be

* The wall at the back. † The back of the cave. ‡ Truth.

in a difficulty ? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him ?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him ?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, do you not think that he will be pained and irritated, and when he approaches the light he will have his eyes dazzled, and will not be able to see any of the realities which are now affirmed to be the truth ?

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by the day ?

Certainly.

And at last he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him as he is in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate his nature.

Certainly.

And after this he will reason that the sun is he who gives the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold ?

Clearly, he said, he would come to the other first and to this afterwards.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them ?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours on those who were quickest to observe and remember and foretell which of the shadows when they moved went before, and which followed after, and which were together, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them ? Would he not say with Homer,

‘ Better to be a poor man, and have a poor master ’,

and endure anything, rather than to think and live after their manner ?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than live after their manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation ; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness ?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous ? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes ; and that there was no use in even thinking of ascending ; and if any tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append to the previous argument; the prison is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, the ascent and vision of the things above you may truly regard as the upward progress of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God only knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of Good appears last of all,* and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other; and is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

PLATO: *The Republic* (B. Jowett).

40. LOOKING FOR A REWARD.

The martyr or sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in raptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended only by a painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediæval saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catherine of Sienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the 'sweets' of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and enough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach,

* As the Sun in the allegory.

in that hour. If he were certain that there were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to be a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot pass away, is his who has not known, but yet who has believed. A very few among the sons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present, or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already present with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of immortality; he has in him already a principle stronger than death. He who serves man without the thought of reward is deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the world's history—Christ Himself being one of them—have attained to such a noble conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology.

B. JOWETT. *Introduction to*
Plato's 'Gorgias'.

41. THE THEORY OF UTILITY.

Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters:—
'That which alone makes actions either right or desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all pleasures are not the same: they

differ in quality as well as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others—of our family, of our country, of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every other'.

Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this sense of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of being greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent with religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all His creatures? and in working out their happiness we may be said to be 'working together with Him'. Nor is it inconceivable that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a conception.

But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle', it seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle', 'the happiness of others principle'—the principle not of the greatest, but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own immediate interest than is required by the law of self-

preservation. Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others', all the associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man must live before he can do good to others, still the last limitation is a very trifling exception, and the happiness of another is very far from compensating for the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the principle of utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and their followers imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are alike superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great sufferer.

And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time so practical—so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration—and which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato 'grew old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms of man-

kind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for which they are ready to contend to their life's end.

And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of Eudoxus and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; while among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found unequal to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are removed from the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. The world was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason for admiring them than for depreciating them. Nor can anyone doubt that the influence of their philosophy on politics—especially on foreign politics, on law, on social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will never have justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name received with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the last. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this.

While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a part—to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable aspect of the truth. The systems of all the philosophers require the criticism of 'the morrow', when the heat of imagination which forged them has cooled, and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to them.

B. JOWETT: *Introduction to
Plato's 'Philebus'.*

42. THE IDEA OF GOOD.

The idea of Good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought which were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power by which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason divested of a human personality. It was the life as well as the light of the world; all knowledge and all power were comprehended

in it. The way to it was through the mathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could be conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God of the *Timæus* is not really at variance with the idea of good; they are aspects of the same, differing only as the personal from the impersonal, or the masculine from the neuter; the one being the expression or language of mythology, the other of philosophy.

This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly and at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some conception of the kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly have recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and tentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his meaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him into the language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his disciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them.

B. JOWETT: *Introduction to
Plato's 'Republic'.*

43. THE STATE.

The association composed of several villages in its complete form is the state, in which the goal of full independence may be said to be first attained. For as the State was formed to make life possible, so it exists to make life good. Consequently if it be allowed that the simple associations, *i.e.*, the household and the village, have a natural existence, so has the State in all cases; for in the State they attain complete development, and Nature implies complete development, as the nature of anything, *e.g.*, of a man, a house, or a horse, may be defined to be its condition when the process of production is complete. Or the naturalness of the State may be proved in another way; the object proposed or the complete development of a thing is its highest Good; but independence, which is first attained in the State, is complete development or the highest Good and is therefore natural.

Thus we see that the State is a natural institution, that Man is naturally a political animal and that one who is not a citizen of any State, if the cause of his isolation be natural and not accidental, is either a superhuman being or low in the scale of civilization, as he stands alone like a 'blot' on the backgammon board. The 'clanless, lawless, heartless' man so bitterly described by Homer is a case in point; for he is naturally a citizen of no state and a lover of war.

ARISTOTLE: *Politics* (J. E. C. Welldon).

44. A POLITICAL ANIMAL.

Man is naturally a political animal, and consequently, even where there is no need of mutual service, men are none the less anxious to live together. Still it cannot be denied that the common advantage of all is also a motive of union, more or less operative according to the degree in

which each individual is capable of the higher life. Although to the citizens, both collectively and individually this higher life is emphatically the end proposed, yet life itself is also an object for which they unite and maintain the corporate political association; for it is probable that some degree of the higher life is necessarily implied in merely living, unless there is a great preponderance of hardship in the life.

ARISTOTLE *Politics* (J. E. C. Weldon).

45. FRIENDSHIP.

Hence it would seem that, when we are in prosperity, we cannot be too ready to summon our friends to share our good fortune—for to confer benefits upon others is a noble thing—but that we ought to be slow to call upon them to share our misfortunes, inasmuch as we ought to do all that we can to avoid inflicting upon others any portion of our own ills. And hence has come the saying, ‘one head is enough for trouble’. But the most fitting time of all for a man to summon his friends, is when it is in their power to do him a great service with but little trouble to themselves. And so, too, the most fitting time for a man to seek his friends is when they are in distress; and he should seek them with all zeal and willingness, and without waiting to be asked. For friendship shows itself in doing good to others, and especially to those who are in need—and above all, in doing good to those who have not claimed such assistance as their right; for this last is not only more noble for both, but also more pleasant. But, when a man’s friends are in prosperity, then he ought readily to go to them, if he can in any way aid them in their good fortune—for even in prosperity friends can be of good service; but he should be slow to offer himself to share in their comforts—for to be over eager to receive a benefit is not noble. Not but that we ought to take heed lest, by rejecting favours, we gain a reputation for churlishness:

for this not unfrequently happens. Thus, then, it is evident that, under all circumstances alike, the presence of friends is a desirable thing.

ARISTOTLE: *Nicomachean Ethics* (R. Williams).

46. FRIENDSHIP.

It is those who wish well to their friend for his own sake who have the highest claim to the title of friend, inasmuch as the friendship of such exists and is felt by them for the sake of their friends alone, and not as an indirect result of any form of self-seeking. And, consequently, the friendship of such men will last as long as they themselves remain virtuous; and virtue is an abiding thing. In a friendship of this kind each of the two friends is good, both in the highest and most abstract sense of being virtuous, and in the lower and particular sense of being serviceable to his friend: for good men are not only good in the abstract sense of the word, but are also of service to one another. And they are also pleasant after the same fashion: for the good are not only pleasant in the highest sense of the word, but are also pleasant in the particular sense of being pleasant to one another. Indeed, each man takes pleasure primarily in his own acts; and, secondarily, in all acts which are of a like nature to his own; and the acts of good men, if not absolutely identical, are at any rate most closely similar. A friendship of this kind is, as might be expected, a lasting thing, inasmuch as in it are united all those requisites which are essential if men are to be really and truly friends.

ARISTOTLE: *Nicomachean Ethics* (R. Williams).

47. FRIENDSHIP.

It is a safe rule not to strive to have as many friends as is absolutely possible, but rather to be content with such a number that it becomes possible for us to pass our life

in their society. And, indeed, it would seem that it is impossible for a man to feel a strong friendship for many friends at once, exactly as it is impossible to feel love for more than one. Love, indeed, may be defined as friendship pushed to its absolute limit, and so can only be felt for one. And, similarly, for friendship to be strong, it must only be felt for a few. To all this it would seem that witness is borne by facts. For it is but seldom that a brotherhood in arms has many members; and, wherever such a friendship has become famous in story, it has always been between two. As for those who are men of many friends, and who are upon intimate terms with all those whom they meet, it would seem that they are not really the friends of any one, except in so far as to move in the same society may be held to constitute friendship. Men of this kind are called over-polite. Not but that it is, of course, quite possible to show all the courtesies of society to any number of persons, and yet, at the same time, not to carry politeness to excess, but to maintain a proper self-respect. But that friendship which is based upon virtue, and in which we love our friend for his own sake, cannot possibly be felt for many. And so, if a man find but a few such friends, he must rest content.

ARISTOTLE: *Nicomachean Ethics* (R. Williams).

48. SERVICE.

Let not such calculations as these oppress thee—‘I shall go through life unhonoured, and shall be nobody anywhere’. For if the lack of honour is indeed an evil, remember on the other hand that thou canst not really fall into evil through another’s action, any more than thou canst fall into wickedness. Then does it depend on thee to obtain a governorship, or to be invited to banquets?—‘Certainly not’.—Then how is the absence of these things a lack of honour? And how shalt thou not be anybody anywhere, whom it behoves to be somebody only in those

things which are in thine own control,* things in which it is in thy power to be worthy in the highest degree ?

‘But’, says one, ‘in this way thy friends will be left unhelpt’.—What meanest thou by unhelpt?—‘They will not have money from thee; neither wilt thou make them Roman citizens’.—But who told thee that matters of this kind were amongst the things which are in our control, and were not another’s business? And who can give to another that which he has not himself?—‘Acquire possessions then’, say they, ‘so that we may have’.—If I can obtain possessions whilst keeping myself modest, faithful, and magnanimous, show me the way and I will obtain them. But if you, my friends, require me to lose my own good, in order that you may store up things which are not good, see, how unfair and ill-judging you are! Which do you prefer; money, or a faithful, modest friend? Then help me rather to this end, and do not require me to do those very things through which I should lose it.

‘But in this way,’ says one, ‘so far as lies with me, my country will receive no help’.—Once more, of what sort is this help? The country will get no public colonnades or baths from thee. And what of that? Neither does she get shoes from the copper-smith, or arms from the shoe-maker; but it is sufficient if each man fulfils his own work. And if thou shouldst fashion for her one more citizen, faithful and modest, wouldst thou not have done her a service?—‘Yes’.—Then thou wouldst not be of no benefit to her.

‘But’, says one, ‘what place shall I have in the State?’—Whatsoever place thou art able to hold, whilst keeping at the same time good faith and modesty. And if in thy wish to benefit thy country thou lose these, what advantage wouldst thou be to her, ending without modesty and without faith?

EPICTETUS: *Manual*.

* See No. 49.

49. THE NOTION OF GOOD.

What then is it to be educated ? It is to learn to apply general ideas (such as our natural notion of the good) to particular things in a manner that is consistent with nature ; and, further, to discern that of existing things some are in our control, and other are not in our control. In our control are the will and all works of the will ; not in our control are the body and its parts, our possessions, and parents, brothers, children, country, in short all those with whom we are associated. Where then should we place the good ? To what kind of thing shall we apply the general idea of the good ? To that which is in our control. — ‘ Then is health not a good, or fitness, or life, or children, parents, or country ? And who will bear with thee if thou maintainest such doctrines ? ’ — Let us then place it here again in these things which are not in our control. Is it, then, conceivable that one who suffers harm and fails to obtain the good is happy ? — ‘ It is not conceivable ’. — And how is it conceivable that he should deal as he ought with his associates ? For I, like all men, am formed by nature for my advantage. If it is of real advantage to me to own land, it is also of advantage for me to take it from my neighbour ; if it is of real advantage for me to have a cloak, it is also of advantage to me to steal it from the baths. Hence come wars, rebellions, tyrannies, and plots. And how, further, shall I be able to keep my duty towards Zeus ? For if I am harmed and suffer misfortune, he evidently does not regard me. And I shall begin to say, what is he to me, if he is not able to help me ; and again, what is he to me, if he wishes me to be in such plight as I am in ? I begin, in short, to hate him. What then, I shall be saying, do we make temples and statues for Zeus as they do for spirits of evil, such as Fever ; and how then is he still the Saviour, how the Rain-bringer,

and the Fruit-giver? And indeed, if we place the substance of the good in any such external things, all these consequences follow.

EPICETUS. *Discourses.*

50. ATTRACTION.

All things which share any common quality hasten towards that which is like in kind. Everything which is earthly inclines towards the earth, everything liquid flows together, and everything aerial likewise, so that they need some kind of force to keep them asunder. . . . So also everything with a share of the common thinking nature hastens in like manner towards that which is akin to it, or even more so. For by how much it is more excellent than the rest, by so much is it the readier to mingle and be fused with that which is intimately allied to it. Straightway then among things without reason were found the swarm, and herds, and the rearing of young, and a kind of love; for now in them there were souls, and attraction was found heightened in them, such as was neither in plants, nor in stocks, nor in stones. But among rational beings there are politics, with friendships, and households, and assemblies, and, even in war, treaties and truces. And among beings still better, even though they exist separately from one another in a manner, unity is found, such as subsists among the stars. Thus the ascent to the more excellent was able to produce sympathy even in those which have their existence apart. See then what happens now. For thinking beings alone have now forgotten this hastening together and consent, and only here is that flowing together not seen. But nevertheless even though trying to escape from it they are overtaken; for nature prevails, and thou wilt see that which I say, if thou wilt watch. For sooner will one find something earthly attached to no other earthly thing ~~than a man split off from men.~~

MARCUS AURELIUS: *Meditations.*